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Abstract 
 
In my thesis I address questions in applied microeconomics within two topic areas: the first is 
the effect of news media on perceptions and political outcomes; the second is labour allocation 
and internal migration decision making in developing country settings.  
In the second chapter I exploit a unique natural experiment occurred in the Italian television 
market - the staggered timing of the digital TV signal introduction - to study the influence of 
information provided by partisan news media on the perceptions individuals hold, focusing on 
perceptions about crime. Combining unique data on each channel’s crime news coverage and 
prime-time viewing shares, I find that reduced exposure to crime-related news decreased 
concerns about crime and did so mainly for older individuals who, on average, watch more 
television and use alternative sources of information less frequently. I also provide evidence of 
potential effects on voting.  
In the third chapter I study the relation between household migration decisions and the 
distribution of risk attitudes within a household in a rural-developing country setting. I do so 
by developing and testing - with data from internal migrants and their family members left 
behind in rural China - a household model of migration decision with heterogeneous risk 
preferences. Findings suggest that risk attitudes of household members other than the migrant 
affect not only individual migrations but also whether a household sends a migrant at all.  
In the fourth chapter I analyse if and in what measure individuals and households in rural 
China reallocate labour across sectors in response to agricultural productivity shocks. I match 
panel data of individual and household labour supply histories with detailed weather 
information, which I use to proxy agricultural productivity. Results suggest that farming is 
reduced and urban sector employment increased in response to negative rainfall shocks, both 
along the intensive and the participation margin; that responses are heterogeneous across age; 
and that land tenure insecurity might partially prevent households from freely reallocating 
labour away from farming. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
In my thesis I address questions in applied microeconomics within two topic areas: the first is 
the role of news media in shaping perceptions and political outcomes (chapter 2); the second is 
household and individual decision making about internal migration and labour allocation in 
developing country settings (chapters 3 and 4).   
The first topic relates to the growing interest economists have in understanding the influence 
of media on beliefs, perceptions and behaviours. As Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2010) argue, 
the efficiency of democratic and economic systems ultimately depends on the accuracy of 
individual beliefs. Yet, such accuracy is often hindered because of many reasons, among them 
the fact that a large share of information is provided by intermediaries – such as television, 
newspaper, or Internet - who might themselves have some interest in the receivers’ behaviour. 
The second chapter of this thesis (based on joint work with Nicola Mastrorocco) investigates 
precisely the influence on news media on beliefs and perceptions individuals hold, with a focus 
on crime perceptions. We do so by focusing on the case of Italy, a country where the majority 
of TV channels have been under the influence of the former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi 
for more than a decade. In the first part of the chapter we document the existence of a potential 
bias in the number of crime news reported by the Berlusconi-influenced TV channels. We then 
test if individuals revise their perceptions about crime once exposure to these channels is 
reduced. In order to identify the causal effect, we exploit a natural experiment in the Italian 
television market where the introduction of the digital TV signal led to a drastic and sudden 
drop in the viewing shares of partisan channels. Exploiting the staggered timing of such 
introduction, and combining unique data on each channel’s crime news coverage and prime-
time viewing shares, we find that reduced exposure to crime-related news broadcast by 
partisan channels decreased concerns about crime. The effect is mainly driven by older 
individuals who, on average, watch more television and use alternative sources of information 
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(such as internet, radio and newspapers) less frequently. Such a change in perceptions is likely 
to be relevant for voting behaviour. We predict that the reduction in crime concern caused by 
the digital introduction might induce about 3% of those aged above 65 who voted for the 
centre-right coalition to change their vote. This chapter contributes to the literature on 
persuasive communication by producing causal evidence of the impact of information 
provided by motivated agents (partisan media) on the beliefs and perceptions individuals hold. 
Further, it adds to the growing literature that looks specifically at the effects of media on 
voting. First, it sheds light on one of the possible mechanisms through which media can 
persuade voters: influencing their beliefs and perceptions about topics that are relevant in the 
political debate. Second, the use of unique data on viewing shares and news content of the 
different TV channels allows us to improve upon some existing studies in the area, by 
measuring the effect of exposure to media more precisely. 
In the second part of the thesis I look at household and individual decision-making about 
migration and labour allocation in rural contexts and I do so by focusing on China.  
The third chapter (based on joint work with Christian Dustmann, Francesco Fasani and Xin 
Meng) studies the relation between household migration decisions and the distribution of risk 
attitudes within a household. Although there is a growing literature suggesting that 
individual’s own risk aversion has an impact on a wide range of individual economic decisions 
(such as portfolio choices, occupational choices and migration), when decisions are taken at 
the household level preferences of all household members might matter as well. Migration, in 
particular internal migration in developing countries, is a good example of such types of 
decisions. We develop a simple model that, allowing for heterogeneous risk preferences within 
the household, implies that which member migrates depends on the distribution of risk 
attitudes among all household members, and that the risk diversification gain to other 
household members may induce migrations that would not take place in an individual 
framework. Using unique data for China on risk attitudes of internal (rural-urban) migrants and 
their family members left behind, we empirically test three key implications of the model: (i) 
that conditional on migration gains, less risk averse individuals are more likely to migrate; (ii) 
that within households, the least risk averse individual is more likely to emigrate; and (iii) that 
across households, the most risk averse households are more likely to send migrants as long as 
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they have at least one family member with sufficiently low risk aversion. Our results not only 
provide evidence that migration decisions are likely to be taken on the level of the household, 
but also that risk attitudes of household members other than the migrant affect not only 
individual migrations but also whether a household sends a migrant at all. These findings have 
relevant implications for the selection of migrants; in fact our household level model predicts 
migration that would not take place in an individual framework of migration decisions.  
In the fourth chapter I move from studying migration as an ex-ante risk-diversification 
strategy to analysing if and in what measure individuals and households in rural China 
reallocate labour across sectors as an ex-post response to agricultural productivity shocks. I 
propose a stylised framework where households can adjust their labour allocation across 
sectors - namely farm, local off-farm, and urban sector - according to the realised agricultural 
productivity, which is observed only after some months into each period. I employ various 
waves of a longitudinal survey of rural households to construct a panel of individual and 
household labour supply histories, and match them to detailed weather information, which I 
use to proxy agricultural productivity. For identification I exploit the year-by-county variation 
in rainfalls generated by the Chinese peculiar size and climatic heterogeneity to explain 
within-individual (and within-household) changes in days of work as well as participation in 
each of the sectors. Results suggest that farming is reduced by 4% while urban sector 
employment is increased by almost 6% in correspondence to mild negative rainfall shocks, i.e. 
rainfall realisation 1 standard deviation below the long term average. Individuals increase the 
number of days spent working in the city along both the participation and the intensive margin. 
While younger individuals tend to shift labour supply from farming toward working in the 
city, older ones generally shift labour from farming toward local off-farm work, without 
leaving the home village. Finally, I study the relationship between land tenure insecurity and 
the decision of households to reallocate labour toward rural-urban migration. Results suggest 
that the elasticity of rural-urban migration to agricultural productivity in villages with high risk 
of land reallocation is about half the size of that in other villages.  
The fifth chapter concludes by providing a summary of the key findings together with some 
directions for future research.   
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
2.    Information and Crime Perceptions: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment 
 
A recent body of empirical literature suggests that media have a significant impact on political 
and public policy outcomes (see, among others: Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gerber et al., 
2009; Enikolopov et al., 2011; Della Vigna et al., 2012; Barone et al., 2014). Yet, little is 
known about the mechanisms through which media concretely manage to influence collective 
decisions and policies. In this paper we explore one possible channel: influencing individuals’ 
beliefs and perceptions about topics that are salient in the political debate. Understanding the 
role of information provided by the media on the formation of beliefs and attitudes is relevant 
for outcomes that go well beyond voting. Indeed, as Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2010) argue, 
the efficiency of democratic and economic systems ultimately depends on the accuracy of 
individual beliefs. One potential threat to the accuracy of belief steams from the fact that, 
although people base their beliefs partly on direct observation, a large share of information is 
provided by intermediaries - such as television, newspapers, or Internet - who might 
themselves have some interest in the behaviour of the receivers. In this case the 
communication is defined as persuasive
1
 (Della Vigna and Gentzkow, 2010) and its effect on 
the receiver is uncertain. In this paper we focus on a particular type of, potentially persuasive, 
                                                     
1
 Della Vigna and Gentzow (2010) provide a theoretical definition of persuasive communication and 
present an extensive review of the empirical literature on the subject. 
2.1. Introduction 
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communication: the one provided by news media. More precisely, we investigate the influence 
of news media on beliefs and perceptions individuals hold, and we focus on perceptions about 
crime.  
We do so in the context of Italy, a country where, for over a decade, a relevant share of 
traditional analogue TV channels has been under the influence of Berlusconi in his dual role of 
media tycoon and Prime Minister
2
. We study if and to what extent individuals revise their 
perceptions once their exposure to news provided by this group of channels is reduced. 
Estimating the causal effect of the exposure to specific media on individuals’ perceptions 
poses difficult identification issues, as people self-select into TV channels according to their 
news content (Durante & Knight, 2012)
3
. To tackle endogeneity we exploit a natural 
experiment: the staggered introduction of digital TV in Italy. Between 2008 and 2012, Italy 
has gradually shifted from analogue to digital TV transmission: on specific dates, which varied 
by region, the analogue signal was switched off and substituted with the digital one. Around 
the digital switch dates the number of nationally available free TV channels increased from 7 
to more than 50 within days. Such a supply shock was accompanied by a drastic drop in the 
viewing shares of the six main traditional analogue channels (Rai and Mediaset) from 82% in 
June 2008 to 60% in June 2012
4
, mostly in favour of the newly available digital channels. We 
exploit the exogenous shift in viewing shares described above to study if and to what extent 
individuals revise their perceptions about crime when exposure to potentially biased news is 
reduced.  
We focus on perceptions about crime for a number of reasons. First, not only have crime 
perceptions been proven to be relevant for several economic outcomes
5
, but also crime is at the 
                                                     
2
 Three channels – Rai1, Rai2 and Rai3 - constituted the bulk of the Italian public broadcasting system, 
which has a long tradition of alignment with the parties in government (Larcinese, 2005). Other three 
channels – Rete4, Canale5 and Italia1 – were privately owned by Berlusconi through his media 
conglomerate Mediaset. Durante and Knight (2012) provide evidence of the bias in favour of the 
Berlusconi’s coalition (centre-right) while he was Prime Minister on five out of six of the above TV 
channels.   
3
 One of many sources of bias is generated by the fact that individuals, for example, tend to choose those 
sources of information that reinforce their pre-existing beliefs. One rare example of attempt to directly 
test the effect of the type of media individuals are exposed to on their beliefs and attitudes is provided 
by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004). 
4
 Source: AUDITEL data. http://www.auditel.it 
5
 Crime perceptions and victimization have been proven to be relevant for outcomes such as house 
prices (Buonanno and Montolio, 2013) mental health (Dustmann and Fasani, 2014) and daily routines 
and behaviours (Braakman, 2014; Becker and Rubinstein, 2011).    
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top of people’s concerns in many countries, and thus often at the centre of the political debate6. 
Second, and most importantly, thanks to unique data on the number of crime news broadcast in 
daily news programs, we are able to document how a specific group of traditional channels 
systematically over report crime news compared to other channels. Finally, it exists a puzzling 
mismatch between individual perceptions and actual data when it comes to crime rates. 
 Figure 2.1 provides evidence of such mismatch for Italy where despite a decreasing (or if 
anything stable) trend in actual crime rates over the period 2004 to 2012 (left panel) about 80% 
of respondents believe that crime is on the rise (right panel)
7
. These figures seem to reveal an 
information problem potentially deriving from the fact that people, by having little 
observational experience about crime, might tend to collect a relevant share of information 
about it through indirect and secondary sources. Thus the providers of such information (i.e. 
the media) are likely to play an important role in the formation of crime perceptions.  
To identify the reduced-form effect of the expansion in the number of available channels on 
crime perceptions we exploit a specific feature of the digital introduction: the fact that the 
deadlines at which the signal switched from analogue to digital varied across regions, and did 
so for exogenous infrastructural reasons. In this way we recover an intention to treatment 
(ITT) parameter and find that the increase in the number of available TV channels - and the 
consequent lower exposure to news broadcast by partisan ones - led individuals to revise their 
perceptions about crime downward. The effect is mainly driven by individuals from older 
cohorts. For example, among those aged above 65, we estimate that the introduction of the 
digital TV caused the probability of mentioning crime as among the three priority problems in 
the country to drop by 5.2 percentage points, or about 8 percent with respect to the average 
value. To rationalise the differential effect across age groups we show that, on average, older 
individuals watch more TV and use alternative sources of information less frequently - i.e. 
internet, radio and newspapers – than their younger counterparts. They were therefore likely to 
                                                     
6
 As Appendix Figure A 2.1 shows, people rank consistently crime among the first five (out of 15) most 
important perceived problems in a number of European countries.  Source: Eurobarometer.  
7
 The gap between actual crime rates and people’s perceptions is a feature common to other countries as 
well. Indeed, while crime levels have been decreasing in many western countries during the last decade 
(see for example “The curious case of falling crime” in The Economist, July 20th, 2013) a surprisingly 
large share of the population believes that crime is actually increasing. Dustmann and Fasani (2014) 
provide similar evidence for the UK. 
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be more exposed to the potential bias before, to place higher weight on information coming 
from television and to respond more to changes in its content. 
We then estimate more precisely the change in the exposure to crime news induced by the 
digital reform. To do so, we combine unique data on: a) the monthly amount of crime-related 
news reported by each TV channel during prime-time news programs; and b) the region-
specific monthly viewing shares of each TV channel during prime-time news programs. We 
use the switch to digital signals to predict exogenous changes in the exposure to crime news 
induced by the policy, and estimate the effect on crime perceptions through a two-step method. 
We find that the digital reform induced a reduction in exposure to crime news of about 12 
percent of the average value and that a 1 standard deviation decrease in exposure to crime 
news is associated with a 9.2 percent decrease in people’s concern about crime, among those 
aged above 65. In this case we recover a local average treatment effect (LATE) driven by 
those individuals who actually “changed” channel because of the digital reform. 
In the last part of the paper we try to assess whether the change in crime perceptions induced 
by the lower exposure to crime news might be relevant for voting behaviour. Using data from 
an electoral survey collected just before the introduction of digital TV, we predict that the 
reduction in crime concern caused by the digital reform might have induced about 3% of those 
aged above 65 who voted for the centre-right coalition to change their vote. Since individuals 
aged above 65 represent about 1 out of 4 of Italian voters (and usually show higher turnout 
rate), the effect we detect is likely to be relevant for electoral outcomes.  
This paper contributes to the growing literature on persuasive communication in economics, 
and in particular to the group of studies that focus on the effect of (biased) news media on 
political outcomes.
8
 A number of papers within this literature provide empirical evidence that 
(biased) media influence voting outcomes. Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007) find that the 
introduction of Fox News has led to a significant increase in the share of votes for the 
Republican Party in the U.S. 2000 election. Enikopolov et al. (2011) adopts a similar empirical 
strategy to show that Russian voters with access to an independent TV channel were less likely 
                                                     
8
 See Pratt and Stromberg (2011) for an exhaustive review of the literature on media and electoral 
outcomes.  A number of studies have also looked at the effect of persuasive communication in other 
context such as: advertisement (Simester et al., 2007); non-profits organisations (Landry et al., 2006); 
communication directed at investors by firms or financial analysts (Engelberg and Parsons, 2009) and 
non-informative communication provided by leaders (Bassi and Rasul, 2014). 
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to vote for Putin during the 1999 national election. Finally, Barone et. al (2014) measure the 
impact of media bias in favour of Berlusconi on his electoral support. Similarly to us, they 
exploit the introduction of the digital signal and, looking at the northern region of Piedmont, 
show how the availability of new digital channels caused a drop in Berlusconi’s voting shares 
in the 2010 regional elections
9
. Our study differs from the papers above because, while most of 
the existing literature convincingly estimates some reduced-form effect of media on voting, we 
shed light on one of the possible mechanisms through which such effect might take place: the 
manipulation of individuals’ perceptions with respect to politically salient topics. In fact, the 
paper is one of the first in producing causal evidence of the impact of information provided by 
potentially motivated agents (partisan media) on the beliefs and perceptions individuals hold. 
Moreover, by using unique data on TV viewing shares and news content of the different 
channels we are able to do better than just estimating an intention to treatment effect, thus 
improving upon some of the existing studies in the literature.  
Our paper also contributes to a broader literature interested in the effect of media (mainly 
television) on beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. In particular our paper is close to those studies 
that look at how media affect perceptions and beliefs through their content (see, among the 
others Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004); La Ferrara et al. (2011); Della Vigna et al. (2014); 
Yanagizawa (2014); Olken (2009); and Jensen and Oster (2009)
10
. We add to this literature by 
providing a new field of evidence about the impact of media on perceptions, and we are the 
first to study the influence on crime perceptions.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 presents the institutional 
background on Italian television market and the intensity in crime news reporting on 
                                                     
9
 Barone et al (2014) exploit the fact that about half of Piedmont region introduced the digital TV signal 
before 2010 regional elections, and compare voting outcomes across municipalities within such region. 
They find that after more than ten years of exposure to biased television, voters have not completely 
filtered out the bias. Another recent working paper investigates the effect of Berlusconi’s TV on voting 
behaviour, yet from a different perspective. Durante et al. (2013) analyse the long-term impact of early 
exposure to Berlusconi’s commercial TV (Mediaset) and find that municipalities with a longer history 
of exposure to it did show greater electoral support for Berlusconi’s party.  They argue that this effect 
could not be explained by exposure to partisan news bias (since, prior to 1985, news programs were not 
broadcast on Mediaset channels) but instead by the decline in social capital and the diffusion of a culture 
of individualism promoted by Berlusconi’s TV.  
10
 Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) study the effect of media use and Anti-American sentiment in the 
Muslim world; La Ferrara et al. (2011) the role of soap operas in reducing fertility in Brazil; Della 
Vigna et al. (2014) and Yanagizawa (2014) the effect of propaganda channeled through the radio on 
violence, respectively in Serbia and Rwanda; Olken (2009) the effect of television on trust in Indonesia; 
and finally Jensen and Oster (2009) the effect of cable TV and women’s status in rural India. 
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traditional channels; section 2.3 discusses our identification strategy and presents the natural 
experiment; section 2.4 introduces the data and the estimating equations; section 2.5, 2.6 and 
2.7 present different sets of results; section 2.8 concludes. 
2.2.1. The Italian TV market  
Up until 2007 - the year before the switch from analogue to digital TV signal transmission 
started - Italy presented a particularly concentrated television market, with only seven national 
channels freely available to viewers through the analogue signal. Three channels – Rai1, Rai2 
and Rai3 - constituted the bulk of the Italian public broadcasting system, which has a long 
tradition of alignment with the parties in government (Larcinese, 2005)
11
. Other three channels 
– Rete4, Canale5 and Italia1 – were privately owned by Berlusconi through his media 
conglomerate Mediaset. Finally, there was a seventh channel - LA7 - which is private and can 
be considered independent from political influences
12
. Until the digital reform the Italian TV 
market has been a de-facto duopoly with the six main traditional channels, those referring to 
either Rai or Mediaset, holding about 85% of total daily viewing shares. Silvio Berlusconi, in 
his double role of media tycoon and Prime Minister, was in the position to influence five out of 
seven national channels while in government, between 2001 and 2006 and between 2008 and 
2011
13.  Durante and Knight (2012) provide evidence of the bias in favour of the Berlusconi’s 
centre-right coalition while he was Prime Minister on five out of seven of the above TV 
channels.   As Larcinese (2005) points out “….for having the owner of a vast broadcasting 
corporation as the leader of one of the electoral coalitions, Italy is probably a unique example 
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 Larcinese (2005) well explains the historical background. Initially there were two main public 
channels and just in a second moment a third one was added. This created the so call “lottizzazione” for 
which the two main channels went to the government coalition (which at the time was a coalition 
formed by Democrazia Cristiana and Partito Socialista) and the third one went to the communist 
opposition. 
12
 LA7, previously called TeleMontecarlo, was owned since 1999 by Telecom Italia Media Spa, a 
telecommunication company specialized in television production and broadcasting, advertising and 
other multimedia activities. 
13
 Durante and Knight (2012) find evidence of bias toward the centre-right coalition in Berlusconi 
privately owned channels. When it comes to the three public channels, Rai 1 and Rai 2 exhibit bias 
toward the centre-right while that coalition is at the government, whereas Rai 3 is generally closer to the 
opposition. 
2.2. Background 
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in having such extreme selective exposure to television news
14”. Such a concentrated television 
market, together with the link between an important share of TV channels with a single 
political party makes the introduction of digital TV a unique experiment for studying the 
effects of a change in the news content individuals are exposed to. 
2.2.2. Crime news reporting on Italian television 
In this section we study the intensity of crime news reporting in Italian TV channels and in 
particular in the six main traditional channels (Rai + Mediaset) in comparison with others. 
News programs in Italy (telegiornali) are usually broadcast between 6:00 and 8:30PM, the 
time slot labelled as prime-time. They last 30 minutes and contain between 10 and 15 news 
items. We have data on the number of crime news items (stories) broadcast by each TV 
channel per month.  
In Figure 2.2 we compare the monthly averages of crime related news broadcast during prime-
time news programs by the six main traditional channels with the same statistic for the only 
independent TV channel nationally transmitted through the analogue signal (LA7) for the 
years from 2007 to 2013. The difference in crime reporting intensity between the two groups is 
striking, with the Rai and Mediaset channels reporting a number of crime related news which 
is on average double that reported by the independent channel LA7. One could argue that LA7 
might be underreporting crime news rather than Rai and Mediaset channels over reporting 
them. Because LA7 has no links with any political parties we expect it to have little incentive 
to under or over-report crime news. Nevertheless, we address such concern by comparing the 
monthly averages of crime related news broadcast by the main Italian public channel (RAI 1) 
with that of the main TV channels in a selected number of European countries. Such data are 
available for Spain (TVE), the UK (BBC), France (France 2) and Germany (ARD) from year 
2010 onward and are presented in Figure 2.3. The main public Italian channel (RAI 1) 
broadcast an average of 73 crime related news per month during the period 2010 to 2013. The 
number is larger for a factor that ranges between 1.7 (Spain) to 18 (Germany) with respect to 
the same metric in the other European countries considered. As Figure 2.3 shows, such a large 
difference in the amount of attention dedicated to crime by news programs on specific Italian 
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channels is not justified by existing differences in crime rates (measured as murder rate) across 
countries.  
We exploit such regularity in the broadcast of crime news together with the shift in viewing 
shares induced by the introduction of the digital TV signal to study the effect of a reduction in 
the exposure to crime news on crime perceptions. In the last section of the paper, while 
assessing the potential implications for voting, we will discuss to what extent it is plausible to 
consider the high amount of crime news reported in partisan channels as a rational strategy to 
gain electoral payoff.     
2.3.1. The Digital Reform 
In 2008 Italy began introducing terrestrial digital TV. On specific deadline dates, which varied 
by region, the analogue signal was substituted by the digital one. Terrestrial digital TV 
technology enhances transmission efficiency and allowed Italian households to receive more 
than 50 new digital channels previously not available through the analogue signal
15
. Terrestrial 
digital TV has a low set-up cost (lower than cable or satellite TV) as it uses existing analogue 
infrastructures. In order to receive the newly available digital channels people needed a 
specific decoder (similar to a modem). The price of such decoders was 50 euros, and its cost 
was 100% subsidized by the government through vouchers. The switch over was initiated in 
2006 by the centre-left government as per a compulsory European Union Directive 
(2007/65/EC). Indeed many other European countries have gone through the same 
technological change, and switched-over from analogue to digital TV signal during the last 
decade. What is peculiar in the Italian case is that the deadlines to switch off differed across 
regions, allowing us to analyse the effect of the policy using a difference-in-difference type of 
strategy. Identification relies on the exogeneity of such switch-off deadlines, after conditioning 
on region fixed effects, time fixed effects and time varying region characteristics.    
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Area-specific deadlines were based on similarity of 1950s infrastructures and could not be 
manipulated by local politicians or interest groups once set
16
. Italy was divided into sixteen 
areas, to each of which a precise date for the switch off of the analogue signal was assigned.  
The switch over for the entire country was completed over 4 years from November 2008 to 
June 2012 (Appendix Figure A 2.2). To test the orthogonally of switch-off deadlines to 
regional characteristics we perform a balancing test and compare two groups of regions: early 
switchers (those that passed to digital before or at December 2009) and late switchers (those 
that passed to digital from January 2010 onwards). Table 2.1 shows that late and early 
switcher regions are similar in dimensions such as unemployment and employment rates, GDP 
per capita, share of tertiary educated, of immigrant residents and of internet users, persons 
cited for crimes and murder rates per 100,000 people, suggesting that area-specific deadlines 
seem to be largely idiosyncratic to the purpose of our analysis.  
2.3.2. The induced change in TV viewing shares and in exposure 
to biased news 
Treatment induced by the digital reform. The switch from analogue to digital TV signal 
caused an unprecedented increase in the offer of channels. Such increase was accompanied by 
a drastic drop in the viewing shares of the six traditional channels (Rai + Mediaset) mainly in 
favor of the newly available digital ones. The viewing shares during prime-time (the period 
between 6:00 and 8:30 pm when most news programs are aired)
 
of the six main traditional 
channels went down from about 82% in June 2008 to 60% in June 2012
17
. At the same time, 
viewing shares of the new digital channels jumped from 2% to 17% (see Figure 2.4). Because 
the two platforms are characterized by different intensities of crime news reporting, such shift 
generates arguably exogenous variation in exposure to crime news. As shown above, the six 
main traditional channels broadcast higher number of crime related news than that broadcast 
by independent Italian TV channel and by most important channels in main European 
countries. On top of that, as we will show below, even among the six traditional channels, 
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 Please refer here for the EU directive legislation summary and here for the official Italian Law on the 
introduction of digital television  
17
 We focus on prime-time, as we are interested in capturing the time of the day when most news 
programs are aired but, as we will show later, the drop in the viewing shares of traditional channels 
shares is homogeneous across all time slots during the day.   
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those characterized by higher crime news reporting intensity are those that lost relatively more 
viewing shares because of the Digital Reform.  
Ultimately, for those who reacted to the introduction of digital TV by “changing” channel 
from traditional analogue channels to the new digital ones, we can think of two alternative 
possibilities. The first is to switch from news programs on traditional channels to news 
programs on digital ones. In this case people would now be exposed to a different (it could be 
lower or higher) amount of crime news. The second possibility is to switch from news 
programs on traditional channels to full-entertainment programs on digital ones. In this case, 
people would not receive any information about crime through that specific channel anymore 
and the exposure to potentially biased news is reduced. Data about the content of new digital 
channels indicate that the latter case is indeed most common.  Figure 2.5 plots the increase in 
the viewing share of new digital channels, split into those that broadcast some news programs 
(News Channels) and those that are full-entertainment (Other Channels). About 95% of the 
viewing shares of new digital channels are of channels that do not broadcast news at all
18
. As 
Figure 2.6 shows the most common programs broadcast by digital channels are TV-shows, 
movies and programs for kids, and to a lower extent sport programs, educational/history 
programs and life-style programs.  
Importantly for our analysis, as we show in detail in the Appendix, the switch to digital signal 
did not induce any change in the total amount of time spent by people watching television (see 
Table A 2.1). Thus, people did not watch more or less television in response to the digital 
reform; instead they simply switched from some channels to others. We therefore can conduct 
our analysis without worrying about possible substitution effects between TV watching time 
and other alternative activities being possibly contaminating the results.  
In the next paragraphs we will show how the shift in viewing shares is clearly triggered by the 
new technology introduction and takes place precisely in correspondence of the region-specific 
switch-off deadlines, thus providing evidence of its exogeneity. 
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 Such data confirm the descriptive evidence presented by Barone et al. (2014) who also show that the 
vast majority of people watching digital TV channels in Italy sort themselves into full-entertainment 
programs. 
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Descriptive evidence. In order to further support the effectiveness of our identification 
strategy, we would like to observe jumps in the region-specific shares of the six main 
traditional and new digital channels in correspondence with the region-specific switch-off 
deadlines. Figure 2.7 plots the evolution of prime-time viewing shares, for respectively the six 
main traditional and new digital channels, in selected regions around switch-off dates. The 
plotted regions are Campania (switch-off deadline December 2009), Lombardy (switch-off 
deadline October 2010), Umbria (switch-off deadline November 2011) and Sicily (switch-off 
deadline June 2012). For all of them it is possible to observe a large and sudden increase 
(decrease) in the viewing shares of new digital channels (traditional analogue channels) in 
precise correspondence with the deadlines to switch off the analogue signal (indicated by the 
vertical dashed lines). To better show the variation we exploit in our empirical exercise, Figure 
2.8 plots the evolution of the prime-time viewing shares of new digital channels in two pairs of 
neighbouring regions that switched off the analogue signal at different times. In Panel A we 
compare Campania with Calabria (in the south) while in panel B Emilia Romagna with 
Tuscany (in the center-north). Focusing on Panel A, the trend in digital channels viewing 
shares is remarkably similar before November 2009, when none of the two regions had 
switched off yet, and after May 2012, when both regions have already switched to the digital 
signal. In between switch-off deadlines (indicated by the dashed vertical lines) individuals who 
happened to live in either of the two neighbouring regions have been exposed to a different 
mix of TV channels. We exploit precisely such differential exposure, which we argue is as 
good as random.  
Evidence from regression analysis. In order to provide a more systematic evidence of the 
effect of the digital introduction on TV watching behaviour we make use of unique data on TV 
viewing shares collected for each channel at the month by region level and estimate the TV 
viewing share during prime-time for various groups of channels (labelled as c) in region r and 
month t as a function of the introduction of digital signal as follows:  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑐 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑟 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑟𝑡                       (1)  
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We group channels into four groups: main traditional channels (RAI + Mediaset), New Digital 
Channels, Satellite Channels and Residual Channels
19
. In equation (1) above Digital_Switchrt  
is an indicator for the region having switched to digital signal in month t or before, while 
𝛾𝑟  and  𝜆𝑡 are region and time fixed effects respectively.  Panel A of Table 2.2 reports 
estimates from equation (1) for the group of main traditional channels. The switch-over 
induces a decrease in the viewing shares of these channels between 8.1 and 8.7 percentage 
points, depending on the specification. This corresponds to more than a 10% decrease on the 
baseline value. In Panel B, C and D we look at viewing shares of New Digital, Satellite, and 
Residual Channels respectively. The switch-over is associated with an increase in the viewing 
shares of New Digital channels that ranges between 6.2 and 7.2 percentage points depending 
on the specification, while, as expected, has only a tiny positive effect on the viewing shares of 
Satellite and Residual Channels. In the table we deal in different ways with the potential 
confounding effect due to time trends by including linear time trends (column 1), year fixed 
effects (column 2), month*year fixed effects (column 3) and month*year plus region-specific 
linear trends (column 4).  The switch to digital signal is very powerful in predicting values of 
TV viewing shares with an F-stat equal to 89.9 and 110.8 in our most restrictive specification 
(column 4) for respectively viewing shares of main traditional and new digital channels.  
Viewing shares during slots other than prime-time. Although most of the news programs 
are aired during prime-time (between 6:00 and 8:30pm), some news are also broadcast during 
other time of the day, for example at lunch-time: between 12:00 and 15:00. One concern is that 
people might watch fewer news programs on traditional analogue channels during prime-time, 
but more of them during other times of the day. Such substitution across time-slots could 
potentially offset the decrease in crime news exposure measured during prime-time. It is 
therefore important to test whether TV viewing shares during other times of the day responded 
to the switch-over in the same way as they did during prime-time. Table A 2.2 presents 
estimates where we replicate, for all other time-slots available and for the entire day, the same 
exercise as in Table 2.2. Reassuringly, the effect of the switch-over on the viewing shares of 
traditional analogue channels (negative effect) and on new digital ones (positive effect) goes in 
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the same direction in all and every time slot and estimates for all of them are very similar to 
those we found for prime-time. 
2.4.1. Data 
To conduct our empirical analysis we draw on various sources of data. 
Individual perceptions of crime. Our primary data source is the Multipurpose Household 
Survey, collected yearly by the Italian National Statistical Agency (ISTAT). One of its several 
modules gathers information about individual and household daily life
20
. The survey is carried 
out yearly (around March) and is a repeated-cross section representative at the regional level of 
the entire Italian population. In addition to the usual demographic, labour market, and 
education information, the survey asks a set of questions about the use of TV, Internet and 
radio, as well as about beliefs and perceptions regarding a number of issues. From this survey, 
we employ two measures of perceptions about crime. The first is the answer to the question 
that asks “What do you think are the priority problems of the country?”. Respondents can 
choose three topics from the following list of ten: unemployment, crime, tax evasion, 
environment/pollution, public debt, inefficiency of health sector, inefficiency of school sector, 
inefficiency of judicial sector, immigration, poverty, others. Individuals are free to mention 
fewer than, but no more than three topics. We construct an indicator variable for the 
individuals reporting crime as one of the three priority problems in Italy and we call it 
Crime_Concern. This variable captures individuals’ concern about crime, or, in other words, 
the level of salience of crime as a priority problem to be tackled at the national level. In our 
estimating sample 57% of individuals report crime as being among the three priority problems 
in Italy, making crime the second most reported problem after unemployment (mentioned by 
72% of individuals) throughout the entire period. The average of Crime_Concern by sub-
group of population, alongside other descriptive statistics for our main estimating sample, is 
reported in Appendix Table A 2.3. The share of people particularly concerned about crime is 
higher among those aged above 65 than among those aged 65 or less, and is equal to 62 and 55 
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2.4. Data and Estimating Equation 
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percent respectively. The survey contains a second measure of crime perception, which derives 
from the question “What level of crime risk does your area of residence present?”. 
Respondents can choose from four categories that range from “absent” to “very high”. We 
therefore construct a categorical variable that goes from 1 to 4 and is increasing in the 
perceived level of crime in the area of residence and call it Crime_Risk_Local. This variable is 
less suited to our purpose as a) it refers only to the local area while we are interested in 
attitudes toward crime at the national level, and b) it is reported only at the household level. 
However, the question, unlike the previous one, has also been asked in year 2011 and 2012.  
TV viewing shares. To measure the shift in audience shares induced by the digital reform we 
gathered unique data about monthly, region-specific, viewing shares for each TV channel 
available from year 2007 until 2013. The data have been extracted from the official Auditel
21
 
dataset. Auditel is an independent third party agency responsible for television audience 
measurement in Italy. Viewing shares data are based on a sample of about 5200 households 
and 14000 individuals that is representative at the regional level of the entire Italian 
population
22
. We have information about viewing shares for five different time slots during the 
day: slot1, from 07:00 to 11:59; slot2, from 12:00 to 14:59; slot3, from 15:00 to 17:59; slot4 
(prime-time) from 18:00 to 21:30 and slot5, from 20:31 to 24:00.  
Crime related TV news items. To measure the number of crime news items reported by each 
TV channel we use data on primetime newscasts collected by the “Pavia Observatory”. The 
Pavia Observatory is an independent research institute specializing in media analysis that 
works in collaboration with the University of Pavia. We obtained data on the monthly number 
of crime-related news items broadcast during prime-time news programs for each one of the 
main traditional TV channels and some others, from 2007 until 2013.  
Crime committed and other control variables. Data about the number of crime committed 
in each region by month and type of crime have been provided by the Italian Home Office 
Ministry. Crimes are split into the following categories: violent and drug related crimes, 
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 More information on Auditel procedure is available at http://www.auditel.it/come-lavora/. Auditel has 
selected a sample of 20000 households. Every year they conduct a face to face interview with each of 
them to check the type of technology they use (Satellite, DG, DVD, etc) and they install the so called 
people meter. The meter is based on the advanced technology Unitam / CTS (content tracking system) 
and collects data everyday on the number of TV minutes watching per all the existing channels.  
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property crimes, and other types of crimes.  A number of regional level time varying 
characteristics, such as employment and unemployment rate, GDP per capita, share of tertiary 
educated, and age structure, are provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
2.4.2. Estimating Equation 
In this section we present our empirical strategy to estimate the reduced-form effect of the 
increase in the number of available TV channels on individual perceptions about crime. In 
order to identify the intention to treatment effect (ITT), i.e. the effect of the switch-over from 
analogue to digital TV signal and the subsequent increase in number of available channels,  we 
exploit region specific idiosyncratic deadlines to switch and implement a difference-in-
difference design that compares crime perceptions of individuals within the same region, 
before and after the switch to digital signal occurred. More formally, we estimate various 
versions of the following linear probability model: 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖𝑟𝑡
′ 𝛿 + 𝒁𝑟𝑡
′ + 𝛾𝑟 + 𝜆𝑡 +
                                              𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡     (2)  
where i indexes individuals, r regions and t time periods. The variable Crime_Concernirt is an 
indicator for the individual mentioning crime among the three priority problems in the country. 
Digital_Switchrt is a dummy that equals 1 if region r experienced the switch-off to digital 
signal at time (year) t or before. The switch-off might occur at any point in time during the 
year previous to the annual household survey collected in March. Indeed, switching to digital 
TV just one month before the survey is likely to induce different treatment than switching 11 
months before it, as the share of time between two surveys during which individuals have 
access to more TV channels differs. In order to take such heterogeneity in (intention to) 
treatment intensity into account we also consider an alternative measure for Digital_Switch, 
which is the fraction of months (over the 12 previous to each annual survey) after the switch-
off occurred. The coefficient of interest is 𝛼2, which captures the impact of the increase in 
available TV channels on individual crime perceptions. For our purpose it is crucial to control 
for region-specific crime rates that are likely to be an important determinant of crime 
perceptions. Crimert is the (log) crime rate, defined as number of crimes over 10’000 
population,  in region r during the calendar year previous to the collection of year t survey. 
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The coefficient on crime rates is of interest on its own as it will tell us whether, and to what 
extent, crime perceptions respond to actual crime rates. Vector  𝐗′𝑖𝑟𝑡 denotes a set of 
individual and household level characteristics including gender, age, age squared, marital 
status, education, set of dummies of occupational status, family size, family structure, and 
major source of household income. Vector Z′rt includes a series of region time-varying 
covariates that might affect crime perception directly or indirectly, such as unemployment rate, 
GDP per capita, share of population with tertiary education, and share of immigrants. The 
𝛾𝑟  are region fixed effects meant to capture any unobserved time-invariant characteristics that 
affect crime perceptions and may also be correlated with the timing of the switch-over to 
digital TV. The 𝜆𝑡 are year fixed effects meant to allow for very flexible trend in crime 
perception common to all regions. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. Our identifying 
assumption is that, conditional on region and year fixed effects and on the time-varying 
controls, the timing of the switch-over to digital TV is orthogonal to the error term. We will 
attempt to test the plausibility of this assumption in the reminder of the paper. Finally, 
throughout the empirical analysis, we cluster standard errors at the region level to allow for an 
arbitrary correlation of residuals within regions.  
After having estimated the reduced-form effect of the digital TV introduction on crime 
perceptions, we will attempt to get a more precise estimate of the relationship between 
exposure to crime news and crime perceptions. To do so we will make use of unique data on 
TV news content and measure the effect of the switch-over on the exposure of individuals to 
crime news.  
2.5. The Effect of the Digital Reform on Crime Perceptions 
2.5.1.    Estimates  
Overall effect. Here we discuss results from the estimation of the reduced form effect of the 
switch-over to digital TV on individual crime perceptions. Table 2.3 summarizes the results 
from our estimation of equation (2): a linear probability model of Crime_Concern on a post 
switch-over indicator Digital_Switch and controls. Crime_Concern is an indicator for the 
individual reporting crime as being among the three priority problems in the country at the 
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moment of the survey. The coefficient on Digital_Switch, an indicator taking value 1 if the 
region has switched-off in period t or before, captures the effect of the increase in the number 
of available TV channels on crime perceptions. When we look at the effect on the overall 
population (column 1) we find a negative coefficient, suggesting that the Digital Reform 
induced a lower concern about crime. The coefficient is not statistically significant though. 
However, we do not expect all groups of the population to a) be exposed in the same way to 
the pre-existing bias, and b) to respond in the same way to the partial removal of it. Indeed, 
individuals of different cohorts are likely to gather information from different combinations of 
media; for example, older individuals are likely to rely more on television and less on new 
technologies such as internet, as we will show in more detail later.  
Heterogeneity of the effect across age groups. We therefore turn and study the 
heterogeneous effect of the Digital Reform for five different age groups of the population 
(results reported in column 2). We do so by interacting Digital_Switch with a set of five age 
group indicators. While estimates for individuals below age 41 are equal to zero, they are 
negative for older individuals. Estimates get larger as we move from younger to older groups 
and are significantly different from zero at conventional levels for the group formed by 
individuals above age 65. These results suggest that elderly individuals’ crime perceptions 
respond more to the decreased exposure to potentially biased news programs broadcast by the 
six main traditional TV channels.  We will investigate the possible reasons for this result in the 
reminder of this section.  
New specification: accounting for the length of treatment. From column 3 onward we 
employ a more precise version of Digital_Switch: the share of months the region has spent 
under the new digital regime during the year previous to the survey. Such specification takes 
into account the length of the (intention to) treatment we are interested in. Our estimates (all 
negative) get larger, and are now significant also for the second oldest group of individuals, 
those aged 52-65. The fact that when we account for the intensity of the treatment estimates 
are larger suggests that in our empirical analysis we are not likely to be picking up just some 
spurious correlation between year of switch-off and changes in crime perceptions. We consider 
this specification more appropriate to the purpose of our analysis and will use it from this point 
forward.   
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Robustness of estimates and magnitude of the effect. The coefficients are very stable across 
specifications, suggesting that the introduction of digital TV is not correlated with any 
individual characteristic (included from column 4) or region time-varying characteristics 
(included from column 5). In Column 5 and 6 we also add region-specific crime rates that, 
very importantly, do not affect the estimates on the Digital_Switch. It is interesting to note that 
crime perceptions respond to actual crime rates, but only to specific crime categories; column 
6 shows that people become more concerned about crime only when violent and drug related 
crimes increase, while property crimes and other crimes do not seem to affect individual 
concerns in any significant way. In our most complete specification the increase in TV 
channels, or better, having access for the entire pre-survey year to an increased number of TV 
channels, is associated with a statistically significant decrease in crime concern for individuals 
aged above 51. The effect estimated is economically relevant: if we focus on the older group 
of individuals, those aged above 65, the digital reform is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of reporting crime as one of three priority problems of 5.2 percentage points, 
corresponding to about 8.4 percent change with respect to the average probability for that 
specific age group (equal to 0.62). These results are consistent with the increase in the number 
of channels available - and the induced lower exposure to partisan ones over-reporting crime 
news - leading individuals to revise their crime perceptions downward. 
Estimates of the group-specific Digital_Switch coefficients from the most complete 
specification (column 6) together with 90% confidence intervals are also plotted in Figure 2.9. 
The figure shows clearly how the effect of the reform gets larger as we move from left to right 
of the age distribution. In Figure 2.10 we also report estimates from regressions of the type in 
column 6 but estimated separately for males and females.  Among females the effect is 
negative and statistically significant for those aged above 40 and gets more precisely estimated 
as age increases. The effect is negative and significant for males above age 65. As for 
interpreting the coefficients, for females aged above 65 the switch-off is associated with a 
decrease in the probability of reporting crime as priority problem of 3 percentage points, which 
represents a decrease of about 5 percent with respect to the average probability for that specific 
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group of individuals. Similarly the effect of the switch-off on males above age 65 corresponds 
to a decrease of about 6.5 percent on their average probability
23
.  
2.5.2. Interpreting heterogeneous effects across age groups 
TV watching time. The increase in the number of available TV channels, and the induced 
lower exposure to partisan ones over-reporting crime news, led to a decrease in the share of 
people who consider crime as a priority problem, particularly among older cohorts. Why do 
elderly people revise their perceptions more than other groups? One possible reason is that 
elderly individuals were more exposed to potentially biased traditional channels before the 
introduction of digital TV. Figure 2.11 shows the average daily TV watching time for 
individuals in our estimating sample, by gender and along the distribution of age. TV watching 
time is lowest for individuals between 25 and 45, when people are in the middle of their labour 
market participation. Then it starts increasing around age 40-50, in correspondence with the 
age group from which the reduced-form coefficients become negative and increasingly 
significant. Females tend to watch more TV than males, and this is true at almost every age. 
On average, individuals aged 65 watch TV for almost 3.5 hours per day, while individuals 
aged 35 do so for little more than 2 hours. By watching more television elderly individuals 
were more likely to be exposed to news programs in partisan channels before the introduction 
of the digital signal and this could be a reason why they revised their perceptions to a higher 
extent. The stronger response for the group of elderly individuals confirms findings from 
previous studies (for example Barone et al., 2014) that while looking at the effect of media on 
voting also found a stronger effects in town with higher share of elderly individuals.   
Differential access to other sources of information. Television is not the only source of 
information people use; indeed we expect the access to other media to matter as well. Let us 
suppose that individuals collect information about the level and the salience of crime from two 
main different sources: direct observation and indirect channels, such as television, Internet, 
newspapers and the radio. We can think of individuals using a simple Bayes rule to update 
their perceptions once a new piece of information is received, and to do so according to the 
weight they attribute to the source of such information.  If many sources of information are 
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 Average probability of reporting crime as a major problem is 0.62 and 0.61 for female and males 
respectively above age 65.  
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available each one will have little weight and contribute only marginally to the update of 
perceptions. Hence, we can expect the weight attached to information coming from television 
to be higher for individuals who have only limited access to other sources. To explore this 
hypothesis we examine data available for our estimating sample about the use of Internet, 
radio and newspapers. Individuals aged above 65 use information sources other than TV much 
less frequently in comparison with individuals aged below 65 (Figure 2.12). More precisely, 
94% of those aged above 65 have never used the Internet, 50% do not read any newspaper, and 
63% never listen to the radio. On the contrary, among individuals below age 65 such shares are 
much lower: 39% have never used the Internet, 36% do not read any newspaper, and 29% 
never listen to the radio. Thus, older individuals appear to have a much less diverse set of 
sources from which they gather indirect information and the prominence of one single source 
could reveal why in their case changes in the content of television are more strongly reflected 
into changes in perceptions.  
Effect on concerns about other topics. If elderly individuals are less concerned about crime 
after the introduction of digital TV, we might be interested in knowing what problems have 
substituted crime as priorities in their opinion
24
. We therefore look at the effect of the digital 
introduction on the likelihood of mentioning any of the other problems suggested by the 
question “What do you think are the 3 priority problems of the country?”, and there are nine 
of them apart from crime. The Appendix Table A 2.4 reports estimates for individuals aged 
above 65 of the effect of the switch-over for each of the other topics plus crime. In the table, 
problems are ranked from left to right from the most (unemployment) to the least mentioned 
(inefficiency of education system). The lower concern about crime seems to be compensated 
for by higher concern about most of the other problems, such as poverty, tax evasion, 
inefficiency of health sector, inefficiency of judicial system and public debt. However, 
estimates are statistically significant at conventional level only for inefficiency of health sector 
and judicial system though. The introduction of digital TV is also associated with lower 
concern about unemployment, but standard errors are quite large. 
                                                     
24
 Our outcome variable is a relative measure of concern as people are asked to report the three priority 
problems. Given such relative nature we are not able to test whether the increase in TV channels, and 
the consequent lower exposure to Berlusconi-influenced news programs, induced a lower general 
concern about every problem.   
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2.5.3. Further robustness checks 
Effect of switch-over on unemployment and crime. The first robustness check we perform is 
to test if, in correspondence with the switch-off deadlines, regions have experienced changes 
in economic outcomes that are themselves relevant for crime perceptions. We test such 
hypothesis by estimating, in a similar fashion as above, the effect of the Digital Reform on 
unemployment and crime rates. The unit of observation is the region*year. Estimates suggest 
(Table A 2.5) that the Digital Reform is not statistically significantly associated with any 
change in unemployment or crime rates at the regional level, regardless of whether we use a 
specification with an indicator for Digital_Switch (columns 1 and 3) or the share of months 
(columns 2 and 4). In the case of unemployment share estimates even change signs when 
adopting the share of months as explanatory variable.   
Effect of switch-over on individuals not watching TV. Some individuals in our sample do 
not watch TV at all. We should expect not to find any effect of the introduction of digital TV 
on them. As a robustness check we thus estimate the same reduced-form regressions presented 
in Table 3 on the sample of those individuals who report not to watch TV at all, i.e. about 5% 
of the total. This exercise is only valid under the assumption that these people did not pass 
from not watching TV to watching it (and vice versa) in response to the digital TV 
introduction. The Appendix Table A 2.6 reports results from such exercise, estimates on 
Digital_Switch are small and never significant (for any of the five age groups) across all the 
four specifications.    
Timing of the switch-over effect: perceptions about local level crime. We now run a 
placebo test to check if we can detect any effect of the switch to digital signal before it actually 
occurred. To do so we employ the second measure of crime perceptions included in our dataset 
that refers to the level of crime risk in the area of residence. The questionnaire asks to rate the 
risk of crime in the local area of residence on a scale from 1 to 4 (highest level of crime) and 
we use answers to such question to construct a measure of perception of the level of crime in 
the local area called Crime_Risk_Local.  Such variable is only reported at the household level 
but is available until year 2012 enabling us to look at the effect of the increase in the number 
of TV channels available also 1, 2 and 3 years after the switch-off. Exploiting the fact that 
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different regions switched from analogic to digital TV transmission at different points in time 
between 2008 and 2012 we are able to run a regression with both lags and leads of the switch-
off year indicator. The estimated leads and lags running from two years prior to two years after 
the switch-off are plotted in Appendix Figure A 2.3. Estimates show no effect of the switch-off 
before it actually occurred and such result is reassuring. They start to become negative right 
after the switch-off, and keep decreasing with time (becoming statistically significant two 
years after it). This might be an indication of individuals adjusting their viewing behavior 
gradually. Furthermore, it could be that perceptions about the level of local crime might take 
longer to adjust. Perhaps because individuals put larger weight on direct information when 
forming their perceptions about the crime level in the local area, while relying more on 
secondary sources of information, such as television, when forming perceptions at the national 
level.  
Strategic editorial response to the change in market shares. The interpretation of our 
results would be hindered if the amount of crime news items broadcast by Berlusconi-
influenced media changed with the introduction of digital television. This would be the case if 
the editors of news programs responded to the change in the television market’s structure by 
strategically increasing or decreasing the amount of crime stories reported. To explore such 
possibility we plot (Appendix Figure A 2.4) the average number of crime news reported on 
channels directly owned by Berlusconi against the viewing shares of new digital channels, 
from 2007 until the end of 2012. Despite the significant increase in digital channels viewing 
shares (dashed blue line), the amount of crime news reported in Berlusconi’s channels (red 
line) fluctuates around an average of about 100, and does not show any clear trend during the 
period. In particular, the number of crime news reported does not seem to change in any 
systematic way in correspondence with the various waves when the digital signal is introduced 
(indicated in the figure by the grey shaded areas).   
2.6. Assessing the Effect of Crime News Exposure on 
Perceptions 
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Our reduced-form estimates indicate that (older) individuals tend to revise their concern about 
crime downward once they less exposed to news programs in partisan TV channels that are 
likely to over report crime news. In this section we try to measure to what extend such 
reduced-form effect can be linked to the change in crime news exposure induced by it. In other 
words, we now attempt to answer to the question about what happens to people’s concern 
about crime when we vary the amount of crime news they are exposed to.  As discussed 
earlier, in our setting the decrease (increase) in exposure to crime news comes also together 
with the decrease (increase) in exposure to other types of news, and with an increase 
(decrease) in exposure to full-entertainment contents. Therefore our measure of exposure to 
crime news will naturally capture those additional elements as well.    
2.6.1. Measuring exposure to crime news 
The first step toward estimating the effect of the amount of crime news on crime perceptions is 
to construct a measure of individual exposure to crime news. To do so, we combine unique 
data on: a) region-specific monthly viewing shares of each TV channel during prime-time 
news programs; and b) the monthly amount of crime-related news items reported by each TV 
channel during prime-time news programs. With these two pieces of information we construct 
the following region*time specific measure of exposure to crime news: 
∑𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑐 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1
 
where  CrimeNewst
c represents the number of crime news items reported during prime-time 
news programs on channel c during period t; while Sharert
c  is the prime-time viewing share of 
channel c in region r during period t. The measure, that we call Crime_News_Exposure, is the 
summation, over all TV channels, of the number of crime news items broadcast during the 
period t weighted by the region-specific viewing share in the region r during the period t.  This 
weighted average delivers us the actual number of crime news items the average individual 
who lives in region r is exposed to at each point in time (during each month or year). Between 
two months, the exposure to crime news of individuals living in a specific region can vary 
either because the average amount of crime news broadcast changes or because of some 
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reallocation of viewing shares between TV channels characterised by different crime news 
reporting intensity takes place.  
2.6.2. Estimating changes in crime news exposure induced by 
Digital Reform 
We now estimate the effect of the Digital Reform on individuals’ exposure to crime news and 
we do so by estimating the following first-stage equation:  
(∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑐 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑐 )𝐶𝑐=1 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑡 + 𝒁𝑟𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝛾𝑟 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑟𝑡      (3)  
Where t can be either month or year and Digital_Switch is an indicator for the regions having 
switched to digital at time t or before
25
. While we always include region fixed effects, from 
columns 1 to 4 we account for possible confounding factors due to the time dimension in 
different ways. More precisely, in column 1 we only include a linear time trend; in columns 2 
year fixed effects; in column 3 year*month fixed effects to allow for maximum flexibility in 
the (common) time trend; finally, in column 4, we estimate our tighter specification where we 
include both year*month fixed effects and region-specific linear time trends. In our context TV 
news programs are broadcast nationally, so any change over time in the amount of crime news 
reported is absorbed by time fixed effects. Instead, the variation in Crime_News_Exposure that 
is generated by the digital switch has to do with the reallocation of viewing shares away from 
traditional analogue channels and in favour of those with fewer or no crime news. In fact it is 
important to underline that if we look within the six main traditional channels, we can observe 
(Figure 2.13) how channels characetised by higher crime news reporting intensity are those 
that lost most viewing shares during the period of digital TV introduction. Thus, because of 
this differential effect of the Digital Reform on viewing shares of different traditional 
channels, even the group of individuals who keep watching those traditional channels is, after 
the reform, on average exposed to lower crime news intensity. Estimates (reported in Table 
2.4) suggest that the digital introduction induced a decrease in the exposure of individuals to 
crime news. The coefficients on the Digital_Switch indicator are always negative, remarkably 
stable across specifications, and very powerful in predicting changes in 
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 In this part of the analysis we to use the dummy measure of the digital switch rather than the fraction 
of months after the switch-off occurred.  
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Crime_News_Exposure. They are all significant at the 1% level and the F-statistic associated 
with Digital_Switch always scores above 35 in our most complete specifications, from column 
4 onward. In column 5 we exclude from the analysis the residual TV channels, which we 
cannot label as either digital, or satellite; while in column 6 we estimate the equation 
collapsing the data into a yearly dataset. Estimates are in both cases very similar to those in the 
main specification. According to these results in column 3 the switch to the digital TV caused 
a reduction in the exposure to crime news equal to 8.4 crime news items per month. This 
number corresponds to about 12% of the average amount of crime news individuals are 
exposed to during a month, thus suggesting a sizable effect.   
2.6.3. Quantifying the effect of crime news exposure on crime 
perceptions 
We then move on and use the predicted values of Crime_News_Exposure to get a better 
measure of the effect of the digital reform on crime perceptions. We do so by estimating the 
following second-stage equation: 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2(∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑐 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑐𝐶
𝑐=1 )
̂ +𝑿𝑖𝑟𝑡
′ 𝛽3 +
                                           𝒁𝑟𝑡
′ 𝛽4 +  𝜂𝑟 + 𝜅𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑡                                                                 (4)  
where the variable Crime_Concernirt is the same as the one used in equation (2) and described 
above. ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑡
𝑐 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡
𝑐𝐶
𝑐=1   is our measure of Crime_News_Exposure. Vectors 
 𝐗′𝑖𝑟𝑡 and 𝐙
′
𝑟𝑡 are the same as in equation (2). As usual robust standard errors are clustered at 
the regional level in all regressions.  
In our first stage the change in Crime_News_Exposure is driven by the compliers, i.e. those 
individuals who decide to change channel in response to the digital reform. We identify a local 
average treatment effect (LATE) for those individuals who changed their viewing habits 
because of the digital introduction. In particular, because we observe Crime_News_Exposure 
at a higher than individual level, the estimates delivered by our model are a mixture of a zero 
effect for individuals in treated regions who did not change channel and a possibly non-zero 
effect for those who did change channel.  
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OLS estimates as well as IV ones of equation (4) are reported in Table 2.5. These are year 
level regressions where the exposure variable is calculated as the average monthly number of 
crime news broadcast during the year before each survey. Both OLS and IV estimates on 
Exposure are positive. OLS are just slightly larger than IV ones. This is due a first stage almost 
perfectly predicting Crime_News_Exposure. In fact, once we account for region and time fixed 
effects, almost the entire variation in the exposure to crime news is explained by the shift in 
viewing shares across TV channels induced by the digital TV introduction.  
When we allow the effect to vary across age groups our IV estimates (column 6) indicate that, 
similarly to the reduced-form case, the effect gets stronger (more negative) with age, and 
estimates are significant for individuals aged above 65. According to these estimates a one 
standard deviation decrease in the exposure to crime news (equivalent to 13 fewer news items 
per month) is associated with a 5.7 percentage point decrease in the probability of reporting 
crime as priority problem for individuals aged above 65. That is about a 9.2 percent drop with 
respect to their average likelihood of being concerned about crime of 0.62. These results 
suggest that, over and above actual crime levels (crime rates is included as control in all 
specifications), people do respond to changes in the number of crime news they are exposed to 
in the intuitive way. That is, they are more concerned about crime when TV broadcasts higher 
number of crime news, regardless of the actual amount of crime.  
In this section we want to analyse the potential implications that the change in perceptions 
induced by the introduction of digital TV might have for voting behaviour.  
Issue bias and agenda setting. To do so we need to discuss whether reporting a particularly 
high number of crime news might be a rational strategy for TV channels under the influence of 
Berlusconi with the objective to increase people’s concern about crime and eventually gain 
electoral advantage (increase voting for the centre-right coalition). Such strategy, called issue 
selection or agenda setting within the political economy literature (Larcinese, Puglisi and 
Snyder, 2011), is realised when media choose which type of information to report (for example 
crime events) in order to influence the perception of citizens about which issues are relevant 
2.7. Crime Perceptions and Voting Behaviour 
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and to what extent. Indeed, quoting Larcinese et al. (2011) “editors and journalists have a large 
degree of freedom in deciding what is newsworthy and what is not, and these choices influence 
the perception of citizens about which issues are relevant and to what extent ”. If this applies, a 
coalition that can influence or partially control the media might be incentivised to make a 
particular topic a salient one in the electorate’s mind if the topic is perceived by the electorate 
as an area of specific expertise of the coalition. When, in other words, the coalition is said to 
“own” that specific topic.  In the USA, for example, the majority of people believe that the 
Republican Party is better suited at dealing with national security issues while the Democratic 
Party is better at dealing with health care and social issues (Larcinese et al. 2011).  
To gather evidence on whether crime is an issue “owned” by the centre-right coalition in Italy 
we use data from the Italian National Election Study Survey (ITANES), a survey similar in 
content to the American National Election Study Survey in the US and representative of the 
entire Italian population.   It turns out that to the question “What coalition would be better able 
to face the problem: crime?”, 51% of the respondents report the centre-right coalition, only 
20% the centre-left and the remaining 29% say that is indifferent.  These numbers suggest that 
making the topic crime a salient one in the electorate’s mind might be a rational strategy for 
the Italian centre-right coalition, which indeed has often based its past electoral campaigns 
around issues such as crime and security.  
During the period of digital TV introduction no national elections took place. Yet, we can look 
at the 2008 national election and use survey data to: a) study the relationship between crime 
concern and the probability of voting for the centre-right coalition; and b) use those estimates 
to, under some assumptions, predict the potential effect of the lower exposure to partisan TV 
channels on the likelihood to vote for the centre-right coalition.   
We employ data from the post-2008 election wave of the Italian National Election Study 
Survey (ITANES) introduced above. Apart from the usual socio-demographic characteristics, 
the survey asks which party the person voted for in the 2008 national elections as well as the 
perceived most important problem in the country at the time of the elections. We regress an 
indicator for the individual reporting having voted for the centre-right coalition (CR_Vote) on 
a dummy equal one if the person reports crime as the most important problem in the country 
(Crime_Concern). Table 2.6 reports linear probability estimates from such regression. 
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Individuals who consider crime as the most important problem are almost 25 percentage point 
more likely to vote for the centre-right coalition that those who do not think so. These results 
are in line with the evidence shown above that the majority of Italian citizens believe that the 
centre-right coalition has a competitive advantage, over the centre-left one, in tackling crime. 
Estimates of the coefficient are stable to the inclusion of individual characteristics and region 
fixed effects. Although we cannot give causal interpretation to these results, they do point in 
the direction of a relationship in the Italian context between having crime as a major concern 
and the likelihood of voting for the centre-right coalition.  
Predicting changes in voting behaviour. We use these estimates to run an illustrative 
exercise of the potential effect of the change in crime concern induced by the lower exposure 
to partisan channels on the probability of voting for the centre-right coalition. We focus on 
individuals aged above 65, the population group for which we found stronger effect of the 
Digital Reform. The estimated coefficient of the effect of the switch-off on crime concern was 
-0.052 (Table 2.3, column 6). Let us suppose a decrease of the same magnitude for the variable 
Crime_Concern from the regression above. Using the estimated relationship between 
considering crime as most important problem in the country (Crime_Concern) and the 
propensity to vote for the centre-right Berlusconi’s coalition (CR_Vote) we obtain that the 
induced change in the latter likelihood would be equal to 1.3 percentage points, or 2.83 percent 
with respect to the average probability of centre-right vote (0.46). According to these numbers 
about 3% of 2008 national election centre-right voters aged above 65 could have been induced 
to change their vote by the decrease in crime concern caused by digital TV introduction. 
Individuals aged above 65 represent about one out of four of the Italian population entitled to 
vote and they have on average higher turnout rates than younger individuals. For such reasons 
we argue that the change in crime perceptions induced by the decreased exposure to partisan 
channels linked to Berlusconi might have relevant effects on voting outcomes.  
People base a good part of their behaviours on beliefs and perceptions. Thus, studying the role 
played by media in the formation of such beliefs and perceptions is particularly relevant for 
2.8. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
43 
our understanding of individual and collective behaviours. In this paper we investigate the 
influence of news media, and in particular partisan ones, on crime perceptions and voting 
behaviour. To do so, we exploit a natural experiment in the Italian television market where the 
staggered introduction of the digital TV signal across regions led to a drastic drop in the 
viewing shares of partisan channels and, as a consequence, to a lower exposure to potentially 
biased news about crime.  
We find that the lower exposure to partisan news channels led individuals to revise their 
perceptions about crime as one of the priority problem in Italy downward. The effect is mainly 
driven by individuals from older cohorts. Older individuals watch more TV and use alternative 
sources of information less frequently - i.e. internet, radio and newspapers – than their younger 
counterparts. They were therefore likely to be more exposed to the potential bias before the 
digital introduction and to place a higher weight on information coming from television. We 
then attempt to estimate the effect of exposure to crime news on crime perceptions. To do so, 
we combine unique data on: a) region-specific monthly viewing shares of each TV channel 
during prime-time news programs; and b) the monthly amount of crime-related news reported 
by each TV channel during prime-time news programs. After using the switch to digital 
signals to predict exogenous changes in the exposure to crime news we attempt to estimate the 
effect on crime perceptions through a two-step method. Findings suggest that the digital 
reform induced a reduction in exposure to crime news of about 12 percent of the average value 
and that a 1 standard deviation decrease in exposure to crime news is associated with a 9.2 
percent decrease in crime concern, among those aged above 65. Finally, we assess whether the 
change in crime perceptions induced by the lower exposure to partisan channels might be 
relevant for voting behaviour. Using data from an electoral survey collected just before the 
introduction of digital TV, we predict that the reduction in crime concern caused by the digital 
reform might induce about 3% of those aged above 65 who voted for the centre-right coalition 
to change their vote. 
This paper contributes to the literature on persuasive communication in economics by 
providing causal evidence of the impact of information provided by motivated agents (partisan 
media) on the beliefs and perceptions individuals hold. Further, using unique data on TV 
viewing shares we identify both an intention to treatment effect of the increase in the number 
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of TV channels and a local average treatment effect driven by those individuals who actually 
“change” channel in response to the increase in their number. Finally, we contribute to the 
growing literature that looks at the effect of (biased) news media on political outcomes by 
shedding light on one of the possible mechanisms through which media manage to influence 
voting decision and policies: the manipulation of individuals’ perceptions with respect to 
politically salient topics. We provide evidence of this phenomenon by studying the Italian case 
where a specific group of media tends to over-report crime news. As a consequence, 
individuals’ perceptions of crime as a priority problem might be distorted, and indeed we find 
that people consistently over-estimate crime rates. We show that once the exposure to such 
news programs is reduced, the level of crime concern decreases, and does it in particular for 
those individuals, the elderly, who are likely to base a larger amount of their beliefs on 
information coming from television.  Since new digital channels are mostly full-entertainment, 
our results suggest that, in this specific case, people’s beliefs might have become more 
accurate once exposed to a lower amount of information. Finally it is worth noticing that 
individuals aged above age 52, for which we find a significant effect, make up about 30 
percent of Italian voting population. Hence, for an office-seeking politician, being able to 
influence their beliefs about politically salient issues might have relevant implications in terms 
of voting outcomes. 
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Figure 2.1 - Actual crime vs crime perceptions in Italy: 2004-2012 
 
Note. The left panel of the figure reports changes in crime rates between 2004 and 2012. Source: 
Authors’ elaboration on Italian Home Office Data. The right panel reports the share of people by answer 
to the question “Do you think that, with respect to five years ago, crime has gone up/gone down/ stayed 
the same/ do not know”  from 2009 to 2012. The shares referring to the answers “stayed the same” and 
“do not know” are not reported. Source: Eurostat (left panel) and UNIPOLIS Foundation (right panel). 
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Figure 2.2 - Intensity of crime news reporting: Main Traditional Channels (Rai + 
Mediaset) vs New Independent Channel (La7) 
 
Note. The graph shows the average monthly number of crime news broadcast during prime-time news 
programs respectively by main traditional channels (Rai + Mediaset) and the new independent channel 
(La7). Data for LA7 channel are available only from year 2010 onwards.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Pavia Observatory data.  
 
Figure 2.3 - Intensity of crime news reporting and murder rates: selected countries 
 
Note. The graph compares the average monthly number of crime news broadcast during prime-time 
news programs by the main public TV channel with the annual murder rate in a selected number of 
European countries.  
Sources: Pavia Observatory (crime news data) and Eurostat (murder rates). Years: 2010-2012. 
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Figure 2.4 - Viewing shares during prime-time (18:00-20:30): Main traditional analogue 
channels (Rai + Mediaset) vs new digital channels   
 
Note. The figure plots monthly TV viewing shares during prime-time for main traditional analogue 
channels (Rai and Mediaset) and new digital channels between 2007 and 2013. Source: authors’ 
elaboration on AUDITEL data.  
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Figure 2.5 - Viewing shares: new digital channels also broadcasting news programs vs 
full-entertainment digital channels  
 
Note. The figure shows the evolution of viewing shares (prime-time) for new digital channels split into 
channels also broadcasting news programs (news digital) and full-entertainment (other digital channels). 
Source: authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data.  
 
Figure 2.6 - Content of new digital channels: composition of total viewing shares  
 
Note. The figure reports the total viewing of new digital channels divided by type of channel, for year 
2010. The interpretation of the y axis scale is that, for example, almost 35% of the entire digital viewing 
share during year 2010 refers to digital channels broadcasting TV shows or movies.   
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Figure 2.7 - Viewing shares (prime-time) around switch-over to digital signal deadlines in 
selected regions 
 
Note. The figure reports the evolution of monthly viewing shares (prime-time) before and after the 
switch-over to digital TV signal in 4 selected regions.  The light grey lines indicate viewing shares of 
main traditional analogue channels while the dark grey ones indicate those of new digital channels. The 
dashed vertical lines indicate switch-off dates for each specific region. Source: authors’ elaboration on 
AUDITEL data.  
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Figure 2.8 - Discontinuity in digital channels viewing shares (prime-time) around switch-
over to digital signal deadlines: selected pairs of neighboring regions  
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Note. The figures show the evolution of monthly TV viewing shares (prime-time) of new digital 
channels in 2 pairs of neighboring regions, before, during, and after the switch to digital signal. The 
dashed vertical lines indicate switch-off dates. In particular in Panel A the first line corresponds to the 
deadline in region Campania (12/2009) while the second to the deadline in region Calabria (06/2012). In 
Panel B the first line corresponds to the deadline in region Emilia-Romagna (11/2010) while the second 
to the deadline in region Tuscany (11/2011). Source: authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data.  
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Figure 2.9 - Reduced-form effect of the Digital Reform on crime perceptions: 
heterogeneity across age groups 
 
Note. The figure plots estimates and 90% confidence intervals by age groups from a LPM regression of 
Crime_Concern on a post digital switch variable (Digital_Switch) and controls. Crime_Concern is an 
indicator for the individual reporting crime as one of the 3 priority problems in Italy. Digital_Switch 
equals the number of months (as fraction of the 12 before each survey) elapsed since region r 
experienced the switch to digital signal. The specification is the same used in column 6 of Table 3. 
Individual and family controls include: gender, age, education, set of dummies of occupational status, 
family size, family structure, major source of household income. Region time-varying controls include: 
unemployment rate, crime rate, GDP per capita, share of immigrants, share of population with tertiary 
education. The regressions include year and region fixed effects.   
90% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by region are reported. 
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Figure 2.10 - Reduced-form effect of the Digital Reform on crime perceptions: 
heterogeneity by gender and age groups 
 
Panel A: Females 
 
Panel B: Males 
 
Note. The figure plots estimates and 90% confidence intervals by gender and age groups from a LPM 
regression of Crime_Concern on a post switch-over variable (Digital_Switch) and controls. 
Crime_Concern is an indicator for the individual reporting crime as one of the 3 priority problems in 
Italy. Digital_Switch equals the number of months (as fraction of the 12 before each survey) elapsed 
since region r experienced the switch to digital signal. The controls included are the same as those in 
column 6 of Table 3. In particular, individual and family controls include: age, education, set of 
dummies of occupational status, family size, family structure, major source of household income. 
Region time-varying controls include: unemployment rate, crime rate, GDP per capita, share of 
immigrants, share of population with tertiary education. The regressions include year and region fixed 
effects.   
90% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by region are reported.  
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Figure 2.11 - Average daily TV watching time: by gender and age 
 
Note. The figure plots average (reported) daily TV watching time (in minutes) for males and females 
along the age distribution. The estimates are obtained by pooling various waves of the Multipurpose 
Household Survey (ISTAT). 
 
 
Figure 2.12 - Use of alternative sources of information 
 
Note. Source: authors’ elaboration on data from the Multipurpose Household Survey (ISTAT). 
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Figure 2.13 - Crime news reporting intensity and viewing share drop during Digital 
Reform  
 
Note. The figure plots monthly average number of crime news against the change in TV viewing shares 
(both between 2007-2013) for each of the six main traditional channels.  
Source: authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data.  
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Table 2.1 - Balancing test: early vs late switcher regions  
 
Note. The table reports means of various characteristics for two groups of regions: those that switched to 
digital before or at December 2009 (early switchers) and those that switched to digital from January 
2010 onwards (late switchers). Column 4 reports the p-values for tests of the difference between means 
in the two groups.  
  
Early 
Switchers
Late 
Switchers
Difference p-value
Unemployment rate 0.063 0.064 -0.002 0.923
Employment rate 0.636 0.629 0.008 0.866
Share of tertiary educated 0.084 0.085 -0.001 0.121
Share of immigrant residents 0.039 0.042 -0.004 0.756
Share of internet users 0.388 0.355 0.033 0.213
GDP per capita (euros) 25,900 23,976 1924 0.550
Population density (people by square km) 186.3 182.9 -3.4 0.950
Persons cited for crimes (per 100,000 people) 1,149 1,137 -13 0.933
Murder rate (per 100,000 people) 1.010 0.881 0.129 0.546
Tables 
 
 
56 
Table 2.2 - Effect of the Digital Reform on TV viewing shares  
 
Note. The table reports estimates from regressions of TV viewing shares (during prime-time) on 
Digital_Switch The level of observation is the viewing share by channel*month*region. Digital_Switch 
equals one if the region r experienced the switch-over to digital signal at time (month) t or before.  Each 
panel reports estimates of the TV viewing shares (prime-time) of a different group of channels. Rai and 
Mediaset channels are indicated as Traditional Channels.  
Robust standard errors clustered at the region level are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Traditional Channels
Digital Switch -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.081***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
F-stat: Digital Switch 79.25 74.09 73.42 89.93
Panel B: New Digital Channels
Digital Switch 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.065***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
F-stat: Digital Switch 103.4 116.5 94.45 110.8
Panel C: Satellite Channels
Digital Switch 0.007 0.009** 0.009* 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
F-stat: Digital Switch 2.732 4.559 3.473 2.370
Panel D: Other Channels
Digital Switch 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
F-stat: Digital Switch 8.728 9.352 11.83 7.513
Region fixed effects X X X X
Linear time trend X
Year fixed effects X
Month*Year fixed effects X X
Region-specific linear trends X
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519
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Table 2.3 - Reduced-form effect of the Digital Reform on crime perceptions 
 
Note. The table reports estimates of the reduced-form effect of the introduction of digital TV on 
perceptions about crime. Estimates are from a linear probability model of Crime_Concern on a post 
switch-over variable (Digital_Switch). Crime_Concern is an indicator for the individual reporting crime 
as one of the 3 priority problems in Italy. In order to take into account the effective time passed since the 
region has switched to the digital signal we employ two alternative versions of the variable 
Digital_Switch. The first, which we employ in column 1 and 2, is a dummy that equals one if the region 
r experienced the switch-over to digital signal at time t or before. The second, which we employ from 
column 3 onwards, is the number of months (as fraction of the 12 before each survey) elapsed since 
region r experienced the switch to digital signal. Crime rates are calculated as logs of crimes per 10’000 
individuals.  Individual and family controls include: gender, age, education, set of dummies of 
occupational status, family size, family structure, major source of household income. Region time-
varying controls include: unemployment rate, crime rate, GDP per capita, share of immigrants, share of 
population with tertiary education. The regressions include year and region fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DigitalSwitch -0.014
(0.010)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 15-29 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 30-40 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.015) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 41-51 -0.009 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 52-65 -0.025 -0.040* -0.039* -0.039* -0.040**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018)
DigitalSwitch * Aged >65 -0.035*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.052**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018)
Crime rate: all 0.097
(0.091)
Crime rate: violent & drug 0.205**
(0.075)
Crime rate: property 0.035
(0.081)
Crime rate: other -0.025
(0.057)
Individual & family controls X X X
Region time-varying controls X X
Region fixed effects X X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X X
Observations 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165
Digital: Indicator of 
switch-off occurred 
Digital: Share of months after switch-off
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Table 2.4 - First-stage estimates: effect of Digital Reform on crime news exposure  
 
Note. The table reports estimates of the effect of the switch to digital signal on the exposure to crime 
news. Estimates are from regressions of Crime_News_Exposure on a post switch-over indicator 
Digital_Switch. The unit of observation is the TV viewing share by TV channel, month and region. 
Crime_News_Exposure is the summation, over all TV channels, of the number of crime news items 
broadcast during period t weighted by the region-specific viewing share in the region r during period t. 
Digital_Switch  is a dummy that equals one if the region r experienced the switch-over to digital signal 
at month t or before. F-stats of the excluded instrument are reported. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
No residual 
channels 
Yearly 
data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Digital Switch -15.895*** -8.306*** -8.436*** -8.130*** -7.783*** -8.154***
(4.515) (1.632) (1.388) (1.172) (1.083) (1.319)
F-stat: Digital Switch 12.39 25.92 36.92 48.16 51.64 38.23
Region fixed effects X X X X X X
Linear time trend X
Year fixed effects X X
Month*Year fixed effects X X X
Region-specific lin. trends X X X
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 133
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Table 2.5 - OLS and IV estimates of the effect of crime news exposure on crime 
perceptions  
 
Note. The table reports OLS and IV estimates of regressions of Crime_Concern on 
Crime_News_Exposure (simply Exposure in the table). Crime_Concern is an indicator for the individual 
reporting crime as one of the 3 priority problems in Italy. Crime_News_Exposure is the summation, over 
all TV channels, of the number of crime news items broadcast during period t weighted by the region-
specific viewing share in the region r during period t. Regressions are estimated on yearly data. In 
column 4, 5 and 6 we employ the switch to digital signal as an instrument for Crime_News_Exposure. In 
column 6 the digital switch is interacted with each of the age group dummies. F-stats of the excluded 
instrument are reported in columns 4, 5 and 6.  Crime rates are calculated as logs of crimes per 10’000 
individuals. Individual and family controls include: gender, age, education, set of dummies of 
occupational status, family size, family structure, major source of household income. Region time-
varying controls include: unemployment rate, crime rate, GDP per capita, share of immigrants, share of 
population with tertiary education. The regressions include year and region fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure 0.0028** 0.0028* 0.0025 0.0022
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0017)
Exposure * Aged 15-29 0.0014 0.0013
(0.0015) (0.0024)
Exposure * Aged 30-40 0.0018 0.0011
(0.0013) (0.0020)
Exposure * Aged 41-51 0.0024* 0.0021
(0.0014) (0.0019)
Exposure * Aged 52-65 0.0033** 0.0035
(0.0015) (0.0026)
Exposure * Aged >65 0.0041** 0.0044**
(0.0015) (0.0019)
F-stat (excluded instr.) 29.80 29.29 18.76
Individual & family controls X X X X
Region time-varying controls X X X X
Region fixed-effects X X X X X X
Year fixed-effects X X X X X X
Observations 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165
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Table 2.6 - Concern about crime and likelihood of voting for the centre-right coalition 
 
 
Note. The table reports estimates from a linear probability model of an indicator for the individual 
having voted for the centre-right coalition in 2008 election on a dummy for reporting crime as most 
important problem in the country at the moment of the elections. Individual controls include: age, male 
dummy, level of education, dummy for married and a set of dummies of occupational status. Sample: 
ITANES Survey (2008) 
Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
Crime Concern 0.249*** 0.248*** 0.246***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
Individual controls X X
Region fixed effects X
Observations 1,652 1,637 1,637
R-squared 0.030 0.071 0.098
Voted for the centre-right coalition 
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Appendix Figures 
  
Figure A 2.1 - Concern about crime in selected European countries (2008-2010) 
 
Note. This figure presents how crime is ranked, from 1
st
 to 15
th
, among a list of major problems in 
selected European countries. The ranking goes from 15
th
, indicating the least mentioned topic, to 1
st
, 
indicating the most mentioned topic. Sources: Authors elaboration from the 2008 and 2010 waves 
(pooled) of the Eurobarometer Survey.    
 
 
Figure A 2.2 - Timing switch-over Italian Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Sources: Italian Ministry of Communication. 
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Figure A 2.3 - Timing of change in perceptions of local area crime after the switch-over 
to digital TV signal. 
Note. The figure plots estimated coefficients and 90% confidence intervals from regression of the 
perception of crime level in the local area (Crime_Risk_Local) on a set of dummies from t-2 to t+2, 
where t=0 is the year when the switch-over to digital signal has occurred. The outcome variable ranges 
from 1 (crime absent) to 4 (crime level very high) and is collected at the household level. Family 
controls include: family size, family structure, major source of household income. Region time-varying 
controls include: unemployment rate, crime rate, GDP per capita, share of immigrants, share of 
population with tertiary education. The regression include year and region fixed effects.   
90% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by region are reported. 
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Figure A 2.4 - Crime news reporting in Berlusconi-owned channels and viewing shares of  
new digital channels 
 
Note. The figure plots the average number of crime news (per month) on TV channels owned by 
Berlusconi (Mediaset) against the viewing shares (prime-time) of new digital channels, from 2007 to 
2013. The grey shaded areas indicate different waves of switch from analogue to digital signal.  
Source: authors’ elaboration on AUDITEL data and Pavia Observatory data.  
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Appendix Tables  
 
Table A 2.1 - Effect of Digital reform on total TV watching time 
 
Note. The table investigates whether the switch to digital signal induced any change in the total amount 
of time people spend watching TV by regressing two measures of TV watching behavior on a post 
switch-over variable. DigitalSwitch is the number of months (as fraction of the 12 before each survey) 
elapsed since region r experienced the switch to digital signal. Column 1 and 2 report estimates from 
regressions where the outcome is an indicator for the individual watching at least some TV (columns 1 
and 2), while columns 3 and 4 report estimates where the outcome is the average daily TV viewing time 
for those who watch at least some TV. Individual and family controls include: age, education, set of 
dummies of occupational status, family size, family structure, major source of household income. 
Region time-varying controls include: unemployment rate, crime rate, GDP per capita, share of 
immigrants, share of population with tertiary education. The regressions include year and region fixed 
effects.  
Estimates show no evidence of individuals from any of the age groups varying their total TV watching 
time after the introduction of the digital signal.  
Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 15-29 -0.007 -0.008 2.672 1.532
(0.005) (0.005) (2.801) (2.790)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 30-40 -0.013 -0.012 1.105 -0.117
(0.010) (0.009) (2.623) (2.195)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 41-51 -0.003 -0.002 -2.073 -3.138
(0.007) (0.008) (2.982) (2.635)
DigitalSwitch * Aged 52-65 -0.005* -0.003 -3.881 -0.647
(0.003) (0.002) (3.028) (2.487)
DigitalSwitch * Aged >65 0.001 0.002 -1.296 0.146
(0.004) (0.004) (4.591) (4.891)
Individual and family controls X X
Region time-varying controls X X
Region fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Observations 140,349 140,349 114,103 114,103
Do watch TV
Average viewing 
time per day 
65 
 
Table A 2.2 - Effect of Digital Reform on TV viewing shares: all time-slots 
 
Note. The table reports estimates from regressions of TV viewing shares on Digital_Switch for different 
time slots during the day. The level of observation is the viewing share by channel*month*region. 
Digital_Switch equals one if the region r experienced the switch-over to digital signal at time (month) t 
or before. In each panel the TV viewing shares of a different group of channel is adopted as outcome 
variable. Month-by-year and region fixed effects are included in all regressions, as in column 3 of Table 
2. Rai and Mediaset channels  are indicated as Traditional channels.  
Robust standard errors clustered at the region level are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time slot: 18:00-20:30 
Prime-time 
news
All day 12:00-14:59 
Lunch-time 
news
7:00-11:59 15:00-17:59 20:31-23:59
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Traditional Channels
Digital_Switch -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.064*** -0.120*** -0.103*** -0.078***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010)
F-stat: Digital Switch 73.42 68.97 43.92 41.06 52.13 62.04
Panel B: New Digital Channels
Digital_Switch 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.057*** 0.094*** 0.086*** 0.062***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
F-stat: Digital Switch 94.45 154.1 140.5 90.33 179.1 110.3
Panel C: Satellite Channels
Digital_Switch 0.009* 0.010* 0.010* 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
F-stat: Digital Switch 3.473 3.177 3.613 1.406 1.401 1.222
Panel D: Other Channels
Digital_Switch 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.006 0.025** 0.020*** 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004)
F-stat: Digital Switch 11.83 9.460 1.677 6.504 10.77 7.251
Month*year fixed effects X X X X X X
Region fixed effects X X X X X X
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519
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Table A 2.3 - Descriptive statistics  
 
Note. Descriptive statistics of the main estimating sample from the Multipurpose Household Survey 
(ISTAT) for the years 2007 to 2010. The variable Crime_Risk_Local is available also for the years 2011 
and 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 139,165
Age 49 19 15 95 139,165
Married 0.60 0.49 0 1 139,165
Tertiary education or more 0.10 0.30 0 1 139,165
Employed dummy 0.43 0.49 0 1 139,165
Retired dummy 0.22 0.41 0 1 139,165
Dummy for not watching TV at all 0.05 0.21 0 1 139,165
Average daily TV watching time (minutes) 165 114 0 930 136,382
Family size 2.98 1.30 1 12 139,165
Crime_Concern: dummy for reporting crime as 
one of 3 main problems in the country
0.57 0.49 0 1 139,165
          Individuals aged <= 65 0.55
          Individuals aged > 65 0.62
          Females 0.57
          Males 0.56
Crime_Risk_Local: perception of crime level in 
the local area
2.01 0.90 1 4 201,923
Individuals
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Table A 2.4 - Effect of Digital Reform on concern about other topics 
 
Note. The table investigates the effect of the switch to digital signal on the likelihood for individuals aged above 65 of mentioning each of the other problem 
suggested by the question “What do you think are the 3 priority problems of the country?”. Suggested problems are ordered from left to right from the most to the 
least mentioned.  The independent variable is the number of months (as fraction of the 12 before each survey) elapsed since region r experienced the switch to digital 
signal.  Individual and family controls include: gender, age, education, set of dummies of occupational status, family size, family structure, major source of household 
income. Region time-varying controls include: unemployment rate, crime rate, GDP per capita, share of immigrants, share of population with tertiary education. The 
regressions include year and region fixed effects.  
Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
  
Unemployment Crime Poverty Tax evasion
Inefficiency 
of health 
sector
Immigration
Environment
/ Pollution
Inefficiency 
of judicial 
system
Public debt
Inefficiency 
of education 
sector
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Effect of digital on aged >65 -0.063 -0.050*** 0.031 0.018 0.028* 0.003 -0.001 0.031* 0.011 -0.010 -0.001
(0.075) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.022) (0.006) (0.007)
Individual & family controls X X X X X X X X X X X
Region time-varying controls X X X X X X X X X X X
Region fixed effects X X X X X X X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X X X X X X X
Mean of outcome 0.72 0.57 0.3 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.02
Observations 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165 139,165
68 
 
Table A 2.5 - Effect of Digital Reform on crime and unemployment  
 
Note. The table investigates whether the timing of the switch to digital signal is associated with any 
changes in economic variables that might themselves explain crime perceptions. We regress the 
unemployment rate (multiplied by 100) and the crime rate in a specific region and year on 
Digital_Switch. Crime rates are calculate as logs of crimes per 10’000 individuals. We use two versions 
of the variable Digital_Switch: a dummy that equals one if the region r experienced the switch-over to 
digital signal at year t or before (columns 1 and 3); and the number of months, in the calendar year to 
which the outcomes refers, elapsed since region r experienced the switch to digital signal. Observations 
are at the region by (calendar) year level. The regressions include year and region fixed effects.  
Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Digital Switch (indicator) -0.245 -0.019
(0.340) (0.016)
Digital Switch (fraction) 0.118 -0.022
(0.302) (0.018)
Region fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Observations 114 114 114 114
Unemployment share 
(*100)
log (Crime rate)
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Table A 2.6 - Effect of Digital Reform on individuals who do not watch TV 
 
Note. The table investigates the effect of the Digital Reform on those individuals who do not watch TV. 
It reports estimates from a linear probability model of an indicator for the individual reporting crime as 
one of the 3 main problems in Italy (Crime_Concern) on a post switch-over dummy. The sample 
includes individuals who report to never watch television. Individual and family controls include: age, 
education, set of dummies of occupational status, family size, family structure, major source of 
household income. Region time-varying controls include: unemployment rate, crime rate, GDP per 
capita, share of immigrants, share of population with tertiary education. The regressions include year 
and region fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by region and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DigitalSwith * Aged 15-29 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006 0.006
(0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.071)
DigitalSwith * Aged 30-40 -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 -0.000
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.032)
DigitalSwith * Aged 41-51 -0.052 -0.057 -0.057 -0.039
(0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.042)
DigitalSwith * Aged 52-65 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.003
(0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.034)
DigitalSwith * Aged >65 -0.061 -0.071 -0.071 -0.061
(0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.080)
Individual & family controls X X X
Region time-varying controls X X
Region & year fixed effects X X X X
Observations 5,822 5,822 5,822 5,822
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Chapter 3 
 
 
     
3.    Risk Attitudes and Household Migration 
Decisions 
 
  
 
A recent and growing body of empirical literature suggests that individual risk aversion has a 
significant impact on a wide range of individual choices, including portfolio diversification, 
engagement in healthy behaviours, occupational choices, wealth accumulation, technology 
adoption and migration decisions (see, among others, Barsky et al., 1997; Bonin et al., 2007; 
Guiso & Paiella, 2008; Dohmen et al., 2011; Liu, 2013; Jaeger et al. 2010). All these papers 
explore the relationship between individual decision making and the individual’s own risk 
aversion. However, when decisions are taken at the household level, the benefit of risk 
diversification to the more risk averse household members may also influence the decisions of 
one particular member. One context in which other household members’ risk aversion may 
affect the behaviour of one focal individual is rural-urban migration in developing countries.
26
  
                                                     
26
 There exists a mainly theoretical body of literature suggesting that migrations in this context may be 
driven by motives of risk diversification (see e.g. Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989). However, these papers do 
not speak to the question as to how the distribution of risk attitudes within the household affects 
migration decisions. 
3.1. Introduction 
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In this paper, therefore, we analyse how the probability of a household sending a migrant 
depends on the distribution of risk attitudes within the household. In doing so, we focus on 
three aspects. First, we re-examine whether migrants are indeed less risk averse than non-
migrants. Second, we investigate whether the risk aversion of other household members affects 
who emigrates from a particular household. Finally, we analyse which households send 
migrants and how this choice depends on the distribution of risk aversion among household 
members, as well as on the individual risk aversion of the potential emigrants.  
To structure our empirical investigation, we develop a theoretical framework of household 
migration decisions from which to derive a set of testable implications. Our model draws on an 
earlier literature on household migration decisions and risk (e.g. Stark & Levhari, 1982; 
Hoddinott, 1994), but is most closely related to Chen et al. (2003). We add to this work by 
introducing heterogeneous risk preferences among family members in a setting in which the 
family chooses not only whether to send a migrant but also whom to send.
27
 Our model 
provides us with testable implications on migrant selection at the individual level, both within 
households and across households. We test the model predictions using survey data on internal 
migration in China, a country that has experienced massive migration flows from rural to 
urban areas in recent years.
28
 As explained in section 3.3.1, the Chinese institutional setting 
makes household decision models a particularly appropriate tool for analysing internal 
migration in this country (see also Taylor, Scott, & de Brauw, 1999, 2003).
29
 We base our 
analysis on a unique dataset that includes responses to a set of items designed to elicit risk 
aversion from both migrants and non-migrants in their areas of origin. The reliability of this 
measure has been experimentally validated. 
We find that in the context of internal migration in a large developing country (in this case, 
China), individuals who migrate are less risk averse than those who do not migrate.  This result 
                                                     
27
 Only few papers study risk sharing when preferences are heterogeneous across households (Mazzocco 
and Saini, 2012; Chiappori et al., 2014) or within households (Mazzocco, 2004), but none of them study 
migration decisions.  
28
 According to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, the number of internal immigrants in China 
increased from about 30 million in 1996 to over 150 million in 2009; that is, from 2.5 to more than 11% 
of the total resident population.  
29
 China provides an ideal context for our study: under the houku residence system (see Section 3.3.1 for 
more details), migrants in urban areas have limited access to public services such as health, 
unemployment benefits, and child education in cities. They therefore leave the rest of the family behind 
while still keeping strong ties to the origin community in the expectation that they will eventually be 
returning. 
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lends further support to the findings of Jaeger et al. (2010) and Gibson and McKenzie (2011); 
our findings further imply that migrations are considered to be risky.
30
 We then investigate 
how migration decisions of one household member are affected by the risk aversion of other 
household members. In line with our model assumptions, we show that individuals who are the 
least risk averse in their households are more likely to migrate than those with identical risk 
aversion but who are not the least risk averse in their household. At the household level, we 
find that more risk averse households are more likely to send migrants, but only if they have at 
least one household member who is sufficiently risk loving. These results suggest that internal 
rural-urban migration in China is a household decision and that the distribution of risk aversion 
within households is an important additional factor determining the selection of individuals 
and households into migration.  
This role of risk diversification in migration decisions has been previously explored in the 
migration literature both when the migration decision is an individual choice (e.g. Dustmann, 
1997) and when it is made at the household level (see e.g. Stark & Levhari, 1982; Rosenzweig 
& Stark, 1989; Chen et al., 2003; Morten, 2013).
31
 Nevertheless, although these papers 
pinpoint risk diversification as a key element in a household’s decision problem, they do not 
investigate the relation between risk attitudes and migration choices within and across 
household units nor do they discuss how the distribution of risk attitudes within households 
may affect the migration decision. Yet understanding who emigrates, how emigrants compare 
with other household members, and which households send migrants is crucial for assessing 
determinants and consequences of migration. Such an understanding is central, for example, to 
the issue of migrant selection based on unobservable characteristics determining productivity, 
which has important economic consequences for both receiving and sending communities (see 
e.g. Borjas, 1987; Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996; Chiquiar & Hanson, 2005; McKenzie & 
Rapoport 2010; Dustmann, Fadlon & Weiss, 2011). To date, however, such selection has been 
addressed primarily using models of individual migration decisions. Our analysis, in contrast, 
                                                     
30
 In line with that, Bryan et al. (2014) provide strong evidence for Bangladesh that migration is 
perceived to be risky and that for this reason individuals refrain from migrating despite large gains and 
small costs. 
31
 The importance of household migration decisions as mechanisms to cope with unexpected negative 
shocks is illustrated by Jalan and Ravallion (1999) for rural China, who show the poorest households 
passing up to 40% of income shocks onto current consumption. Further, Giles (2006) and Giles and Yoo 
(2007) show that the liberalization of internal migration flows in China in the early ‘90s provided rural 
household with a new mechanism to hedge against consumption risk. 
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employs a household-level migration decision model to show that the risk preferences of other 
household members and their distribution within the household may not only determine who 
and how many emigrate but may also influence the level of risk aversion of the migrant 
population. This latter point is especially important in the face of recent findings that risk 
aversion is negatively correlated with both cognitive ability (Dohmen et al. 2010) and the 
probability of engaging in entrepreneurial activity (Ekelund, Johansson, & Lichtermann, 2005; 
Levine & Rubinstein 2014), which point to it being a key factor determining immigrant 
success.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines our theoretical 
framework for the relation between individual risk aversion and the household decision of 
whether to send a migrant and whom to send, and then develops the empirical implications of 
this relation. Section 3.3 describes the institutional background and data, and section 3.4 
explains our empirical strategy. Section 3.5 reports the estimation results, and section 3.6 
concludes the paper.   
3.2.1. Setup 
We denote individual earnings by 𝑦𝑗, where 𝑗 = 𝑆, 𝐷 for source (S) and destination (D) region, 
and assign earnings a deterministic component ?̅?𝑗 and a stochastic component 𝜖𝑗, with 
𝐸(𝜖𝑗) = 0; 𝑉(𝜀𝑗) = 𝜎𝑗² for  𝑗 = 𝑆, 𝐷.
32
 We further assume that shocks in source and 
destination regions are uncorrelated: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑆𝜀𝐷) = 0.
33
 Migration to region D incurs a 
                                                     
32
 In the context of rural-urban migration in China, the variance in earnings of urban migrations stems 
primarily from unemployment risk, while wages for rural migrants are fairly compressed around the 
subsistence level). 
33
 Allowing for a non-zero correlation between shocks in source and destination regions does not change 
any of our conclusions (see Appendix section A.I.C) but does complicate our analysis.  
3.2. A Model  of Household Migration Decision with 
Individual Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion  
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monetary cost c that is heterogeneous across households but homogenous within households.
34
 
Earnings in the two regions are thus 
                                                𝑦𝑆  = ?̅?S + 𝜀𝑆                                                           (1) 
                                             𝑦𝐷 = ?̅?D − 𝑐 + 𝜀𝐷                                                      (2) 
Here, each household consists of two members who can perfectly pool their income only if 
they are both residing in the same origin region S.
35
 We use ?̃? to denote total pooled household 
income and ?̃? to represent the amount each individual receives from the pooled income. If both 
members stay in S, the total pooled household income is given by ?̃?𝑆𝑆 = 2𝑦𝑆, and each 
individual receives exactly ?̃?𝑆𝑆 = 𝑦𝑆. 
If one individual migrates, distance and frictions will only allow imperfect income pooling. In 
particular, the member who remains in region S will pool her entire income 𝑦𝑆 and receive a 
full quota of the total pooled income, while the member who migrates to region D will only 
contribute a fraction α of his earnings 𝑦𝐷 and will receive the same fraction α of the full quota. 
Hence, total pooled income if one household member has emigrated is given by  ?̃?𝑆𝐷 = 𝑦𝑆 +
𝛼𝑦𝐷. Defining ?̃?
𝑁𝑀 and ?̃?𝑀  as the individual disposable income of the non-migrant (NM) and 
migrant (M) household member, respectively, yields: 
                                              ?̃?𝑁𝑀 = ?̃?𝑆𝐷/(1 +  𝛼)                                                       (3) 
                                     ?̃?𝑀 = 𝛼[?̃?𝑆𝐷/(1 +  𝛼)] + (1 − 𝛼)𝑦𝐷                                      (4) 
It is thus parameter α that determines the extent to which the household engages in risk 
diversification across its members and the level of insurance the migrant receives against 
uncertainty in the destination region. If α equals zero, the migrant is fully exposed to 
uncertainty in region D (which is equivalent to the case of an individual migration decision). If 
instead, α equals one, migration can reduce the overall household variance in income, and the 
migrant and non-migrant members face the same exposure to uncertainty.  
                                                     
34
 This assumption reflects the fact that households may differ in their wealth, access to credit, distance 
from the destination region, etc. but that, within each household, the cost of financing the migration of 
one member or the other does not differ. 
35
 Our theoretical framework can be straightforwardly extended to N household members. For example, 
in the subsequent simulation (see Appendix section AII), we use four household members, reflecting the 
average household size in our data. 
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3.2.2. Household migration decision 
The household’s decision to send a migrant to the destination region D is made by comparing 
the household utility of no migration with that of sending one household member to region D. 
We assume that household members differ only in their degree of risk aversion k, have a mean-
variance utility function, and jointly maximize the sum of their utilities to act as a coherent 
unit.
36
  
If both members remain in the source region S, the household utility is given by  
       𝑈𝑆𝑆 = [𝐸(𝑦𝑆) − 𝑘1𝑉(𝑦𝑆)] + [𝐸(𝑦𝑆) − 𝑘2𝑉(𝑦𝑆)] = 2?̅?S − (𝑘1 + 𝑘2)𝜎𝑆
2              (5) 
If instead one household member remains in region S (individual 1) and one migrates to region 
D (individual 2), the household utility is given by 
𝑈𝑆𝐷 = [𝐸(?̃?
𝑁𝑀) − 𝑘1𝑉(?̃?
𝑁𝑀)] + [𝐸(?̃?𝑀) − 𝑘2𝑉(?̃?
𝑀)] = 
           = [(
?̅?S+𝛼(?̅?D−𝑐)
1+𝛼
) − 𝑘1 (
𝜎𝑆
2+𝛼2𝜎𝐷
2
(1+𝛼)2
)]⏟                    
𝑁𝑀
+ [(
𝛼?̅?S+(?̅?D−𝑐)
1+𝛼
) − 𝑘2 (
𝛼2𝜎𝑆
2+𝜎𝐷
2
(1+𝛼)2
)]⏟                    
𝑀
                (6) 
The household will send a migrant whenever  USD − USS > 0: 
USD − USS = (
?̅?S + 𝛼(?̅?D − 𝑐)
1 + 𝛼
− ?̅?S)
⏟              
∆ 𝐸(?̃?𝑁𝑀)
− 𝑘1 (
𝜎𝑆
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝐷
2
(1 + 𝛼)2
− 𝜎𝑆
2)
⏟            
∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀)
+ 
                          +(
𝛼?̅?S+(?̅?D−𝑐)
1+𝛼
− ?̅?S)⏟            
∆ 𝐸(?̃?𝑀)
− 𝑘2 (
𝛼2𝜎𝑆
2+𝜎𝐷
2
(1+𝛼)2
− 𝜎𝑆
2)
⏟          
∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀)
 > 0                             (7) 
These terms thus characterize the change in expected earnings and earnings variance from 
migration (with respect to non-migration) for both the migrant and the non-migrant household 
member.  
                                                     
36
 The assumption that the family acts as a coherent unit can be justified either (a) based on the existence 
of a dominant head of household or (b) by a family utility function that is the aggregate of individual 
utility functions (assuming all household members have the same preferences, including risk aversion) 
(see Chen et al., 2003). In our case, household members do not have homogenous preferences (i.e. they 
differ in risk aversion), so we assume that a dominant head of household makes the decision of who 
migrates on behalf of the household.  
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We now identify the conditions under which expression (7) (i.e. the household gains from the 
migration of one of its members) is positive.
37
 We first consider the changes in the expected 
earnings of the non-migrant and migrant, Δ𝐸(?̃?𝑁𝑀) and Δ𝐸(?̃?𝑀). Both these will be positive 
as long as the migrant’s expected earnings in the destination region (net of migration costs) are 
larger than in the source region (?̅?D − 𝑐 > ?̅?S). We then consider the changes in the earnings 
variances for the non-migrant and the potential migrant,  ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀) and ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀). In this 
model, risk diversification alone may lead the household to choose to send a migrant, even if 
the earnings differential between source and destination regions is zero (i.e. Δ𝐸(?̃?𝑁𝑀) =
Δ𝐸(?̃?𝑀) = 0). FIGURE 3.1 shows the relation between 𝜎𝐷
2 (horizontal axis) and the change in 
earnings variance (vertical axis) for the migrant (∆𝑉(?̃?𝑀)) and non-migrant (∆𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀)), 
respectively. Although both terms are increasing functions of 𝜎𝐷
2, ∆𝑉(?̃?𝑀) is steeper than 
∆𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀), with slopes of 1 (1 + 𝛼)2⁄  and 𝛼2 (1 + 𝛼)2,⁄  respectively, which reflects the higher 
exposure of the migrant to risk in the destination region.
38
 The non-migrant’s earnings variance 
is reduced by migration (∆𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀) < 0) if the variance in destination region D is not 
excessively larger than in source region S: 𝜎𝐷
2 <
2+𝛼
𝛼
 𝜎𝑆
2. Similarly, the migrant will 
experience a reduction in earning variance for sufficiently low values of 𝜎𝐷
2:  ∆𝑉(?̃?𝑀) is 
negative for 𝜎𝐷
2 < (1 + 2𝛼)𝜎𝑆
2. It should also be noted that ∆𝑉(?̃?𝑀)  crosses the zero line 
before ∆𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀): the threshold for 𝜎𝐷 above which a migration leads to higher earnings risk 
than non-migration is always higher for the non-migrant than for the migrant ( 
2+𝛼
𝛼
> 1 + 2𝛼). 
Obviously, the lower the share α of the migrant’s earnings that is re-distributed to the non-
migrant, the higher (lower) the earnings variance in region D that still reduces the overall 
earnings variance for the non-migrant (migrant) household member. Finally, if 𝜎𝐷
2 = 𝜎𝑆
2, the 
change in earnings variance is identical (i.e. ∆𝑉(?̃?𝑀) and ∆𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀) cross), and both 
individuals benefit from the diversification of income risk. 
                                                     
37
 We do not consider the case in which both household members migrate because in the context we 
empirically analyse entire households do not emigrate. 
38
 The difference in the slope of the two lines is inversely related to the parameter 𝛼, which determines 
the degree of income pooling: when income pooling is perfect (α =1) the two lines overlap. 
77 
 
The intersection of these two lines with each other and with the zero line creates three different 
scenarios for 𝜎𝐷
2 > 𝜎𝑆
2.
39
 To the right of the two-line intersection but before either line 
intersects the x-axis (𝜎𝐷
2 < (1 + 2𝛼)𝜎𝑆
2; area I in the graph), 𝜎𝐷
2 is only moderately larger than 
𝜎𝑆
2, so risk diversification leads to a decrease in earnings risk for both migrant and non-
migrant. For intermediate values of 𝜎𝐷
2, ((1 + 2𝛼)𝜎𝑆
2 ≤ 𝜎𝐷
2 <
2+𝛼
𝛼
 𝜎𝑆
2; area II), earnings risk 
decreases for the non-migrant but increases for the migrant. Finally, for high values of 𝜎𝐷
2, 
(𝜎𝐷
2 ≥
2+𝛼
𝛼
 𝜎𝑆
2; area III), migration increases earnings risk for both household members. 
The actual decision to migrate, however, also takes into account the relative gains in expected 
earnings. In the case of a zero earnings differential (net of migration cost) between source and 
destination region, migration will always be optimal in area I (in which both individuals reduce 
their exposure to risk by having one migrant in the household). There will be migration in area 
II as long as the utility gain in reducing uncertainty of the non-migrant member more than 
compensates for the loss experienced by the migrant. Finally, no migration will take place in 
area III. Positive earning differentials, however, may shift these decisions, meaning that 
migration may also take place in area III. 
3.2.3. Who will migrate? 
We now investigate the household’s choice of whom of its members to send as a migrant. We 
first note that if the earnings variance is higher in the destination region than in the source 
region (σD
² ≥ σS
² ), the migrant is always exposed to at least as high an income variance as the 
non-migrant (for any value of  0 ≤ α ≤ 1):   
                  𝑉[?̃?𝑀] = (
𝛼2𝜎𝑆
2+𝜎𝐷
2
(1+𝛼)2
)  ≥ 𝑉[?̃?𝑁𝑀] = (
𝜎𝑆
2+𝛼2𝜎𝐷
2
(1+𝛼)2
)        if      σD
² ≥ σS
²  .                   (8) 
The decision of which of the two individuals will emigrate will be based on the comparison of 
household utility when one member, rather than the other, migrates. We have:  
Proposition 1. As long as migration is riskier than non-migration, 𝑉[?̃?𝑀] ≥ 𝑉[?̃?𝑁𝑀], it is 
always optimal to choose the least risk averse individual in the household as the potential 
                                                     
39
 A fourth case (area 0 in the graph) arises whenever 𝜎𝐷
2 < 𝜎𝑆
2. In this scenario, not only does the 
earnings risk decrease for both migrant and non-migrant, but the earnings risk of the migrant is lower 
than that of the non-migrant. 
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migrant (although it may be optimal to send nobody. If instead 𝑉[?̃?𝑀] ≤ 𝑉[?̃?𝑁𝑀], it is optimal 
to choose the most risk averse individual in the household. 
Proof. See Appendix A.I.A 
If migration choices are made at the individual level, only the absolute risk aversion of 
individuals should matter for the migration decision. Proposition 1, however, implies that if the 
decision is taken at the household level, the elasticity of migration probabilities to individual 
risk aversion depends also on the way individuals with different risk attitudes mix within the 
household. Hence, the relative risk aversion of individuals with respect to the risk aversion of 
other household members should also matter.  In other words, whereas two individuals with 
identical risk aversion would, all else being equal, have the same probability of migrating in an 
individual migration decision model, in a household decision model, that probability will differ 
depending on the composition of the risk aversion of the other household members. 
Empirically, an individual decision model (which corresponds to the case where 𝛼 = 0) would 
predict a lower average risk aversion among the migrant population than among the non-
migrant one when income variance at destination is higher than in the source region. This 
prediction is also compatible with the household migration decision model outlined above. 
However, whereas the individual model makes no predictions about how the migration 
probability relates to the risk aversion of other household members, the household decision 
model predicts that the relative position in the within household risk aversion ranking – and 
not just the absolute risk aversion – matters for the migration probability.  This is one of the 
implications of the model that we will test below. 
3.2.4. Which household will send a migrant? 
Which households, then, are more likely to send migrants? The answer involves two 
counteracting factors within each household. On the one hand, migration can reduce the 
income uncertainty of the non-migrant household members, and their utility gain increases 
with their risk aversion. On the other hand, if migrating involves more exposure to uncertainty, 
the household needs members with sufficiently low risk aversion as suitable candidates for 
migration. Hence, in a household in which everyone is very risk averse, although there is a 
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strong desire for risk diversification, no member will be a good candidate for migration. 
Conversely, in households in which all members have low risk aversion, there will be many 
candidates for migration but lower demand for risk diversification.  Thus, the likelihood of a 
household sending a migrant will depend on the distribution of risk attitudes within the 
household. We formalize this intuition in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2   
(i) Consider two households that differ only in the risk aversion of their members but 
have identical average risk aversion. If migration increases (reduces) the exposure to risk of 
the migrant member, the household with more (less) variation in its members’ risk preferences 
will benefit the most from migration. 
(ii) Consider two households that differ only in the degree of risk aversion of the least risk 
averse individual. If migration increases (reduces) the exposure to risk of the migrant member, 
the household whose least risk averse individual has lower (higher) risk aversion will benefit 
the most from migration. [Alternatively: Consider two households that differ only in the degree 
of risk aversion of the most risk averse individual. If migration reduces (increases) the 
exposure to risk of the non-migrant member, the household whose most risk averse individual 
has higher (lower) risk aversion will benefit the most from migration.] 
Proof. See Appendix A.I.B. 
According to proposition 2, when migration is risky households are more likely to send 
migrants if they have some members with low risk aversion (who are good candidates for 
migration) and some with high risk aversion (who will gain most by sending another 
household member to reduce their exposure to income uncertainty). This observation implies 
that, beyond the risk aversion of individual members, the within household dispersion in risk 
aversion affects the likelihood that a household sends a migrant. Again, this is an implication 
tested below. 
3.2.5. An illustration of individual and household decisions 
Our model suggests that the risk attitudes of other household members, in addition to the risk 
preferences of individuals, should matter in shaping individuals’ migration choices. Before 
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exploring this question empirically, we examine the implications of an individual versus a 
household decision model for migration rates and for the selection of migrants and non-
migrants according to their risk aversion. In the individual model, there is no income pooling 
(𝛼 = 0) and each agent autonomously decides whether it is optimal to migrate or not. In the 
household decision model, instead, household members pool income (0 < 𝛼 ≤ 1) and take 
joint decisions on the migration of their members.  
In our simulation, we generate a population of 10,000 individuals with mean-variance utility 
functions that are randomly assigned a value of willingness to take risks (varying between zero 
and ten) whose distribution mimics the one we observe in our data. Further, we choose values 
for expected earnings 𝐸(𝑦𝑆) and earnings variance 𝑉(𝑦𝑆) in the source region S, assume that 
expected earnings 𝐸(𝑦𝐷) in destination region D are twice as large as in region S, and vary the 
earnings variance 𝑉(𝑦𝑆) to study how migration choices react to relative changes in the 
earnings variance in the two regions.
40
  
We then simulate migration decisions under the two models discussed above: the individual 
model and the household model. In the first case, decisions are made individually, and 
individuals face the same expected income and income variance but differ in migration costs.
41
 
In the second model, we assign individuals to households so that the within household 
correlation in risk aversion roughly resembles that in our data (the within household standard 
deviation of willingness to take risks is 0.9). Each household has four members, the average 
household size in our data, which results in 2,500 households in the simulation. Once 
households are formed, we randomly reassign migration costs to the household using the same 
distribution as above. Finally, we assume that migrants pool about a third of their income with 
the origin family (i.e. we set the parameter 𝛼 = 0.3), and that at most one individual can 
migrate from each household. As in our model, a household chooses to send a member to 
destination region D if the utility is higher than the utility from keeping all members in region 
S. 
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 We set: 𝐸(𝑦𝑆) = 16; 𝑉(𝑦𝑆) = 40; 𝐸(𝑦𝐷) = 32 and we let  𝑉(𝑦𝑆) vary in the interval: [0.1 ∗ 𝑉(𝑦𝐷) ≤
𝑉(𝑦𝑆) ≤ 10 ∗ 𝑉(𝑦𝐷)]. 
41
 We assume migration costs are uncorrelated with risk attitudes. In our simulations, individuals are 
assigned a (pseudo) random value of migration cost drawn from a chi-squared distribution with 2 
degrees of freedom so that the mean value of migration costs (7.9) is approximately equal to half of the 
expected earnings in the source region. 
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FIGURE 3.2 plots the predicted migration rates and the average willingness to take risks among 
migrants and non-migrants for the two models. The horizontal axis carries the earnings 
variance in the destination region D relative to the source region S (with expected earnings in 
region D assumed to be twice as high as in region S), while the vertical axis carries the 
migration rate on the left-hand side and the average willingness to take risks on the right-hand 
side. In both models the trend of the simulated migration rates are similar: when the variance 
ratio  𝑉(𝑦𝐷)/𝑉(𝑦𝑆) < 1 the migration rates (solid line) are close to 100%, but they gradually 
decline as uncertainty in the destination region increases (relative to the source region). 
Similarly, both the individual and the household decision models imply that sorting leads to a 
higher average willingness to take risk for migrants (dash-dotted line) than for non-migrants 
(dashed line) when there is lower uncertainty in the source region than in the destination. Thus, 
migrants will always be less risk averse than non-migrants no matter whether the migration 
decision is taken at the individual or household level.  
The two models diverge, however, in their quantitative predictions of the migration rate for 
any given level of relative earnings variance in the two regions. Whereas the individual model 
predicts a rapid decline in the share of migrants with increasing uncertainty in the destination 
region, such decline is less pronounced when migration decisions are taken at the household 
level. Thus, the household migration model predicts positive migration rates for levels of 
destination uncertainty for which an individual model would predict zero migration. It does so 
because first, the other household members benefit from risk diversification even if the 
earnings variance in the destination region is high and second, the migrant is partially insured 
against risks in the destination region by household members who stay at home.
42
 Both these 
factors are absent in a model in which migration decisions are made at the individual level.
43
 It 
is thus important to understand whether migration decisions are taken at the individual or the 
household levels and whether they depend on the level of risk aversion of other household 
members. We address both these issues empirically in the remainder of the paper. 
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One can show that the lower is the share of income that the migrant pools with the rest of the family 
(parameter α in the model), the faster the migration rate drops as relative uncertainty in the destination 
region increases.  
43
 When the risk aversion of the most risk averse household members increases, and the insurance 
parameter 𝛼 increases, the solid line in panel B of FIGURE 3.2 shifts further outwards.  
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3.3. Background and Data 
3.3.1. Internal migration in China 
In the late 1970s, rural communities in China moved from a “commune system” to a 
“household responsibility system” under which households, which were allocated land use 
rights, could choose their own crops, and were allowed to sell their produce freely on the 
market. While this shift significantly increased agricultural productivity, many basic social 
services provided by the communes were abolished, so households found themselves in the 
situation of having to finance their own health and education, as well as having to deal with 
other unforeseeable risks, such as adverse weather conditions. This change increased the need 
to diversify the sources of household income, but before the early 1990s, such diversification 
was limited by relatively strict rural-urban segregation enforced through a household 
registration system (or hukou) that gave people the right to live only in the jurisdiction of their 
birth (see Meng, 2012). It was not until the late 1990s, when the massive economic 
development of urban areas created a significant increase in demand for unskilled labour that 
the government began to loosen its enforcement of migration restrictions. According to data 
from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the total number of rural-urban 
migrants increased from around 30 million in 1996 to 150 million in 2009, a rise from 2.5 to 
11% of the total resident population.  
However, the lack of an urban hukou prevents migrants in cities from accessing certain 
occupations and excludes them and their dependants from health care, pension insurance, 
unemployment insurance, and many other social services available to urban hukou holders 
(Meng & Zhang, 2001). The hukou system thus prevents rural migrants from settling in cities 
and causes them to leave their families behind (Meng & Manning, 2010). As a result, complete 
households seldom migrate to urban areas in China, choosing instead to send particular 
household members to migrate to urban centres (as represented by our model in the previous 
section). Migrants generally engage in circular migration and repeated short term migration 
spells are common (in our sample, migrants spend an average 9.6 months per year working in 
destination regions and the remaining 2.4 months at home).  
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Rural migrants face difficult conditions in urban areas, with average wages at the lower end of 
the urban wage distribution (Meng & Zhang, 2001; Frijters et al., forthcoming), receiving 
unequal pay even within the same occupation (Meng & Zhang, 2001), with about one in three 
falling below the poverty line (Du et al., 2005). Strenuous working hours, poor housing, and 
no access to health care are all factors that lead to serious health hazards (Du et al., 2005), 
contributing to the various risks associated with migration. In line with the theoretical model 
outlined in the previous section, if migrants are exposed to more uncertainty in the destination 
region than at home we should expect them to be relatively less risk averse than the non-
migrant population. 
3.3.2. Data and samples 
Our primary data source is the Rural Household Survey (RHS) from the Rural-Urban 
Migration in China (RUMiC) project (henceforth RUMiC-RHS). RUMiC began in 2008 and it 
conducts yearly longitudinal surveys of rural, urban, and migrant households. The RUMiC-
RHS was conducted for 4 years and administered by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. It 
covers 82 counties (around 800 villages) in 9 provinces identified as either major migrant 
sending or receiving regions and is representative of the populations of these regions. The 
survey includes a rich set of individual and household level variables that contains not only the 
usual demographic, labour market, and educational data but also information on individual 
migration experience and subjective rating of willingness to take risks, both particularly 
relevant to this study. Unlike other surveys, it records information on all household members 
whose hukou are registered in the household. Thus, household members who were migrated to 
cities at the time of the survey were also included. Information on household members who 
were not present at the time of the survey was provided by the main respondent. However, 
questions related to subjective issues and opinions (e.g. risk attitudes) are only answered by 
individuals who were present at the time of the survey. In this paper, we use data from the 
2009 RUMiC-RHS, conducted between March and June of that year, which was the first wave 
that reports information on risk aversion. 
To identify migrants, the survey includes questions on the number of months each individual 
spent living away from home during the previous year (i.e. 2008) and the reason for their 
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absence (e.g. education, military service, work/business, visiting friends and relatives.) We 
thus define a labour migrant as an individual who spent 3 or more months away from home in 
the previous year for work or business purposes.  
In the 2009 wave of the RUMiC-RHS survey interviewees were asked to rate their attitudes 
towards risk. The question states “In general, some people like to take risks, while others wish 
to avoid risk. If we rank people’s willingness to take risks from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates 
‘never take risk’ and 10 equals ‘like to take risk very much,’ which level do you think you 
belong to?” According to a recent literature, responses to direct questions on self-reported risk 
aversion are reasonable proxies of more objective measures of risk attitudes obtained from 
having respondents playing lotteries (Ding, Hartog, & Sun, 2010; Dohmen et al., 2011). 
Moreover, Frijters, Kong, and Meng (2011) have specifically validated the risk attitude 
question used in the RUMiC survey.
44
  
In our empirical analysis, we test the predictions of the theoretical model presented in section 
3.2 by investigating individual as well as household migration probabilities (see section 3.4). 
For the individual level analysis we focus on individuals who are in the workforce and who, 
therefore, are potential migrants. The 2009 RUMiC-RHS survey includes 17,658 individuals in 
the labour force (i.e. aged between 16 and 60 and not currently at school or disabled) who 
provide information about age, gender, educational level and migration status.
45 
To be able to 
carry out our analysis we restrict the sample to individuals living in households where at least 
two members in the work force have reported risk preference, which reduces the sample to 
7,808 individuals. As Panel A in Appendix Table A 3.1 shows, the sample of individuals in 
households we focus on is almost identical in observables to that of individuals in households 
in the overall sample. Information on risk aversion is available for 81% of that sample, leading 
to a final estimating sample of 6,332 individuals. For the household-level analysis, we use all 
households where at least two members reported their willingness to take risks, but we also 
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 Frijters, Kong, and Meng (2011) ask a random sub-sample of 1,633 rural-urban migrants from the 
Urban Survey to play a risk game similar to that used by Dohmen et al. (2011). They find that self-
assessed risk and the risk measures revealed by the game are highly correlated, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.7. 
45
 The 2009 RUMiC-RHS survey includes a total of 32,249 individuals. We focus on those aged 16–60 
because the probability of being a migrant drops below 1% for individuals over 60. Nevertheless, 
shifting the upper bound of this age range by five years (in either direction) does not alter our empirical 
findings.   
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include individuals above age 60, as their risk aversion is likely to matter for decisions of the 
household whether or not to send a migrant, which results in a sample of 2961 households.
 46
  
Panel B in Appendix Table A 3.1 shows that these households are almost identical in 
observable characteristics to the overall sample.  
The risk attitudes question can only be answered by respondents who are present at the time of 
the survey, which is a potential problem for migrants. In our data, the share of non-responses is 
higher among migrants (55%) than among non-migrants (10%).
47
 This may be problematic if 
unobservables that affect the probability to be present at the time of the interview are 
correlated with individual risk aversion, conditional on observables. There is no reason to 
believe that migrants who happened to be present at home between March and June in 2009 
differ systematically in risk attitudes from migrants who were absent. To nevertheless test this 
hypothesis, we make use of the fact that we observe individual characteristics also for those 
who are absent at the time of the survey as these are reported by other family members; as 
discussed above, attitudes towards risk is the only missing information in such cases. We 
estimate a simple selection model using family events such as death, marriage, or birth that 
occurred before or after the interview as instruments to identify the participation equation, i.e. 
whether the migrant was present at the interview. These events, while arguably uncorrelated 
with migrants’ risk attitudes, may have induced the individual to return to the home village, or 
to remain longer at home, and hence increased the probability of participating in the survey. 
We then construct the generalised residuals and include them in an equation where willingness 
to take risk is the dependent variable, conditioning in both equations on other observables that 
are used in the main analysis. A test of correlation between the unobservables determining 
survey participation and individual risk attitudes corresponds then to a simple t-test of whether 
the coefficient of the generalised residual is significantly different from zero. Despite our 
instruments being strong predictors for interview participation, we cannot reject the null 
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 Excluding individuals over 60 from the household sample lead to very similar estimation results. 
47
 In comparison with similar surveys in other developing countries, the RUMiC-RHS survey has a 
much higher response rate for migrants, due to the special institutional settings of internal migration in 
China. As discussed earlier, most migrants are still subject to a rural hukou in their home village and 
leave their immediate family behind to go and work in cities. To look after their left-behind relatives, 
repeated short term migration spells are common. In our sample migrants spend on average 9.6 months 
per year working in destination regions and 2.4 months at home. Moreover, the majority of migrants 
return home for the Chinese New Year (or Spring Festival), celebrated between late January and early 
February, and stay on for some weeks or months. All this increases the chances of finding migrants in 
their home village at the time of the survey. 
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hypothesis that the residual correlation in risk aversion and interview participation is zero for 
any of the specifications we estimate. We provide details of this test in appendix A.II, and 
report estimates in Appendix Table A 3.2. 
3.3.3. Descriptive statistics  
We provide descriptive statistics on individual characteristics in the upper panel of Table 3.1. 
The numbers show that males account for about half our sample, with an average age of 43.8 
years and an average education of 7.15 years. About 92% of our respondents are married and 
have on average 3.1 siblings and 1.7 children. The average of our measure of willingness to 
take risks is 2.6 (with a standard deviation of 2.4). The lower panel of Table 3.1 shows the 
characteristics of the 2,961 households in our sample. The average household size is 4.1, with 
an average of 2.9 individuals of working age.
48
 About 16% of the households in the sample 
have at least one member who migrated in the previous year, and 11% of the individuals in our 
sample can be classified as migrants, with the rate among males and females being 14.0% and 
7.9%, respectively. Further, about 23% of the interviewees in our sample reported having 
migrated at least once in the past. In our empirical analysis, we will use this as a second 
measure for migration status to check the robustness of our findings.  
The distribution by migrant status of our measure of willingness to take risk, which ranges 
between 0 (highest level or risk aversion) and 10 (lowest risk aversion), is plotted in Figure 
3.3.  For both groups of respondents, the distribution is skewed to the left: the mode value is 
zero for both migrants and non-migrants, and the share of respondents categorizing themselves 
as being at the highest level of risk aversion is 18% and 31%, respectively. The unconditional 
mean of the measure is 2.4 and 3.6 for non-migrant and migrants, respectively. Hence, the 
migrant distribution is clearly shifted more towards less risk aversion than the non-migrant 
distribution. 
Our data also show a correlation between individual and household risk preferences that 
supports Dohmen et al.’s (2012) claim that intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes and 
assortative mating of parents may generate within household correlation in preferences 
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 The one-child policy introduced in 1979 was less restrictive in rural areas (allowing rural families to 
have a second child if the first one was a girl) and less strictly enforced. In our sample, individuals born 
before and after 1979 have an average of 3.3 and 2.1 siblings, respectively.   
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towards risk. Nevertheless, there is still substantial heterogeneity in the way individuals with 
the same degree of risk aversion are matched with other household members’ risk preferences. 
To demonstrate these features, we compute the residuals from regressing individual 
willingness to take risks on basic demographic controls (gender, age, and age squared) and a 
full set of county of residence dummies.  
Figure 3.4 plots the residuals for each individual in our sample (on the vertical axis) versus the 
average of other household members (on the horizontal axis); the fitted line shows a clearly 
positive relation between individual and household residual risk attitudes (with a correlation of 
about 0.58), which confirms Dohmen et al.’s (2012) findings. On the other hand, the scatter 
plot also shows considerable variation, a within household heterogeneity we exploit in our 
regression analysis (see section 3.4).
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3.4. Empirical Strategy 
In our empirical analysis, we regress the probability of being a migrant, or the probability that 
a household sends a migrant, on different measures of willingness to take risk at both the 
individual and household level, as well as on a large set of background controls (individual 
characteristics, household characteristics, and area fixed effects). Our analysis addresses two 
issues: first, how risk aversion determines individual migration decisions, and second, the role 
of risk attitudes at the household level for migration decisions. In this second part, we first test 
whether and to what extent individuals are chosen to migrate according to their relative risk 
preferences within the family (within household migration decision) and then which 
households are more likely to send migrants (across household migration decision). 
Individual migration decision. To assess this first aspect, we estimate the following equation: 
           Pr (𝑀𝑖ℎ𝑘 = 1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖ℎ𝑘 + 𝐗
′
𝑖ℎ𝑘𝛽 + 𝐖
′
ℎ𝑘𝜃 + 𝜂𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑘             (9) 
where i indexes individuals, h households, and k administrative counties. The variable  𝑀𝑖ℎ𝑘  is 
an indicator of whether individuals have spent at least 3 months working outside their origin 
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 This is in line with evidence provided by Mazzocco (2004) of imperfect assortative mating on risk 
aversion in US couples. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), he shows that self-
reported risk attitudes differ between husband and wife for about 50 percent of the couples in the 
sample. 
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area during the previous year. Our main variable of interest is the willingness to take risks, 
 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖ℎ𝑘, measured on a scale from 0 (most risk averse) to 10 (least risk averse). The vector 
 𝐗′𝑖ℎ𝑘  collects a set of individual-level covariates that are important determinants of individual 
migration probability, including gender, age, age squared, marital status, number of children, 
years of education, number of siblings, and birth order. The vector 𝐖′ℎ𝑘 includes a set of 
family characteristics, such as household size and structure (number of family members under 
16, in the work force, or older than 60); and per capita house value (in logs). We also include 
county fixed effects 𝜂𝑘 to capture any time invariant observable and unobservable area 
characteristic that may be correlated with both attitude towards risk and propensity to 
migrate.
50
 An individual or household migration decision model in which migration implies 
exposure to higher uncertainty would suggest that migrants are less risk averse than non-
migrants. Therefore, if Chinese rural migrants are exposed to higher uncertainty in urban areas 
than their relatives who remained at home, we would expect the coefficient 𝛼1 in equation (9) 
to be positive. 
Within household migration decision. Proposition 1 of our theoretical model implies that the 
individual probability of being a migrant should depend on both the individual’s own risk 
aversion and the risk aversion of other household members (section 3.2.3).  
We test this proposition in two ways: First, we estimate individual-level regressions as in 
equation (9) but now including both the individual’s absolute risk preferences (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖ℎ𝑘) and 
the individual’s position in the household ranking of willingness to take risk (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑘) 
among members in the workforce. This way, we can use the coefficient on the 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑙 
variable to identify individuals with higher relative risk preference within the family from 
individuals who have the same level of risk preference (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) but are in different positions 
on the risk aversion ranking within their respective households. According to proposition 1, 
when migration is risky, all else being equal, the least risk averse individuals in a household 
should have a higher probability of migrating. The ordinal measure of risk preferences should 
thus have an effect over and above the effect of the cardinal measure. If migration is purely an 
individual decision, then once individual risk attitudes are controlled for, the position in 
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 Dohmen et al. (2012) provide evidence of correlation in risk aversion among individuals residing in 
the same area, showing particularly that once parental attitudes are controlled for, regional risk attitudes 
are correlated with children’s risk attitudes. 
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household ranking should not influence the migration probability (i.e. the coefficient on the 
𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑙 variable should not be statistically different from zero). 
Our second approach is to re-estimate equation (9) including both individual risk attitudes 
(𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖ℎ𝑘) and the average risk preferences of the other household members who are in the 
workforce (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖ℎ𝑘). Conditional on their own risk attitudes, individuals who belong to 
a household in which the other members are relatively less willing to take risks (i.e. have lower 
values of the 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑜𝑡ℎ variable) should be more likely to migrate (because they are more 
likely to be the least risk averse in the household). If migration implies a higher exposure to 
uncertainty, we would thus expect to find a positive coefficient on the 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 variable (as in 
all previous regressions) and a negative coefficient on the 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑜𝑡ℎ  measure.  
Across household migration decision. Finally, to assess which households have a higher 
probability of sending migrants, we estimate household-level regressions of the probability of 
sending a migrant, and then test statements (i) and (ii) of proposition 2 (see section 3.2.4).  
The first statement suggests that, conditional on having the same mean risk aversion, 
households with a larger variation in risk preferences should be more likely to send migrants. 
We test this prediction by estimating the following equation:  
Pr (𝑀ℎ𝑘 = 1) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝐻𝐻_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘 + 𝛿2 𝐻𝐻_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘 +𝐖
′
ℎ𝑘𝜃 + 𝜂𝑘 +
𝑢ℎ𝑘  (10) 
where the probability that a household sends a migrant depends on the average risk aversion in 
the household (𝐻𝐻_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘), the within-household range in risk attitudes 
(𝐻𝐻_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘), other household controls and area fixed effects.  Conditional on 
household average risk aversion, we expect households with a larger variance in risk attitudes 
to be more likely to send a migrant. 
The second statement in proposition 2 implies that (if migration implies exposure to higher 
uncertainty) the probability of a household sending a migrant increases with the willingness to 
take risk of the least risk averse member but simultaneously decreases with the willingness to 
take risk of the other (non-migrant) members. To test this implication, we estimate the 
following household-level equation: 
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Pr (𝑀ℎ𝑘 = 1) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐻𝐻_𝑚𝑎𝑥_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘 + 𝛾2 𝐻𝐻_𝑜𝑡ℎ_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘 + 𝐖
′
ℎ𝑘𝜃 + 𝜂𝑘 + 𝑢ℎ𝑘 
(11) 
where we separately include in the regression the risk preferences of the least risk averse 
individual in the household (𝐻𝐻_max_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) and then the average risk attitudes among the 
other household members (𝐻𝐻_oth_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘). Our theoretical framework would lead us to 
expect the coefficients on these two risk measures to have opposite signs if migration exposes 
the migrant to higher uncertainty but allows the household to diversify risk and thus reduce the 
other household members’ risk exposure. In particular, we would expect a positive coefficient 
on the first variable and a negative one on the second. 
3.5. Results 
We first present our findings for individual and within household migration decisions and 
report the results of our robustness checks against alternative interpretations of our results. We 
then discuss our results for across household migration decisions. 
3.5.1. Individual risk aversion  
Table 3.2 summarizes the results from our estimation of a linear probability model of the 
individual probability of migrating based on equation (9).
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Here, we use two alternative 
measures of migration status: whether the individual migrated for work during the year before 
the survey (columns 1–4) and whether the individual had ever migrated in the past (columns 
5–8). In all regressions, we include a full set of 82 county dummies and cluster the standard 
errors at the household level to allow for within household correlation in the error terms.  
In column 1, we report the results of regressing individual migration status on our measure of 
willingness to take risk, after which we successively add in further individual and household 
controls (columns 2–4). All estimates show a strong positive association between individual 
willingness to take risks and the probability of being a migrant, which suggests that individual 
risk attitudes play an important role in determining individual propensities to migrate. The 
estimated coefficient on the 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 variable reduces in magnitude when basic individual 
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 The marginal effects based on probit or logit estimators,  reported in Appendix Table A 3.3, are 
almost identical to those reported here. 
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controls are included (from 0.014 in column 1 to 0.005 in column 2), but remains stable when 
additional individual controls and household characteristics are added in (columns 3–4). This 
pattern is consistent with basic demographic characteristics such as gender and age being 
strong predictors of individual risk attitudes (see among others, Barsky et al. 1997 and 
Borghans et al. 2009).
 
 The effect estimated is economically relevant: in our most restrictive 
specification (column 4), a one standard deviation increase in the willingness to take risks is 
associated with a 1.2 percentage point increase in the migration probability, corresponding to 
an 11% increase with respect to the baseline migration probability of 11%. This positive 
relationship between willingness to take risks and probability of migration is consistent with 
internal migration in China exposing migrants to higher level of uncertainty than non-migrants. 
In columns 5–8 of Table 3.2, we report estimates for the alternative migration status measure 
of whether individuals have ever migrated for work. About 23% of the interviewees in our 
sample reported having migrated at least once in the past. As before, willingness to take risk is 
a strong predictor of migration status: in the most general specification (column 8), a decrease 
of one standard deviation in the willingness to take risk is associated with a 3.3 percentage 
points increase in migration probability, corresponding to about 14% of the baseline sample 
probability, an estimate that is very close to the one obtained with migration in year 2008 as 
the main outcome.
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To investigate the linearity in the relation between migration propensity and risk attitudes, we 
estimate equation (9) with a set of five dummies for different levels of willingness to take risks 
(the excluded dummy corresponds to a zero willingness to take risks). Panels A and B of 
Figure 3.5 report the estimated coefficients and their 90% confidence intervals for the two 
measures of migration based on the specification in columns 4 and 8 of Table 3.2. The figure 
shows a clear and almost linear relation between migration probability and individual 
willingness to take risks above values of about 2.  
Our findings on individual migration decisions are much in line with previous findings in the 
literature. For instance, while a one standard deviation decrease in individual risk-aversion 
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 In Appendix Table A 3.4, we report estimated coefficients on the other controls. As expected, male, 
non-married and younger individuals are more likely to migrate, while education does not seem to 
predict migration status (see column 4). 
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leads to an 11% or 14% increase, respectively, in the baseline probability of having migrated 
in the previous year or overall, Jaeger et al. (2010), using a specification almost identical to 
that reported in column 2 of Table 3.2, report that a one standard deviation decrease in 
individual risk aversion leads to a 12% increase in the baseline migration probability.  
One concern with our results is that, because attitudes towards risk are measured after the 
migration decision, the migration experience itself may have affected the risk attitudes 
reported during the interviews. We can investigate this possibility by exploiting the 
longitudinal nature of the survey. Almost half of our estimation sample reported risk attitudes 
in both the 2009 and the 2011 waves of the RUMiC-RHS. These repeated measures, together 
with the information on 2010 migrations, allow us to investigate two empirical questions: Do 
individuals report consistent measures of risk aversion over time? Are migration experiences 
systematically associated with changes in self-reported risk aversion? The Appendix Figure A 
3.2 reports the distribution of changes in self-reported risk attitude between 2009 and 2011. In 
our sample, the average change in self-reported risk attitudes over these two years is small, 
0.39 for a measure ranging between 0 and 10. About one fourth of the respondents reported 
exactly the same value in both surveys, while almost half reported changes smaller than or 
equal to plus or minus one, and about 80% showing changes ranging between 0 and 3. These 
numbers suggest that interviewees consistently report their risk preferences over time.
53
  
One concern may be that migration experiences are systematically related to changes in risk 
aversion. To investigate this, we follow Jaeger et. al. (2010) and regress the change in self-
reported willingness to take risks between 2009 and 2011 (from the 2009 and 2011 waves of 
the RUMiC-RHS) on a dummy variable that equals one if the individual migrated in 2010. We 
report results in Panel A (columns 1-4) of Appendix Table A 3.5. Alternatively, we regress the 
willingness to take risks reported in 2011 on a dummy for migration in 2010 and on the 
willingness to take risks reported in 2009 (Panel A, columns 5-8). We gradually include in the 
specification the individual and household controls used in our main analysis of individual 
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 On average, the change in self-reported risk aversion over two consecutive waves (2009 and 2010) is 
0.2 and almost 40 percent of the sample reports identical risk preferences. A few recent papers suggest 
that individuals may be less willing to take risks after being affected by major negative events such as 
natural disasters (Cameron and Shah, forthcoming), war and extreme violence (Callen et al., 2014), or 
financial crises (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2013). However, it is unclear whether this behavioural 
response is due to a change in the underlying degree of risk aversion, or to an increase in the degree of 
uncertainty individuals are exposed to.  
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selection, using the same specifications as in Table 3.2. According to the estimation results, 
having migrated in 2010 does not affect the observed change in risk preferences or the level of 
risk preferences in 2011 when controlling for risk attitudes in 2009. In all specifications, 
estimated coefficients are not significant and of small magnitude.  
Panel B of Appendix Table A 3.5 reports the same regressions than Panel A, but we 
distinguish between individuals who migrated only in 2010 and individuals who migrated in 
both 2008 and 2010. Again, estimates are very small for both measures, and not significantly 
different from zero throughout.  
 To further investigate a possible relation between our measure of risk aversion and migration 
experience, we use data from various waves of the Urban Migrant Survey (UMS) of the 
RUMiC project and test whether risk preferences vary across migrations of different duration.  
In particular, we regress risk attitudes of migrants on the years since first migration, while 
controlling for individual characteristics as well as for city and year fixed effects. We report 
estimates in Appendix Table A 3.6, where columns 1 and 2 report results unconditional and 
conditional on individual fixed effects, respectively. Estimated coefficients of migration 
duration are very small in magnitude and never significantly different from zero. We conclude 
from all these tests that risk attitudes are not systematically affected by previous migration 
experiences.  
3.5.2. Within household migration decision  
As pointed out earlier, finding that individual risk aversion determines migration choices is 
compatible not only with a model of individual choice but also with a model in which 
migration decisions are taken at the household level (as in the model developed in section 3.2). 
If such decisions are taken on a purely individual level, however, the risk attitudes of other 
household members should play no role in determining migration decisions. We now further 
examine the role of the household in migration decisions by exploring the testable implications 
of our propositions 1 and 2.  
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Proposition 1 (section 3.2.3) implies that the individual probability of being a migrant should 
depend on both the individual’s own risk aversion and the risk aversion of other household 
members. As indicated before, we test this proposition in two ways.  
In our first approach, we still run individual-level regressions but now explicitly include both 
the individual’s absolute risk preferences (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) and the individual’s position in the 
household ranking of willingness to take risk (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑙) among members in the work force. 
The coefficient on this latter variable is identified from individuals who have the same level of 
willingness to take risk (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) but who hold different positions in the risk aversion ranking 
within their respective households. According to proposition 1, the individual probability of 
migrating should increase with both the cardinal and ordinal measures of willingness to take 
risks. We also use two alternative measures for the variable  𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑟𝑒𝑙: the individual 
ranking in risk attitudes within the household and a dummy variable indicating the household 
member with the highest willingness to take risks.
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 To construct the individual rankings, we 
rank household members by their willingness to take risks, assigning a value of 1 to the most 
risk-averse person and a value of n (where “n” is the number of people with risk measure in 
the household) to the least risk averse individual, and we then normalize this measure by the 
number of members reporting risk preferences. Both these measures increase with the focal 
individual’s willingness to take risks. If, as proposition 1 suggests, being relatively more 
willing to take risks with respect to the other household members makes individuals more 
likely to migrate, then we would expect positive coefficients for both the level and the relative 
risk variables.  
We report estimation results in Table 3.3. For comparative purposes, column 1 of Table 3.3 
exactly replicates column 4 of Table 3.2 (which includes county fixed effects as well as 
individual and household controls and clusters standard errors at the household level).  In 
columns 2–5, we add our two alternative measures of relative risk attitudes, where we include 
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 In constructing these variables, we need to decide how to treat cases in which some household 
members reported identical values of risk attitudes. For the ranking measure, we assign an average 
ranking to individuals with the same willingness to take risks (e.g. if two individuals are ranked second 
in the household, we assign a ranking of 2.5 to each and a ranking of 4 to the next household member, if 
any). In our second procedure, we assign the value 1 if the individual has the lowest risk aversion in the 
household, irrespective of other household members possibly reporting the same level of willingness to 
take risks. We have experimented with alternative methods for dealing with ties in other unreported 
regressions, but our empirical results do not change. These estimates are available upon request.  
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only the relative measure for each variable in even columns and both the relative and absolute 
willingness to take risks in odd columns. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the 
estimated coefficients are positive and significant for all relative measures of willingness to 
take risks. This finding also holds when we include both absolute and relative attitudes towards 
risk (columns 3 and 5): the estimated coefficients are positive and significant on both 
variables, implying that the relative measure of risk attitudes also affects the probability of 
migrating over and above the individual’s absolute risk preference. As a result, not only are 
individuals with low risk aversion more likely to migrate, but this probability increases for 
those who are relatively less risk averse than their family members. Specifically, according to 
the estimates in column 5, being the least risk averse in the household implies a 1.4 percentage 
point higher likelihood of migrating (around 13% of baseline) than for an individual with the 
same individual risk attitude who is not the least risk averse in the household.  
Our second approach to investigating within household selection is to add in the average risk 
preferences of the other household members who are in the workforce (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑜𝑡ℎ), in 
addition to the individual risk attitudes (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘) variable. Following the structure of the 
previous columns in Table 3.3, column 6 reports the results for the 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑜𝑡ℎ variable alone, 
while column 7 lists the outcomes when both variables are included. Our expectations are that 
the average risk preferences of other household members will have no predictive power alone, 
but, conditional on individuals’ own risk attitudes, an individual in a household where the 
other members are relatively less willing to take risks (i.e. have lower values of the 
𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑜𝑡ℎ variable) should have higher probability of migration. Both hypotheses are 
supported by the data: the estimated coefficient on 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑜𝑡ℎ is zero (column 6) but 
becomes significant and negative once we condition on individual willingness to take risks 
(column 7). As in all previous regressions, the coefficient on this latter variable is positive and 
significant.  
A first important implication of our analysis is therefore that migration decisions in the context 
that we study are taken on the level of the household rather than the single individual. Our 
results further provide strong evidence of within-household migration decision being 
consistent with a model, where beyond individual willingness to take risks, risk preferences of 
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other household members matter in determining migration decisions, with the direction of the 
effects being in line with our Proposition 1. 
3.5.3. Across household migration decision  
We now turn to the last part of our analysis, where we investigate which households have a 
higher probability of sending migrants. We first estimate household-level regressions of the 
probability of sending a migrant, and then test parts (i) and (ii) of proposition 2 (see section 
3.2.4).  
The first part of the proposition suggests that, conditional on having the same mean risk 
aversion, households with a larger variation in risk preferences should be more likely to send 
migrants. In Table 3.4, we report the results of regressing a dummy variable for whether a 
household sends at least one migrant on the average and the within household range of 
willingness to take risks, with other household controls and county fixed effects included.
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When the regression includes only the household’s average risk aversion (columns 1 and 3), 
the coefficient is positive and strongly significant: households that are on average less risk 
averse are more likely to engage in migration. As correlation in risk attitudes within 
households is sizeable in our sample (see section 3.3.3), this finding may simply reflect that 
less risk averse individuals are more likely to migrate and to belong to households whose 
members are also less risk averse. Hence, in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3.4, we also add in the 
within household range in risk attitudes. These estimates indicate that, in line with our 
theoretical model, households with a higher variation in risk preference across members are 
also more likely to send migrants conditional on the average household risk aversion. In both 
specifications, only the range, and not the mean, of household risk preferences is significantly 
(and positively) associated with having sent a migrant.  
The second part of proposition 2 implies that the probability of a household sending a migrant 
decreases with the risk aversion level of the least risk averse member and increases with the 
degree of risk aversion of the other (non-migrant) members. To test this implication, we run 
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 We define the within household range as the difference between the highest and lowest values of 
willingness to take risks reported by each household. The household controls are number of family 
members under 16, in the work force, and older than 60; per capita house value; size of the family plot; 
and years of education and age of the head of the household. 
97 
 
household-level regressions of the probability of sending a migrant by separately adding the 
risk preferences of the individual with the highest willingness to take risks in the household 
(𝐻𝐻_max _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘), and then the average risk attitudes of the other household members 
(𝐻𝐻_oth _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘). Based on our theoretical framework, we would expect the coefficients 
on these two risk measures to have opposite signs if migration exposes the migrant to higher 
uncertainty but allows the household to diversify risk and thus reduce the exposure to risk of 
other household members. All else being equal, the probability of sending a migrant should be 
higher for the household in which the least risk averse individual has a higher willingness to 
take risks (relative to most risk loving individual in other households), so the coefficient on 
𝐻𝐻_max _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 should be positive. Conversely, the probability of sending a migrant should 
be higher for households in which the other individuals in the household on average have 
lower willingness to take risks relative to the average willingness to take risk of other 
households, implying that the coefficient on 𝐻𝐻_oth _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 should be negative.  
Columns 1–4 of Table 3.5 report the estimates of regressing the probability that a household 
will send a migrant on 𝐻𝐻_max _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘 and 𝐻𝐻_oth _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘. All regressions include 
county fixed effects, and household controls are added in columns 3–4. When only the 
willingness to take risks of the most risk loving individual in the household 
(𝐻𝐻_max _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘) is included in the regression (columns 1 and 3), we find a positive and 
strongly significant coefficient. When the specification also includes the average risk aversion 
of the other household members (𝐻𝐻_oth _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘), the coefficients on both risk measures 
are significant but have opposite signs (column 2 and 4): the coefficient on 𝐻𝐻_max _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 
remains positive (and increases slightly), whereas the coefficient on 𝐻𝐻_oth _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is 
negative.
56
 Hence, a household has a higher probability to send a migrant the lower the risk 
aversion level of the least risk averse member and the more risk averse the other household 
members are. This conclusion is in line with the predictions of our theoretical model for the 
case in which a migration that increases exposure to risk for the migrant members allows 
reduction of income uncertainty for the non-migrant members. The estimates in column 4, 
specifically, suggest that a one unit decrease in the measure of willingness to take risks of the 
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 The increase in the size of the coefficient on 𝐻𝐻_max _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘   when conditioning on 
𝐻𝐻_oth _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is compatible with 𝐻𝐻_oth _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 having a negative effect on the migration 
probability and being positively correlated with 𝐻𝐻_max _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘. 
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least risk averse household member implies a 1.5 percentage point increase in the household’s 
probability of sending a migrant, corresponding to a 9% increase over the baseline household 
migration probability (see Table 3.1). At the same time, a one unit increase in the average risk 
aversion among all other household members, conditional on the most risk loving member’s 
risk attitudes, is associated with a 0.8 percentage points increase in the household’s probability 
of sending a migrant (or a 5% increase), although the coefficient is not precisely estimated. 
In column 5 and 6 of Table 3.5, we check the robustness of our findings to changes in the age 
limit for individuals to be considered part of the workforce by reducing it from 60 to 50 years. 
Our estimates, remain unaffected, becoming if anything more significant in spite of a 25% 
reduction in sample size.   
The findings in Table 3.5, combined with the other estimates in Table 3.4, suggest that the 
distribution of risk attitudes within the household plays an important role in the household’s 
decision to send a migrant. Moreover, the direction of the effect is fully consistent with the 
predictions of our theoretical framework. 
3.6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyses empirically the relation between the distribution of risk attitudes - within 
and across households - and migration decisions. It provides strong evidence not only that, in 
the context of internal migration in China, migration decisions are taken at the household level, 
but that heterogeneity in risk aversion within the household plays an important part in 
determining whether a migration takes place, who emigrates, and which households send 
migrants. 
The insight that migration decisions, in the context that we analyse, but also likely in other 
settings, are taken at household level, and are influenced by risk attitudes of other household 
members has important policy implications. For instance, the implementation of a policy that 
creates possibilities to insure against risk – such as the introduction of social safety net 
schemes - will possibly increase migrations if decisions are taken on an individual level. When 
the migration decision is taken at the household level, however, this may work in the opposite 
direction because it allows risk averse household members to diversify risk in other ways.  Our 
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model implies that household migration increases with the share of income pooled between 
migrant and non-migrant household members, as it allows other household members to 
diversify risk, and the migrant to insure against risk. Hence, the easier it is for households to 
transfer income back and forth between source and destination regions the higher will be the 
likelihood to engage in migration.  
In demonstrating that the distribution of other household members’ risk attitudes affects 
decisions to migrate, our analysis suggests that risk attitudes within the household may also 
affect other choices that are determined on a household level. Examples are the adoption of 
innovative farming practices, the selection of new crops, or the investment in a new family 
business, where decisions may be influenced by the distribution of risk attitudes within 
households and by the possible benefits of risk reduction to members other than the individuals 
directly concerned. Understanding direction and magnitude of the interactions between the 
effects of such decisions on different household members and their risk preferences should be 
an interesting avenue for future research, with the potential to contribute significantly to a 
better understanding of key economic decisions, particularly in developing countries. 
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FIGURE 3.1 - MODEL 
 
 
Figures 
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FIGURE 3.2 - INDIVIDUAL AND HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION DECISION MODELS 
 
PANEL A: INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION DECISION MODEL 
 
 
PANEL B: HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION DECISION MODEL 
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FIGURE 3.3 - DISTRIBUTION OF WILLINGNESS TO TAKE RISKS, BY MIGRANT STATUS 
 
Note. The measure (wtRisk) varies between 0 (lowest level of willingness to take risk) and 10 (highest 
level of willingness to take risk).  Source: RUMiC –RHS Survey.  
 
FIGURE 3.4 - INDIVIDUAL WILLINGNESS TO TAKE RISKS AND HOUSEHOLD AVERAGE
 
Note: The scatter plot shows residual willingness to take risks for each individual in our estimating 
sample (vertical axis) versus the average residual willingness to take risks of other members in the 
household (horizontal axis). Residuals are obtained by regressing individual willingness to take risks on 
basic demographic controls (gender, age, and age squared) and a full set of county of residence 
dummies. The figure shows the regression fitted line (correlation = 0.58). 
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FIGURE 3.5 - RISK ATTITUDES AND INDIVIDUAL PROBABILITY OF MIGRATING, BY LEVEL OF 
WILLINGNESS TO TAKE RISKS 
Panel A: Migrated last year 
 
Panel B: Ever migrated 
 
Note. In panel A, individuals are defined as migrant if they migrated for work during the year before the 
survey; in Panel B, if they ever migrated for work in the past. Individual probabilities of being a migrant 
are regressed on five dummy variables identifying different levels of willingness to take risks in which 
the excluded category corresponds to a willingness to take risks equal to zero. The graph plots the 
estimated coefficients on these dummies together with their 90% confidence intervals.  Included in the 
regressions are individual controls (age, age squared, a dummy for male, years of education, a dummy 
for married relation with HH head dummies, order of birth, number of siblings, and number of children) 
and household controls (number of family members under 16, in the work force, and older than 60; per 
capita house value (in logs)), and 82 county dummies.  
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Table 3.1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Note. The sample includes all individuals in the labour force (i.e. aged between 16 and 60 and not 
currently in school or disabled) who live in households in which more than one member in the labour 
force has reported risk attitudes.  
Source: 2009 RUMiC-RHS Survey. 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Male 0.50 0.50 0 1 6,332
Age 43.82 10.65 16 60 6,332
Married 0.92 0.27 0 1 6,332
Years of education 7.15 2.83 0 13 6,332
Birth order 2.24 1.33 0 10 6,123
Number of siblings 3.15 1.64 0 11 6,250
Number of child 1.68 0.99 0 7 6,332
Willingness to take risks (wtRisk) 2.57 2.36 0 10 6,332
Migrated last year 0.11 0.31 0 1 6,332
Ever migrated 0.23 0.42 0 1 6,280
Household size 4.08 1.32 2 11 2,961
HH members aged <16 0.57 0.73 0 5 2,961
HH members in the work force 2.89 1.09 1 8 2,961
HH members aged >60 0.34 0.61 0 4 2,961
HH head's education (years) 7.25 2.58 0 12 2,961
Plot size (Mu, 15Mu = 1 hectare) 4.12 4.08 0 75 2,961
House value per capita (Yuan, in logs) 9.16 1.33 1.20 14.04 2,961
HH avg willingness to take risks 2.46 2.03 0 10 2,961
At least one HH member migrated last year 0.16 0.36 0 1 2,961
Individuals
Households
Tables  
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Table 3.2 - INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION DECISION 
 
Note. The table reports estimates from LPM regressions of a dummy for individual migration status on individual willingness to take risk (wtRisk) and other controls. 
The migration status dummy equals one if the individual migrated for work in the year before the interview (columns 1–4) or had ever migrated for work (columns 5–
8). The wtRisk variable measures individual willingness to take risks (decreasing with risk aversion) and has a mean of 2.57 and a standard deviation of 2.36. The 
basic individual controls are age, age squared, a dummy for male, years of education, and a dummy for married; the additional individual controls are a dummy for 
relation to head of household, order of birth, number of siblings, and number of children; and the household controls are household size and structure (number of 
family members under 16, in the work force, and older than 60); and per capita house value (in logs). All regressions include 82 county fixed effects. The sample 
includes all individuals in the labour force (i.e. aged between 16 and 60 and not currently in school or disabled) who live in households in which more than one 
member in the labour force has reported risk attitudes. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
wtRisk 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.030*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Basic individual controls X X X X X X
Additional individual controls X X X X
Household controls X X
County fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Observations 6,332 6,332 6,103 5,992 6,280 6,280 6,052 5,946
R-squared 0.187 0.288 0.305 0.310 0.148 0.273 0.288 0.292
Migrated last year Ever migrated
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Table 3.3 - WITHIN HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION DECISION:  RELATIVE MEASURE AND RISK PREFERENCES OF OTHER HOUSEHOLD 
MEMBERS 
 
Note. The table reports the estimates from LPM regressions of a dummy for individual migration status (in the previous year) on different measures of willingness to 
take risks (at both the individual and household level) and other controls. The wtRisk variable measures individual willingness to take risk (which decreases with risk 
aversion) and has a mean of 2.57 and a standard deviation of 2.36. Columns 2–9 include two alternative measures of the individual’s position in the household 
ranking of willingness to take risk among members in the work force (i.e. aged between 16 and 60 and not currently in school or disabled): (i) individual ranking in 
risk attitudes within the household, obtained by ranking household members by their willingness to take risks, assigning a value of one to the most risk-averse person 
and progressively higher values  to the other members, and then normalizing this measure by the number of members reporting risk preferences (columns 2–3); (ii) an 
indicator for the individual having the highest willingness to take risks in the household (columns 4–5). In columns 6–7, we include the average risk preferences of 
the other household members who are in the workforce (𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘_𝑜𝑡ℎ). The individual controls are age, age squared, a dummy for male, years of education, a dummy 
for married, relation with HH head dummies, order of birth, number of siblings, and number of children; and the household controls are household size and structure 
(number of family members under 16, in the work force, and older than 60); and per capita house value (in logs). All specifications include county fixed effects. The 
sample includes all individuals in the work force (i.e. aged between 16 and 60 and not currently in school or disabled) who live in households in which more than one 
member in the work force has reported risk attitudes. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
wtRisk 0.005*** 0.003* 0.005*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
wtRisk_rel: ranking in HH normalised 0.070*** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.020)
wtRisk_rel: Dummy for highest wtRisk in HH 0.016** 0.014*
(0.008) (0.008)
wtRisk_oth: Average wtRisk of other HH members -0.000 -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Individual controls X X X X X X X
Household controls X X X X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X X X X
Observations 5,992 5,992 5,992 5,992 5,992 5,992 5,992
R-squared 0.310 0.310 0.311 0.309 0.310 0.309 0.311
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Table 3.4 - ACROSS HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION DECISION (A)  
 
Note. The table reports estimates from LPM regressions of a dummy that equals one if the household 
has at least one migrant member in the labour force on different household-level measures of 
willingness to take risks and other controls. The variables 𝐻𝐻_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 and 𝐻𝐻_𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 
measure the average and the range of willingness to take risks in the household, respectively. The 
household controls are household size and structure (number of family members under 16, in the work 
force, and older than 60); per capita house value (in logs); size of the family plot; and the years of 
education and age of the head of household. All specifications include 82 county fixed effects. The 
sample includes all households in which at least two individuals have reported risk attitudes, and at least 
one of these is in the labour force (i.e. aged between 16 and 60 and not currently in school or disabled). 
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HH_avg_wtRisk 0.010*** 0.004 0.009*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
HH_range_wtRisk 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004)
Household controls X X
County fixed effects X X X X
Observations 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,961
R-squared 0.306 0.311 0.314 0.319
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Table 3.5 - ACROSS HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION DECISION  (B) 
 
Note. The table reports estimates from LPM regressions of a dummy that equals one if the household has at least one migrant member in the labour force on the risk 
preferences of the individual with the highest willingness to take risks in the household (𝐻𝐻_max _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘), the average risk attitudes among the other household 
members (𝐻𝐻_oth _𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ𝑘) and other controls. In columns 1–4, the age bracket for workers to be considered part of the workforce is 16–60; in columns 5-6 it is 
16–50. The household controls are household size and structure (number of family members under 16, in the work force, and older than 60); per capita house value 
(in logs); size of the family plot; and years of education and age of the head of household. All specifications include 82 county fixed effects. The sample includes all 
households in which at least two individuals have reported risk attitudes, and at least one of these is in the work force (i.e. within the defined age bracket and not 
currently in school or disabled).  
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HH_max_wtRisk 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HH_oth_wtRisk -0.009* -0.008 -0.012** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Household controls X X X
County fixed effects X X X X X X
WF age range:        16-60 X X X X
16-50 X X
Observations 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,189 2,189
R-squared 0.310 0.311 0.317 0.318 0.350 0.356
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A.I. Theoretical Framework 
A. Proof of Proposition 1 
Assume that individual 1 is more risk averse than individual 2 so that 𝑘1 > 𝑘2. Then the 
difference in household utility when individual 2 emigrates instead of individual 1 is  
𝑈𝑆𝐷(1 = 𝑁𝑀;2 = 𝑀) − 𝑈𝑆𝐷(1 = 𝑀; 2 = 𝑁𝑀) = 
= [𝐸(?̃?𝑁𝑀) − 𝑘1𝑉(?̃?
𝑁𝑀) + 𝐸(?̃?𝑀) − 𝑘2𝑉(?̃?
𝑀)] − [𝐸(?̃?𝑀) − 𝑘1𝑉(?̃?
𝑀) + 
                  +𝐸(?̃?𝑁𝑀) − 𝑘2𝑉(?̃?
𝑁𝑀)] = (𝑘1 − 𝑘2)[𝑉(?̃?
𝑀) − 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀)]            (A.1) 
The first term is positive because 𝑘1 > 𝑘2. The sign of the second term depends on the relative 
size of the earnings variance of being a migrant vs. not being a migrant, although it will always 
be positive as long as σD² ≥ σS²  (see proposition 1). Hence, as long as the earnings variance 
is higher for the migrant, which in our setting will always be the case if the earnings variance 
is larger in the destination (see Figure 3.1), it is optimal to choose the least risk averse 
individual in the household as the potential migrant. Nevertheless, it may still be that USD <
USS,  so that it is optimal for the household to send no migrant.  
B. Proof of Proposition 2 
Given two households,  ℎ𝐴 and ℎ𝐵, which differ only in the degree of their members’ risk 
aversion, then it follows from proposition 1 that in both households, if a migrant is sent, it will 
be the member with the lowest risk aversion. Assuming that in both households individual 2 is 
less risk averse than individual 1, each household will evaluate whether the household utility 
increases when individual 2 migrates compared to the non-migration option. For both 
households, the utility gain from migration is  
Appendix 
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𝛥𝑈𝑗 = ∆ 𝐸(?̃?𝑁𝑀) − 𝑘1
𝑗∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀) + 𝑀𝐸(?̃?𝑀) − 𝑘2
𝑗∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀)            𝑗 = ℎ𝐴, ℎ𝐵        (A.2) 
Which household gains the most from migration depends on the difference in utility gains: 
         𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐵 − 𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐴 = ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀)(𝑘1
ℎ𝐴 − 𝑘1
ℎ𝐵) + ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀)(𝑘2
ℎ𝐴 − 𝑘2
ℎ𝐵)          (A.3) 
We can now prove statements (i) and (ii) of proposition 2: 
(i) Supposing that the two households have the same average risk aversion (?̅?ℎ𝐴 = ?̅?ℎ𝐵) 
but differ in the within household variance in risk attitudes, 𝑘1
ℎ𝐴 − 𝑘2
ℎ𝐴 ≠ 𝑘1
ℎ𝐵 − 𝑘2
ℎ𝐵, we can 
substitute 𝑘1
ℎ𝐴 = 2?̅?ℎ𝐴 − 𝑘2
ℎ𝐴 and 𝑘1
ℎ𝐵 = 2?̅?ℎ𝐵 − 𝑘2
ℎ𝐵 into A.3: 
𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐵 − 𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐴 = ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀)(2?̅?ℎ𝐴 − 𝑘2
ℎ𝐴 − 2?̅?ℎ𝐵 + 𝑘2
ℎ𝐵) + ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀)(𝑘2
ℎ𝐴 − 𝑘2
ℎ𝐵) = 
                                 = (𝑘2
ℎ𝐵 − 𝑘2
ℎ𝐴)(∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀) − ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀))                                   (A.4) 
Given that ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀) < ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀) (for σD
² ≥ σS
² ; see section 3.2.2), household B will benefit 
more from migration (𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐵 > 𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐴 ) if its least risk averse member is less risk averse than 
the least risk averse member of household A (𝑘2
ℎ𝐵 < 𝑘2
ℎ𝐴 ). Having assumed that the average 
risk aversion in the two households is the same, this last condition implies also that the most 
risk averse individual in household B must be more risk averse than the most risk averse 
individual in household A (𝑘1
ℎ𝐵 > 𝑘1
ℎ𝐴 ). Hence, for household B to benefit more from 
migration than household A, the risk attitudes of household members must be more 
heterogeneous. 
(ii) Assuming that member 1 has the same level of risk aversion in both households 
(k1
ℎ𝐴 = k1
ℎ𝐵), while member 2 is less risk averse in household 2 ( k2
ℎ𝐴 > k2
ℎ𝐵), then the 
difference in utility gain reduces to 
                           𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐵 − 𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐴 =   ∆𝑉(?̃?𝑀)(𝑘2
ℎ𝐴 − 𝑘2
ℎ𝐵)                                 (A.5) 
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so that ΔUℎ𝐵 > 𝛥Uℎ𝐴 as long as ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀) > 0 (areas II and III in Figure 3.1) and ΔUℎ𝐵 <
𝛥Uℎ𝐴  if  ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀)<0 (area I in Figure 3.1). That is, if migrating increases (reduces) the 
exposure to risk of the migrant member, the household that gains most from migration is the 
household in which individual 2 (i.e. the least risk averse in her own household) is less (more) 
risk averse.  
Supposing instead that member 2 (with the lowest risk aversion in each household) has the 
same level of risk aversion (k2
ℎ𝐴 = k2
ℎ𝐵) in both households while member 1 is less risk averse 
in household 2 ( k1
ℎ𝐴 > k1
ℎ𝐵), then the difference in utility gains from migration between the 
two households is 
                                      𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐵 − 𝛥𝑈ℎ𝐴 = ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀)(𝑘1
ℎ𝐴 − 𝑘1
ℎ𝐵)                                  (A.6) 
Now, ΔUℎ𝐵 > 𝛥Uℎ𝐴 as long as ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀) > 0  (area III in Figure 3.1) and ΔUℎ𝐵 < 𝛥Uℎ𝐴  if  
∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀)<0 (area I and II in Figure 3.1). In other words, if migration exposes the non-migrant 
individual to lower (higher) uncertainty, the household gaining the most from migration is the 
household where individual 1 is less (more) risk averse.  
C. Extension: Non-zero correlation  (𝜎𝑆𝐷 ≠ 0) 
Assuming now that  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑆𝜀𝐷) = 𝜎𝑆𝐷 ≠ 0,  the household utility from sending one migrant to 
region D is  
𝑈𝑆𝐷 = [𝐸(?̃?
𝑁𝑀) − 𝑘1𝑉(?̃?
𝑁𝑀)] + [𝐸(?̃?𝑀) − 𝑘2𝑉(?̃?
𝑀)] = 
= [(
?̅?S+𝛼(?̅?D−𝑐)
1+𝛼
) − 𝑘1 (
𝜎𝑆
2+𝛼2𝜎𝐷
2+2𝛼𝜎𝑆𝐷
(1+𝛼)2
)]⏟                        
𝑁𝑀
+ [(
𝛼?̅?S+(?̅?D−𝑐)
1+𝛼
) − 𝑘2 (
𝛼2𝜎𝑆
2+𝜎𝐷
2+2𝛼𝜎𝑆𝐷
(1+𝛼)2
)]⏟                        
𝑀
         (A.7)     
The household will now send a migrant whenever USD − USS > 0: 
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USD − USS = (
?̅?S + 𝛼(?̅?D − 𝑐)
1 + 𝛼
− ?̅?S)
⏟              
∆ 𝐸(?̃?𝑁𝑀)
− 𝑘1 (
𝜎𝑆
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝐷
2 + 2𝛼𝜎𝑆𝐷
(1 + 𝛼)2
− 𝜎𝑆
2)
⏟                  
∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀)
+ 
                    + (
𝛼?̅?S + (?̅?D − 𝑐)
1 + 𝛼
− ?̅?S)
⏟              
∆ 𝐸(?̃?𝑀)
− 𝑘2 (
𝛼2𝜎𝑆
2 + 𝜎𝐷
2 + 2𝛼𝜎𝑆𝐷
(1 + 𝛼)2
− 𝜎𝑆
2)
⏟                  
∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀)
 > 0      (A. 8) 
Here, as explained in section 3.2.2, the terms characterize the change in expected earnings and 
in earnings variance from migration (with respect to non-migration) for both migrant and non-
migrant members of the household. The presence of a non-zero correlation between shocks in 
source and destination regions (𝜎𝑆𝐷 ≠ 0) does not substantially change the conditions under 
which the household gains from the migration of one of its members (see section 3.2.2).  It 
should be noted that the change in earnings variance for both the migrant (∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀)) and the 
non-migrant (∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀)) now increases with the correlation 𝜎𝑆𝐷, with the first derivative being 
identical for both terms: 
𝜕∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀)
𝜕𝜎𝑆𝐷
=
𝜕∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀)
𝜕𝜎𝑆𝐷
=
2𝛼
(1 + 𝛼)2
> 0                                      (A. 9) 
In Figure 3.1, a positive (negative) correlation 𝜎𝑆𝐷 implies an upward (downward) shift in the 
intercepts of the functions ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑀) and ∆ 𝑉(?̃?𝑁𝑀) and reduces (increases) the threshold 
values of  𝜎𝑆
2 for which migration implies a reduction in earnings variance. In other words, if 
the shocks in source and destination regions are positively (negatively) correlated, migration 
will allow the household to reduce exposure to risk for lower (higher) values of 𝜎𝑆
2, as 
compared to the case where the correlation is zero.  
A.II. Sample selection 
The fact that risk aversion is only observed for individuals who were present at home at the 
interview may bias our estimates if unobservables in the interview participation equation are 
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correlated with risk aversion, conditional on observables.
57
 To address this concern we 
estimate the following sample selection model: 
 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖ℎ𝑘
∗ = 𝐗′𝑖ℎ𝑘𝐴 + 𝐖
′
ℎ𝑘𝐵 + 𝜂𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑘                                        (A. 10)    
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖ℎ𝑘 = 1[𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑘
∗ = 𝐗′𝑖ℎ𝑘𝐶 + 𝐖
′
ℎ𝑘𝐷 + 𝒁𝒊𝒉𝒌
′ 𝐸 + 𝜇𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑘 ≥ 0]                             (A. 11) 
where  𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖ℎ𝑘
∗  is the latent willingness to take risk and 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖ℎ𝑘 is a dummy equal one if the 
individual 𝑖 was at home at the interview (i.e. 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖ℎ𝑘 = 1 if the latent variable 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑘
∗ ≥ 0), so 
that: 
 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖ℎ𝑘
 = {
 𝑤𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖ℎ𝑘
∗        𝑖𝑓   𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖ℎ𝑘 = 1
𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑       𝑖𝑓   𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖ℎ𝑘 = 0
               
The vectors  𝐗′𝑖ℎ𝑘 and 𝐖
′
ℎ𝑘 collect the same observable individual-level covariates and 
family characteristics as in our main outcome equation (9), and 𝜂𝑘and 𝜇𝑘 are county fixed 
effects. The selection equation is non-parametrically identified by the variable vector 𝒁𝑖ℎ𝑘 that 
includes major events in the families of interviewees such as pregnancies, births, illnesses, 
deaths, and that occurred in the months before or after the interview.
58
 These events, while 
arguably uncorrelated with risk attitudes, may have induced the individual to return to the 
home village, or to remain longer at home, and have hence affected the probability of being at 
home at the time of the interview. To test for selection, we estimate equation (A.11) using a 
probit model (thus assuming that 𝑢𝑖ℎ𝑘 is normally distributed) and construct the generalised 
residuals which we include in equation (A.10) (see Heckman 1978). A test of correlation 
between the unobservables determining participation and individual risk aversion corresponds 
                                                     
57
 Within the migrant population, individuals absent at the survey are more likely to be males, younger 
and less likely to be married. 
58
 We gather information about events from the 2009 and the 2010 surveys. The events recorded in the 
2009 survey refer to year 2008 and, therefore, took place before the 2009 interview. The 2010 survey 
collected information on events taking place in the twelve months previous to the survey and on their 
month of occurrence. We combined this information to identify events that took place after the 2009 
survey but by the end of year 2009.  
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to a simple t-test of whether the coefficient of the generalised residual is significantly different 
from zero.  
We report probit estimates of the first stage in the lower panel of Table A 3.2 where the 
dependent variable is the probability of being at home for the interview (which occurred 
between March and June 2009). The first four columns report estimates where we use events 
that occurred before the interview (during year 2008) as instruments, while the last four 
columns use events that occurred after the interview, but close enough to the interview date so 
that their occurrence could have been anticipated by families. The instruments are a dummy 
for a “pregnancy/birth” in the wider family (column 1 and 5), a dummy for “illness or death” 
(column 2 and 6), dummies for “pregnancy/birth” and “illness/death” (column 3 and 7) and a 
dummy for any of the events “pregnancy/birth/illness/death” (column 4 and 8).59 In all 
specifications, we condition on individual and household controls and on county fixed effects. 
As Table A 3.2 shows, the occurrence of major life events in the months before the interview 
(columns 1-4) is a strong predictor for the probability of being at home at the time of 
interview. Events that happen after the interview (columns 5-8) are also significant in all 
regressions, although estimates are slightly less precise. 
In the upper panel of Table A 3.2, we report the estimated coefficient on the generalised 
residuals (or inverse Mills ratios) that we have included in equation A.10. This coefficient is 
small (ranging from 1.2 and 2.6 percent of the average value of wtRisk in our sample) and not 
statistically different from zero in any of the specifications, with a coefficient/standard error 
ratio that is never larger than 0.35. Thus, conditional on observables, individual risk attitudes 
are not correlated with unobservables that determine participation in the survey. 
 
 
                                                     
59
 The share of respondents reporting at least one event among pregnancy/birth, illness and death is 
9.6% for year 2008 and 3.6% for year 2009. 
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Appendix Figures  
FIGURE A 3.1 - MAP OF RUMIC SURVEY 
 
Note. The figure shows the provinces in which the RUMiC survey is conducted. 
 
FIGURE A 3.2.– DISTRIBUTION OF CHANGES IN SELF-REPORTED WILLINGNESS TO TAKE 
RISKS (2009 AND 2011 RUMIC-RHS WAVES) 
 
Note: The sample is composed of 2,906 individuals from our estimating sample who reported wtRisk in 
both waves.  
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A 3.1 - SAMPLE OF INDIVIDUALS IN RELEVANT HOUSEHOLDS VS ENTIRE SAMPLE  
 
Note. The table compares characteristics of individuals in households in which more than one member 
in the labour force has reported risk attitudes with those of individuals in other households.  
Source: 2009 RUMiC –RHS Survey. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Male 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50
Age 40.4 12.16 40.6 12.15
Married 0.82 0.38 0.83 0.37
Years of schooling 7.4 2.76 7.4 2.78
Birth order 2.2 1.31 2.2 1.28
Number of siblings 3.0 1.64 3.0 1.61
Number of child 1.5 1.08 1.5 1.06
Migrated last year 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40
Ever migrated 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47
Number of individuals 
Household size 4.1 1.30 4.1 1.32
HH members aged < 16 0.58 0.74 0.57 0.73
Hh members in the work force 2.9 1.10 2.9 1.09
HH members aged > 60 0.24 0.52 0.34 0.61
HH head's education (years) 7.5 2.38 7.3 2.58
Plot size (Mu, 15 Mu = 1 hectare) 4.5 4.64 4.1 4.08
House value per capita (Yuan, in logs) 9.1 1.32 9.2 1.33
Number of households 6,425 2,961
Entire sample
At least 2 individuals 
reporting wtRisk in 
the HH
17,658 7,808
Panel A - Individuals
Panel B - Households
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Table A 3.2 - SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Note. Panel B of the table reports marginal effects from probit regressions of a dummy that equals one if individuals reported risk attitude during the 2009 survey on 
indicators for a number of major life events having occurred to them and/or their relatives during 2008 or 2009. We define indicators for the following events or 
combinations of them: pregnancy/birth in 2008 (column 1 and 3), at least one illness or one death in 2008 (column 2 and 3), at least one pregnancy/birth, illness or 
death in 2008 (column 4), one pregnancy/birth in 2009 (column 5), at least one illness or death in 2009 (column 6), at least one pregnancy/birth, illness or death in 
2009 (column 8). The sample includes all individuals (regardless of having reported risk attitudes or not) in the work force (i.e. aged between 16 and 60 and not 
currently in school or disabled) who live in households in which more than one member in the labour force has reported risk attitudes. Panel A reports estimates from 
OLS regressions of wtRisk on individual, household controls and the estimated Inverse Mill’s Ratio. For each column, the inverse Mills ratio is computed using the 
instrument(s) reported in the lower panel of the table. All regressions include individual controls (age, age squared, a dummy for male, years of education, a dummy 
for being married, relation with the HH head dummies, number of siblings, order of birth, and number of children) household controls (household size and structure 
(number of family members under 16, in the work force, and older than 60); and per capita house value (in logs)) and county fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the household level and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel a) outcome = wtRisk (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inverse Mill's 0.054 0.043 0.032 0.032 0.053 0.065 0.063 0.067
-0.187 -0.185 -0.186 -0.186 -0.193 -0.194 -0.194 -0.194
Observations 5893 5893 5893 5893 5627 5627 5627 5627
R-squared 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.247
F-stat (Inverse Mills) 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.1 0.12
Prob > F (Inverse Mills) 0.7723 0.8145 0.8651 0.8634 0.7859 0.7377 0.746 0.73
Panel b) outcome = reporting wtRisk (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pregnancy/Birth 0.013** 0.013** 0.022** 0.021*
-0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011
Illness/death 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015* 0.015*
-0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
Pregnancy/Birth/Illness/Death 0.015*** 0.018**
-0.005 -0.007
Observations 6609 6609 6609 6609 6347 6347 6347 6347
Pseudo R-squared 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.632 0.632 0.632 0.632
Chi2 (x,N) 3.4 4.77 7.74 6.21 1.88 1.91 3.53 3.83
Prob > chi2 0.0653 0.029 0.0208 0.0127 0.1709 0.1665 0.1713 0.0503
Events occurred in 2008 Events occurred in 2009
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Table A 3.3 - INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION DECISION: PROBIT AND LOGIT ESTIMATES (MARGINAL EFFECTS) 
 
Note. The table shows the marginal effects derived using the probit (columns 1-4) and logit (columns 5-8) estimators of an individual indicator for migrants (in the 
previous year) on individual willingness to take risk (wtRisk) and other controls. The wtRisk variable measures individual willingness to take risks (decreasing with 
risk aversion) and has a mean of 2.57 and a standard deviation of 2.36. The basic individual controls are age, age squared, a dummy for male, years of education, and 
a dummy for married; the additional individual controls are: relation with HH head dummies, order of birth, number of siblings, and number of children; and the 
household controls are household size and structure (number of family members under 16, in the work force, and older than 60); and per capita house value (in logs). 
All regressions include 82 county fixed effects. The sample includes all individuals in the labour force (i.e. aged between 16 and 60 and not currently in school or 
disabled) who live in households in which more than one member in the labour force has reported risk attitudes. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household 
level and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
wtRisk 0.013*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.014** 0.004* 0.003** 0.004**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Basic individual controls X X X X X X
Additional individual controls X X X X
Household controls X X
County fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Observations 6,332 6,332 6,103 5,992 6,332 6,332 6,103 5,992
R-squared 0.232 0.386 0.400 0.409 0.234 0.391 0.404 0.414
Probit Logit
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Table A 3.4 - INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION DECISION: FULL SPECIFICATION 
 
Note. The table reports estimates from LPM regressions of a dummy for individual migration status on 
individual willingness to take risk (wtRisk) and other controls. The migration status dummy equals one 
if the individual migrated for working reasons in the year before the interview (columns 1–4) or has ever 
migrated for working reasons (columns 5–8). The wtRisk variable measures individual willingness to 
take risks (decreasing with risk aversion) and has mean of 2.57 and a standard deviation of 2.36. The 
basic individual controls are age, age squared, a dummy for male, years of education, and a dummy for 
married;  the additional individual controls are: relation with HH head dummies, order of birth, number 
of siblings, and number of children; and the household controls are household size and structure 
(number of family members under 16, in the work force, and older than 60); and per capita house value 
(in logs). All regressions include 82 county fixed effects. The sample includes all individuals in the 
labour force (i.e. aged between 16 and 60 and not currently in school or disabled) who live in 
households in which more than one member in the labour force has reported risk attitudes. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
wtRisk 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.030*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Male dummy 0.060*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.135*** 0.132*** 0.132***
(0.0064) (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0087) (0.0178) (0.0179)
Age -0.021*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.020***0.005 0.003
(0.0040) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0060)
Age squared*100 0.015*** 0.001 -0.000 0.009* -0.015** -0.013**
(0.0044) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0052) (0.0063) (0.0063)
Years of education 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Married -0.032 -0.044 -0.055* -0.013 -0.032 -0.035
(0.0274) (0.0289) (0.0286) (0.0291) (0.0305) (0.0310)
Order of birth -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0043) (0.0043)
# of siblings 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0040) (0.0040)
# of children -0.002 0.001 -0.008 -0.005
(0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0079) (0.0080)
# HH members below age 16 0.009 0.008
(0.0059) (0.0083)
# HH members in work force -0.005 -0.011*
(0.0040) (0.0059)
# HH members above age 60 -0.004 0.009
(0.0094) (0.0130)
Ln (p.c. house value) -0.002 0.002
(0.0034) (0.0049)
Relationship with HH head dummies X X X X
County fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Observations 6,332 6,332 6,103 5,992 6,280 6,280 6,052 5,946
R-squared 0.187 0.288 0.305 0.310 0.148 0.273 0.288 0.292
Migrated last year Ever migrated
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Table A 3.5 - CHANGES IN SELF-REPORTED WILLINGNESS TO TAKE RISKS (2009-2011 
RUMIC-RHS WAVES) 
 
Note. This table tests the relationship between changes in self-reported risk attitudes between 2009 and 
2011 and migration experience in 2010. In columns 1-4, the dependent variable is the change in self-
reported willingness to take risks between the 2009 and the 2011 waves, while in columns 5-8 the 
dependent variable is self-reported willingness to take risks in 2011. In Panel A, the main regressor of 
interest is an indicator for the individual being recorded as migrant in year 2010. In Panel B, the main 
regressors of interest are an indicator for the individual having migrated only in 2010 and an indicator 
for having migrated in both 2008 and 2010. In Panel B, willingness to take risks reported in 2009 is 
always included in the controls. The basic individual controls are age, age squared, a dummy for male, 
years of education, and a dummy for married; the additional individual controls are: relation with HH 
head dummies, order of birth, number of siblings, and number of children; and the household controls 
are household size and structure (number of family members under 16, in the work force, and older than 
60); and per capita house value (in logs). All regressions include 82 county fixed effects. The sample 
includes all individuals in our estimating sample who also reported risk attitudes in the 2011 wave. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Migration in 2010 0.037 0.120 0.106 0.108 0.151 -0.059 -0.088 -0.093
(0.232) (0.239) (0.245) (0.244) (0.192) (0.196) (0.201) (0.201)
Observations 2,906 2,906 2,813 2,791 2,906 2,906 2,813 2,791
Migration only  in 2010 -0.121 -0.027 -0.032 -0.013 0.056 -0.164 -0.192 -0.199
(0.303) (0.307) (0.316) (0.315) (0.261) (0.263) (0.270) (0.269)
Migration in 2008 and 2010 0.195 0.267 0.242 0.227 0.246 0.045 0.015 0.011
(0.319) (0.325) (0.333) (0.331) (0.257) (0.255) (0.261) (0.261)
Observations 2,906 2,906 2,813 2,791 2,906 2,906 2,813 2,791
wtRisk 2009 X X X X
Basic individual controls X X X X X X
Additional individual controls X X X X
Household controls X X
County fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Change in wtRisk 2009-2011 wtRisk 2011
Panel A
Panel B
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Table A 3.6 - MIGRATION DURATION AND RISK ATTITUDES (RUMIC URBAN 
SURVEYS) 
 
Note. This table tests the relationship between attitude toward risks and the length of migration 
experience. It reports estimates of wtRisk on years since first migration for a sample of migrants living 
in urban areas. Individual controls are age, age squared, a dummy for male, years of education, a 
dummy for married and the number of cities the individual has migrated to. OLS estimates are 
presented in column 1 while estimates including individual fixed effects are presented in column 2. 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of rural-urban migrants living in urban areas coming from six 
waves (from 2008 to 2013) of the urban module of the RUMiC Survey. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the household level and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
  
OLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2)
Years since first migration 0.006 -0.002
(0.004) (0.007)
Individual controls X X
Year and city dummies X X
Individual fixed effects X
Observations 22,208 22,208
R-squared 0.132 0.013
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Chapter 4 
 
 
     
4.    Weather Shocks and Labour Supply 
Reallocation in Rural China 
4.1 Introduction 
Rural households in developing countries, by relying mainly on agricultural activity, face 
substantial idiosyncratic and common risk, which can result in high income variability. 
Furthermore, due to imperfect insurance and credit markets, their ability to smooth 
consumption and insure against adverse events is typically limited; and since many 
households live close to, or below, the poverty line, failure to cope with shocks can have 
negative impacts on nutrition, health, mortality rate, and translate into persistent poverty. 
Maccini and Yang (2009) show, indeed, that income shocks, even temporary ones, can have 
sizable negative long-term consequences on education, health, and labour market outcomes. 
In order to cope with negative economic shocks, in the absence of adequate markets, 
households have developed a number of strategies as risk sharing (Rosenzweig and Stark, 
1989; Townsend, 1994); self insurance and precautionary savings (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 
1993); asset depletion and disinvestment in education (Udry, 1995; Thomas et al., 2004). All 
these mechanisms have received quite extensive attention. Yet, another way through which 
households can smooth consumption is by smoothing income. In other words individuals can 
respond to negative productivity shocks in agriculture by temporary shifting the labour 
supply across sectors and locations. To the extend that non-agricultural labour market and 
own-farm productivity are not perfectly correlated, indeed, supply of labour to the local non-
agricultural sector, as well as to the urban one, are two means that households can use in 
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order to cope with negative agricultural productivity shocks. The use of labour markets to 
smooth income has been, relatively to the other potential coping mechanism, under-
researched. It is however, of great importance for economists and policy makers to 
understand how labour market opportunities and institutions help poor households to smooth 
income and consumption when their primary source of income is under threat.    
The research question this paper wants to answer is if, and in what measure, individuals and 
households in rural China reallocate labour across sectors – away from farming and toward 
local off-farm and urban sectors - as an ex-post response to negative productivity shocks in 
agricultural sector. The paper focuses on both the participation and the intensive margin of 
adjustment of the allocation of labour, as well as on the heterogeneous responses to shocks. 
Furthermore, it studies the role that institutional features, such as land tenure insecurity, play 
in influencing and constraining labour reallocation away from agriculture.    
There are a number of reasons why it is relevant to study how households use the labour 
market to respond to negative agricultural productivity shocks in China. First, despite the 
outstanding growth record China has enjoyed during the last two decades, many are still 
those left behind, especially in rural areas where half of the population, and about 90%-95% 
of all the poor live (World Bank). Agriculture is the most important source of income in most 
rural areas, and weather is responsible for about 25-30% of the annual variation in 
agricultural production (Zhang & Carter, 1997). Second, China is characterised by high rates 
of internal mobility, with estimates of about 150 million of rural migrants working in Chinese 
cities in year 2009 (NBS). Furthermore, migration is mostly temporary, also because of 
restrictions to permanent change of residence such as the houku system. According to 
RUMiC, a longitudinal household survey that is the main source of data this paper is based 
on, almost one out of three individuals aged 16-65 spent some time working in the city 
between year 2008 and 2010. Interestingly enough, there is large variability in the share of 
time over the year spent in the city both in the cross sectional than in the time dimension. In 
an average year, 42% of rural-urban migrants (i.e. individuals who have spent a positive 
number of days working in the city)
 60
 spend less than 300 days working in the city, and 18% 
                                                     
60
 In this paper I use a broad definition of rural-urban migrants, considering as such all individuals who 
have spent at least 1 day working in a city outside the home village.  The usual definition considers as 
migrants those who have spent at least 3 months away from home. Furthermore the definition used 
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spend less than 200 days. A 33% of them also reported to have been working in the home 
village as well as in the city of destination during the same year. As far as the variation over 
time is concerned, if one takes two consecutive years, in 70% of the cases the length of time 
spent working in the city differs between them. According to these data rural-urban migrants 
are a very mobile population, so called floating population, which goes back and forth from 
the native village to the city for different length of time across years. I will show that some of 
this variability can be explained as an optimal response to shocks in the productivity of the 
main agricultural sector.   
The paper proposes a stylised framework of household labour allocation across sectors in the 
presence of temporary productivity shocks. Then, in the empirical section, I use data from a 
longitudinal household survey conducted in rural China between 2008 and 2011 to relate 
changes in days of work supplied to each of three different sectors  - farm, local off-farm in 
the home village, and urban sector) with weather shocks affecting agricultural productivity at 
the county level. Rainfall shocks have been shown to the relevant determinants of agricultural 
productivity in China, especially for rice cultivation (Shili, 2005).  Jiles (2006) also 
underlines the relevance of rainfall shocks for rural Chinese households and the importance 
of the opening up of rural labour markets to provide new margins of income smoothing. For 
identification I will thus exploit the yearly variation in labour supplied by individuals (and 
households) to each of the sectors along both the intensive and the extensive margin together 
with year-by-county variation in rainfalls, which is generated by the Chinese peculiar size 
and climatic heterogeneity.    
I find that yearly working days devoted to farming drop by 4% while those spent working in 
the urban sector increase by almost 6% in correspondence to mild negative rainfall shocks, 
i.e. rainfall realisation 1 standard deviation below the long term average. The increase in 
number of days individuals spend working in the city derives from both longer spells in the 
city for those already engaging in urban work (intensive margin) and from increase in the 
likelihood to participate at all in the urban sector (extensive margin). Indeed the probability to 
engage in rural-urban migration increases by 3.7% on the baseline value. I find interesting 
                                                                                                                                                       
here does not constraint individuals to have left the home while working in the city (they might be 
commuting). Nevertheless, I will often refer to those who participate in some form of urban labour 
market as rural-urban migrants throughout the paper.  
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heterogeneous response across generations driven by age specific productivities in the urban 
sector and costs of leaving (even temporarily) the home village. While younger individuals 
tend to shift labour supply from farming toward working in the city, older individuals 
generally shift labour from farming toward local off-farm work, without leaving the home 
village. At a higher level, I calculate that in correspondence with rainfall 1 standard deviation 
lower than the average households reduce by 2.6% the total labour supply to the farming 
sector and reallocate it almost completely to the urban one. Finally, I look at the interplay 
between land reallocation risk and propensity to move labour from farming toward rural-
urban migration in bad years. Results suggest that the elasticity of rural-urban migration to 
agricultural productivity in villages with high risk of land reallocation is about half the size of 
that in other villages.  
This paper aims to contribute to various areas of the literature. The first one is the literature 
on labour supply as ex-post response to shocks. The two papers that are closest to this are 
Kochar (1999) and Rose (2001). The first one makes use of self-reported information on crop 
losses, included in the ICRISAT dataset from India, to analyse how households respond to 
shocks by increasing off-farm labour. The second one uses district level rainfall as measure 
of aggregate shocks and looks at how households change their labour force participation. 
Neither of these papers has looked at internal migration as a further margin of adjustment, 
and this paper is trying to fill that gap. Internal, temporary migration can indeed be a relevant 
option for households to respond to shocks, especially when these shocks are aggregate and 
affect the entire community (as rainfall shocks do). The second type of literature this paper 
wishes to contribute to, is the one employing rainfalls as an IV for migration. Starting from 
the seminal paper from Munshi (2003) rainfalls have been used to instrument migration 
flows, especially in the Mexico-U.S. case. However, aggregate data being usually employed, 
the relationship between rainfall shocks and migration is still a black box. This paper hopes 
to shed some light on the mechanisms in play and on the heterogeneity driving responses to 
rainfall shocks. Furthermore I focus on a different type of migration, temporary rural-urban 
migration as opposed to international. 
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 presents the theoretical 
framework; section 4.3 introduces the data and some descriptive statistics; section 4.4 
describes the empirical strategy; section 4.5 discusses the results and section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Agricultural Productivity Shocks and Labour Reallocation 
In this section I present a very simple labour allocation framework. I will start by assuming 
that each household has an endowment of labour and has to decide how to allocate it across 
different sectors in order to maximise utility. The three options are farm sector (farm work in 
or outside the family plot), local off-farm sector within the home village, and work in the 
urban sector (rural-urban migration). Farm production function depends on rainfalls 𝜉, a 
stochastic productivity factor which distribution (𝜇, 𝜎) is known by the household: 
𝑌 = 𝜉𝐹𝛼𝐾1−𝛼 
Because local off-farm activities are likely to be linked (directly or indirectly) to the 
agricultural sector, off-farm wage is also considered a function of rainfalls, 𝑤𝑟(𝜉), as well as 
of other factors. Finally, if one decides to work in the city she will earn a fixed wage that 
does not depend on rainfalls: 𝑤𝑢. The year is divided into two periods as shown in the figure 
below.  
 
The first period is before rainfall realisation and could be seen as the cultivation and 
preparation stage of agriculture. In this period the household chooses the allocation of labour 
according to wages and the known distribution of rainfalls. At the beginning of period 2 
actual rainfalls are realised and the household can observe their deviation from the average: 
𝜖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜉𝑡. With the new information in hand the household can eventually respond to the 
shock by optimally adjusting the labour allocation for the second part of the year. This 
conceptualisation is compatible with the structure of the agricultural year in China, where 
rainfalls during the first months of the calendar year are crucial for agricultural productivity 
through the whole year and highly correlated with the total amount of yearly rainfall. 
Rainfall (ξ)Ex Ante Ex Post
Period 2Period 1
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In this simplified framework the responsiveness of productivity to rainfalls varies across 
sectors. More precisely, it is highest in the farm sector, from the moment that small plots are 
usually not, or only partially, irrigated. Consequently productivity strictly depends on rainfall 
annual fluctuations. Differently, because productivity in the off-farm sector does not directly 
depend on rainfalls, elasticity to rainfalls is lower. Finally, the productivity in the urban 
sector is the one that plausibly least depends on rainfalls since they should not directly affect 
economic activity in the city. As an extreme, exemplifying case, elasticity of productivity to 
rainfalls is set to zero in the urban sector. Utility of working in each one of the sectors, as a 
function of an adverse rainfall shock (which can be though as a negative deviation of rainfalls 
from the long term average
 
) is presented in panel A of Figure 4.1.  
In presence of adverse weather shocks households can find optimal to shift some labour from 
the most affected sector, farming, toward off-farm and urban work. It is important to 
underline that individual heterogeneity in, for instance, migration costs or productivity in the 
different sectors will cause the intercept of the curves in Figure 4.1 panel A, as well as their 
slopes, to varies. Panel B of Figure 4.1 shows the case where for certain individuals working 
off-farm delivers higher utility to start with, i.e. even for zero levels of adverse rainfall 
shocks. What is crucial for the qualitative implications of this simplified framework to hold is 
that the ranking of elasticity of productivity with respect to rainfalls is preserved. If that is the 
case, we should always expect to observe, if anything, labour reallocation that goes from 
activities more affected by rain to activities less affected and not the other way around. This 
unless general equilibrium effects drive wages in the city down to a level that more than 
counter balance the decline in agricultural productivity due to rainfall shocks.  
4.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
4.3.1. Data 
Labour supply. This paper uses data from the Rural Household Survey (RHS) from the 
Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) project (henceforth RUMiC-RHS).  RUMiC 
began in 2008 and it conducts yearly longitudinal surveys of rural, urban, and migrant 
households. The RUMiC-RHS covers 82 counties (around 800 villages) in 9 provinces 
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identified as either major migrant sending or receiving regions and is representative of the 
populations of these regions. A map of RUMiC-RHS surveyed provinces is proposed in 
Figure 4.2. The survey was conducted for 4 years and administered by China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics and includes a very rich set of individual and household level variables. I 
use information from the 2009, 2010 and 2011 rounds of the survey as they contain detailed 
information about the number of working days individuals have devoted to each specific 
sector during the past calendar year. In particular, the survey asks the number of days the 
individual has dedicated, during the previous calendar year, to each of the following 
alternative occupations: 1) farm work; 2) local (within local countryside) off-farm work; and 
3) work in urban area, i.e. outside local countryside.  RUMiC-RHS survey includes 18,910 
individuals in the labour force (aged between 16 and 65 and not currently at school or 
disabled) who provide information about age, gender, educational level and days devoted to 
each of the above alternative sectors in at least two of the three survey rounds between 2009 
and 2011 (referring to years 2008, 2009 and 2010). Out of the 18,910 individuals above, 
complete labour supply information in each and every year are reported by 10,394 
individuals, and in two of the three years by the rest of them of them (8,516), producing an 
estimating sample of 48,214 individual*year observations. For the part of the analysis at the 
household level, in order to keep the composition of household members reporting labour 
supply data fixed over time, I focus on those individuals who have reported labour supply 
information for all three years, from 2008 to 2010.  That leaves me with a balanced panel of 
3,713 households, corresponding to 11,139 household*year observations
61
.   
Weather shocks. I use detailed, county specific, information about daily rainfall to proxy 
agricultural productivity shocks. Daily precipitation data come from the Chinese National 
Ground Surface Dataset (GNGSD) provided by the Chinese National Meteorological 
Information Centre. Precipitation data are matched to counties in the RUMiC-RHS survey 
using the distance between the closest weather stations and the centroid of each county. I 
construct a county-specific measure of rainfall shock, that is the deviation of rainfalls in year 
t from the long term average, normalised by its county-specific standard deviation as follows: 
                                                     
61
 I also drop 830 individuals who are the only member in their households reporting complete labour 
supply information for the three years.   
129 
 
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑘 =
𝑦𝑡𝑘−𝑦𝑘̅̅ ̅̅
78−10 
𝑆𝐷𝑘
78−10(𝑦)
. 
The long term average is computed over a period of 33 years, from 1978 to 2010.  Figure 4.3 
shows the distribution of the Zscore_Rain for all county-year observations from year 2000 to 
2010.  Standardising the yearly rainfall deviation by the long term county–specific standard 
deviation allow to control for the fact that some counties might have very high raimfall 
standard deviations and thus are more likely in each period to experience large deviations 
from the average. Standardisation also provides a straightforward interpretation of the 
variable as Zscore_Rain=1 (-1) corresponds to rainfalls 1 standard deviation above (below) 
the mean. Because I do not want to focus my analysis on extreme events, such as flooding, I 
exclude observations in counties that experienced values of Zscore_Rain above 2 between 
2008 and 2010
62
.   
4.3.2. Labour allocation across the farm, local off-farm and 
urban sector 
Before moving to the empirical strategy I think it is worth to describe some interesting 
patterns in the way individuals and households allocate labour across different sectors in rural 
China. From them it arises a picture of a pretty fluid labour market where households (as well 
as individuals) tend to diversify their supply of labour across different sectors.  
Individual level. Descriptive statistics about individual labour supplies to different sectors 
are presented in Table 4.1.  Statistics are calculated on the pooled estimating sample of 
48,214 observations from year 2008, 2009 and 2010. Males represent about half of the 
sample, average age is 43, 84% of respondents are married and average education is 7.2 
years. About 2 individuals out of 3 devote a positive amount of working days to the farm 
sector, confirming the importance of agriculture as the primary source of occupation. On the 
other hand, 28% of the sample supplies positive amount of working days to the local off-farm 
sector and 24% to the urban one (rural-urban migration). Participation shares sum up to more 
than 1 because, as I will show in more detail below, many individuals tend to work in more 
than one sector during the same year. The unconditional average number of days per year 
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 Only 3 counties have experienced values of Zscore_Rain above 2 in the period of interest. 
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supplied to the farm, local off-farm and urban sector are, respectively, 93, 60 and 65. While 
conditional on participation, the average number of days supplied to the three sectors is about 
139, 214 and 270. In an average year, 42% of rural-urban migrants (i.e. individuals who have 
spent a positive number of days working in the urban sector) spend less than 300 days 
working in the city, and 18% spend less than 200 days.  
Further, these numbers mask relevant heterogeneity along the age distribution in the amount 
of days of work spent in different sectors. Indeed, as Figure 4.4 shows, labour supply to the 
urban sector is highest for individuals aged 25-35 and declines with age, while supply to the 
farming sector increases with age and picks around age 55-65. Finally labour supply to the 
local off-farm sector is highest for individuals aged between 30 and 50 and is lower for both 
younger and older ones. Although young individuals are more likely to engage in urban 
sector work while elderly ones are more likely to farm, there is a non-negligible positive 
probability of participating to each of the three sectors at any age between 16 and 65.  
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for individuals in our sample to engage in more than one 
sector during the same year. The first column in the bottom panel of Table 4.1 reports the 
share of individuals in each of the following 8 categories of labour allocation: 1) no work at 
all; 2) farm only; 3) local off-farm only; 4) urban sector only; 5) farm + off-farm sector; 6) 
farm + urban sector; 7) off-farm + urban sector; and 8) all three sectors. 95% of individuals 
work and almost half of them are dedicated only to farming, while 11% and 17% of 
individuals work in the local off-farm and in the urban sector only respectively. Yet, almost 1 
person out of 4 diversifies his supply of labour across more than one sector during the same 
year. When people do so they tend to pair farming with either working in the local off-farm 
sector or in the urban one. It is indeed interesting to notice that almost 1 individual out of 3  
of those who have been working in the urban sector have also supplied some positive amount 
of labour to one of the other two, in most of the cases the farming one.  
The likelihood of individuals to spread their supply of labour across different sectors, and the 
extent to which they do so, varies across both the gender and the age dimension. Panel A of 
Figure 4.5 shows that although “farming only” is by far the most common choice for both 
females and males, males are double as likely than females to diversify their supply of labour 
across different sectors during the same year. Indeed 32% of males report to have been 
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working in at least 2 sectors during the last year, while only 15% of females do so. As far as 
young (aged below 41) versus elderly (aged above 40) individuals, Panel B of the same 
Figure 4.5 shows that those aged above 40 are much more likely to engage in farming only 
while the shares of young and elderly individuals who participate to more than one sector are 
similar, respectively 22% and 25%. 
Household level. I show descriptive statistics about household characteristics and their 
labour supply choices in Table 4.2. Household descriptive statistics are calculated on the 
pooled estimating sample of 11,139 observations from year 2008, 2009 and 2010. Average 
household size is 4 and the average number of members in the work force is 2.9. 86% of 
households in the sample engage in farm work, 48% in the local off-farm sector and 39% in 
the urban one. When we look at how households allocate their supply of labour across 
different sectors we observe that, despite the diffusion of off-farm and urban work, 1 out of 4 
of rural households still engages in farming only. On the other hand 61% of them allocate 
labour supply across more than one sector, 40% have someone who has spent some days 
working in the urban sector, and 12% are fully diversified, i.e. engage in all 3 sectors.     
Labour supply variation over time. The descriptive statistics above show relevant cross 
sectional variation in the likelihood of individuals and households to participate to different 
sectors and in the amount of working days supplied conditional on participation. This reveals 
how households tend to diversify the supply of labour across different sectors and away from 
farming to reduce, ex-ante, their exposure to income risk related to each one of the sectors.   
Yet, what is of particular interest for this paper is how they change their labour supply 
allocation over time, in response to variations in the relative productivity of sectors. Figure 
4.6 shows the great amount of variation in the number of days dedicated to each one of the 
sectors within individuals over time. The figure plots the distribution of changes, within 
individuals and between consecutive years, in the number of days worked in each sector and 
in the total number of days worked. In each of the panels, the sample is restricted to 
individuals who reported positive days of work in the specific sector in at least one year. As 
far as days of work in the urban sector are concerned, for only 30% of the observations there 
is no change (i.e. a change ranging between -/+10 days) between two consecutive years. 
Similar patterns are observable in the farm and in the off-farm sectors as well as in the total 
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amount of days worked in a year. These statistics combine changes in the amount of days 
devoted to each sector deriving from variations along both the extensive and the intensive 
margin. In the empirical analysis I will show how such changes are in part an optimal 
response to weather shocks affecting agricultural productivity.     
4.4. Empirical Strategy  
The main threat to identification in this study is the endogeneity of agricultural productivity 
shock. Household level farm productivity may indeed be correlated with unobservables that 
contribute to determine the supply of labour to off-farm and urban sectors as well. A 
household could, for instance, opt to invest less in pesticides and fertilizer because has 
decided to send a migrant away working in the city. In this case the estimates of the 
(negative) relationship between farm productivity and the probability to observe a rural-urban 
migrant in the household would be biased. To solve the endogeneity problem I employ 
rainfalls as an instrumental variable for agricultural productivity. As outlined above rainfalls 
have significant impact on farm productivity and income. At the same time they cannot be 
affected by farmers' behaviour providing thus a fairly exogenous source of variation in 
agricultural productivity, which has been indeed widely used in the literature (see 
Rosenzwaig and Wolpin, 2000, for an extensive literature review on the use of rainfalls as 
natural experiment). Furthermore, crucially for identification, China's size and climatic 
heterogeneity generates variation in rainfalls both across counties within years and between 
years within counties. Not having available data on household farm productivity I will 
identify a reduced form effect of rainfall shocks on labour reallocation rather than any 
structural parameter relating the latter to agricultural productivity. The empirical analysis 
looks at both individual level and household level labour allocation responses to rainfall 
shocks. 
Individual level analysis. For the individual level analysis I estimate various versions of the 
following equation:       
𝐿𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛)𝑘𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑘
′ 𝜉 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡                Eq. (1) 
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where i indexes individuals, h households, k administrative counties, and t years.   𝐿𝑖ℎ𝑘𝑡 is 
either a binary variable indicating whether the individual participates in different sectors or 
the number of days of work spent in those sectors during the previous year. On the one hand, 
when estimating the binary outcome equation (using a linear probability model) I study the 
participation decision to different sectors, i.e. the response to shocks through the extensive 
margin. On the other hand, when I estimate the days of work equation (unconditional on 
participation and using OLS) I am capturing a mixture of intensive and extensive margin 
response. There are three sectors: farm; local off-farm; and urban sector (to which I will often 
refer to as rural-urban migration). Zscore_Rain is the county-specific rainfall shock defined 
above as the deviation of rainfall at time t from the long-term average, normalised by its 
standard deviation. The estimates of the impact of rainfall shocks on labour supply allocation 
have to interpreted as reduced form parameters of a two step model where rainfalls affect 
agricultural productivity and individuals respond to the latter. Zscore_Rain is measured at the 
county level (there are 82 counties in the RUMiC sample), thus in order to allow the error 
terms of individuals (and households) who live in the same county to be correlated, I cluster 
robust standard errors at the county level throughout the analysis. The vector Z includes 
individual and household time varying characteristics such as marital status, number of 
family members respectively aged less than 16, in the work force and older than 65, and sex 
ratio of family members in working age. Finally, 𝛾𝑖and 𝜆𝑡 are respectively individual and 
time fixed effects. I employ an individual fixed effects specification to condition on every 
time-invariant individual observable and unobservable characteristic - such as ability, 
preferences, productivity, migration costs etc. - that might affect labour supply decisions in 
the farm, off-farm and urban sector. This allows me to focus on ex-post responses to shocks - 
i.e. on changes in the labour supply across years within individuals which are determined by 
unexpected weather shocks – rather than on ex-ante labour supply strategies driven by, for 
instance, diversification purposes.    
Household level analysis. In the household level analysis I study how the allocation of 
household total labour supply is shifted across sectors in response to weather shocks affecting 
agricultural productivity, both on the participation and on the intensive margin. To do so I 
estimate various versions of the following equation:       
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𝐿ℎ𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛)𝑘𝑡 + 𝑍ℎ𝑘
′ 𝜉 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑢ℎ𝑘𝑡             Eq. (2) 
where h indexes households, k administrative counties, and t years.   𝐿ℎ𝑘𝑡 is either: a binary 
variable indicating whether the household participates in different sectors; the number of 
days of work, per household member in the work force, allocated to those sectors; and the 
share of total household working days devoted to those sectors. Similarly to the individual 
case I use the binary outcome (estimating a linear probability model) to identify responses 
along the participation margin. Similarly to above I rely on the panel structure of the data and 
include household fixed effects (𝛿ℎ) to identify ex-post responses to shocks.   
4.5. Results  
4.5.1. Individual level analysis  
Days of work. I start by exploring the average response to weather shocks. Table 4.3 reports 
OLS estimates of equation (1) above where the output is the number of days worked by the 
individual in different sectors (columns 1-3) and in total (column 4). Individuals respond to 
negative (positive) deviations of rainfalls from the long term average by decreasing 
(increasing) the time devoted to farming. Females do so to a higher extend than males (Panel 
B). As expected, people farm more when agricultural productivity (which is increasing in 
rainfalls until a value of Zscore Rain of +2) is higher and vice versa. On the other hand 
individuals respond to negative (positive) agricultural productivity shocks by working more 
(less) days in the urban sector, where wages and job opportunities are not (or at least less) 
affected by agricultural productivity. Males tend to increase more than females their work in 
the urban sector during bad times, even when considering the difference between the two 
genders at baseline. This is probably due to females facing a higher fixed cost for rural-urban 
migration than males.  Days spent working in the city seem to replace almost completely the 
decrease in days of farming.  
The estimates are both statistically significant and economically relevant. Days of farming 
decrease by 4% and days of work in the urban sector increase by 5.7% (6.9% and 3.6% 
respectively for males and females) on the baseline value when rainfall realization is one 
standard deviation below the average.  The coefficient in the local off-farm equation is 
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positive but much smaller in size with respect to that in the farming equation, indicating that 
agricultural productivity seems to affect the productivity in the local off-farm sector in the 
local countryside. Yet the coefficient is not statistically significant, and I will show later how 
that masks interesting heterogeneity.  
Males shift their labour allocation across sectors leaving unchanged their total labour supply. 
On the other hand females, who are less engaged in the labour force to start with, do work 
more in years when agricultural productivity is high.  The estimates presented in this section 
capture a mix between the response along the participation margin (those shifting from zero 
days of work in a sector to some positive number and vice versa) and the intensive margin. 
We can imagine that, especially for sectors where entry costs are higher, such as local off-
farm and rural-urban migration, differentiating between the response along the extensive and 
intensive margin might be relevant. 
Participation. Table 4.4 presents estimates of a LPM of equation (2) where the output is an 
indicator as whether the individual supplied positive amount of days to different sectors 
(columns 1-3) and to any of them (column 4). As far as farming is concerned, no significant 
response along the participation margin is detected when looking at males and females 
together (Panel A) suggesting that individuals are attached to the farming sector and tend to 
engage in it even when agricultural productivity is low. Only the coefficient for females 
(Panel B) is significantly different from zero although its magnitude is small. On the other 
hand the probability to engage in rural-urban migration increases by 3.7% on the baseline 
value in response of a 1 standard deviation negative rainfall shock. This percentage effect is 
smaller than the one detected in the days of work equation (5.7%) suggesting that  the 
increase in aggregate days of work in the urban sector steams from both the participation and 
the intensive margin, unless one assumes that the “new” rural-urban migrants spend on 
average many more days working in the city than the “old” ones. The response along the 
participation margin as far as rural-urban migration is concerned is striking different across 
genders. While the estimated effect of a 1 standard deviation negative rainfall shocks is equal 
to 4.9% on the baseline value for males, the coefficient for females is close to zero. These 
results confirm the possibility that fixed costs to participate to the urban sector (i.e. migration 
costs) are higher for females than for males and that the change in productivity in the farm 
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sector vis-a-vis the urban one is not large enough to overcome fixed costs of moving. For this 
reason females mainly respond through the intensive margin. Coefficients for the local off-
farm equation are positive and statistically significant for both females and males. Finally, 
variations in agricultural productivity do not trigger individuals to move in and out of the 
labour force (column 4).            
Intensive margin. To attempt to assess the relevance of the change in aggregate days of 
work to various sectors coming from individuals who move in and out of the sector compared 
to that derived from individuals always participating to it, I, for each sector, compare 
estimates obtained on the full “unconditional” sample (the same presented in Table 4.3) with 
those obtained on a sample of observations conditional on days of work >0 (for each specific 
sector). Results are presented respectively in Panel (A) and (B) of Table 4.5. Estimates for 
both the farm and the urban sector equation are of the same sign in the two samples. Yet, 
those in the sample when I condition on participation are about 80% of those in the 
unconditional sample. These results represent suggestive evidence that the majority of the 
effect comes from changes in the amount of days devoted to sectors conditional on 
participation rather than from individuals moving in and out of them.  Local off-farm sector 
presents somehow more puzzling results with the coefficient on the conditional sample 
turning negative and statistically significant.  
4.5.2. Response heterogeneity  
I now turn to study the heterogeneity of the response to shocks along the distribution of age. 
Figure 4.7 shows predicted coefficients (and 90% confidence intervals) in correspondence of 
a negative rainfall shock equal to a 2 standard deviations for six different age groups. 
Coefficients where the outcome is days of work are presented in Panel (A) while those for the 
participation equations in Panel (B). Days of work in the farm sector decrease homogenously 
(estimates are all statistically significant at the 10% level) along the distribution of age until 
age 55. Because individuals aged <45 do much less farming to start with (refer to Figure 4.4 
for descriptive statistics about sectorial participation by age) for many of them a decrease in 
days of farming is translated into moving out of the sector (Panel B). Individuals >55 are the 
group that reduces farming the most, yet they tend not to bring their farming days to zero. 
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Working days in the urban sector increase in response to negative rainfall shocks for almost 
all age groups, and so does the likelihood to work in the city. Estimates for younger 
individuals are larger (Panel A) but once the mean group-specific values of days of work in 
the urban sector are taken into account (engagement in rural-urban migration declines with 
age) individuals between 46 and 55 appear to be the most responsive group. As far as total 
working days are concerned, there is no clear pattern in the increase of total labour supply. 
Indeed, most of the adjustment seems to be coming from individuals reallocating time across 
sectors as opposed to increasing (decreasing) the total amount of labour supplied. 
It is interesting to notice how estimates for the local off-farm sector differ between young (< 
45/50) and elderly individuals (>55), for both the days of work and the participation 
specifications. Indeed, younger individuals tend to respond to negative shocks by leaving the 
farming and the local off-farm sector and move to work in the urban area. On the other hand 
older individuals tend to farm less, although without leaving the farm sector completely. In 
fact they tend to remain in the home village and increase participation into the local off-farm 
sector, while only marginally increasing rural-urban migration. Both young and elderly 
individuals respond to negative rainfall shocks by shifting labour supply away from farming, 
yet their next best alternative appears to be different. On the one hand, younger individuals, 
who face low migration costs and have relatively high productivity in urban sectors, tend to 
leave the home village and engage in rural-urban migration. They indeed seem to also exit 
the local off-farm sector - whose productivity is likely to be partially affected by rainfalls, 
although to a lower extent - in bad times. On the other hand, older individuals, who face high 
migration costs and low productivity in the urban sector, have their best alternative in taking 
a non-farming job within the rural home village which might potentially include substituting 
in some family run business a younger family member who moved to the city. Finally there is 
no clear pattern in the increase of total labour supply. Indeed, most of the adjustment seems 
to be coming from individuals reallocating time across sectors as opposed to increasing 
(decreasing) the total labour supply.  
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4.5.3. Household level analysis  
We might be interested to know how the individual level responses showed so far are 
translated at the household level.  Thus, I now turn to the analysis of labour allocation 
responses to weather shocks at the household level. I aggregate individual labour supply data 
within families and in doing so I focus on those individuals who have reported complete 
labour supply information for all three years, from 2008 to 2010.  That leaves me with a 
balanced panel of 3,713 households, whose composition of individuals from whom I 
aggregate labour supply data is fixed over time. First, to make sure that the sample used to 
construct the household level data is indeed similar to the full estimating sample employed 
for the individual level analysis I replicate baseline individual level results for the sample 
used to construct the household level data. Reassuringly, estimates for both the days of work 
and participation equations, presented in Appendix Table A 4.1, are very similar in size and 
significance level to those in Panels (A) of Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.  
Results for the days of work and participation analysis at the household level are presented in 
Table 4.6. Responses in terms of days of work per household members by sectors (columns 
1-4) are similar to those estimated at the individual level, as expected. Further, no increase in 
the total household supply of labour is detected. When I look at the share of total household 
days of work dedicated to different sectors as outcome (columns 5-7) I find that about 1.2-
1.3% of total labour supply is shifted from farming toward rural-urban migration. That 
corresponds to a reduction of 2.6% with respect to the baseline share of labour time devoted 
to farming and an increase of 5.4% with respect to the baseline one devoted to the urban 
sector. Interestingly, the share of household labour supply to the local off-farm sector remains 
unaffected. This result might suggest that some within household re-allocation occurs as far 
as engagement in the off-farm sector is concerned and might be compatible with a story 
where young household members previously working in the local off-farm sector leave to 
work in the city in coincidence with a negative weather shock, while older members from the 
same households substitute them in the (perhaps family owned) off-farm activity. Finally 
when I look at the likelihood of households to participate at all in different sectors, I find that 
the participation to the farm sector (and to the local off-farm) does not respond to weather 
shocks: some amount of farming is always performed even when agricultural productivity is 
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low. On the other hand the likelihood of households to send a member to work to the city 
increases by 1.2 percentage points, corresponding to an economically relevant 3.1% increase 
with respect to the baseline share of households who have a member working in the city.  
4.5.4. Land tenure insecurity  
The analysis in his paper shows that Chinese households do reallocate labour across sectors 
and away from farming when hit by a negative agricultural productivity shocks. Yet 
institutional features might have a role in easing or making more difficult the use of labour 
markets as an ex-post coping mechanism. One relevant institution is land property rights. 
Under China’s constitution, rural land is the property of administrative villages, or 
collectives, but exclusive use rights are contracted out to individual households. Land can be 
reallocated within a village if necessary. Because the presence in the village and the active 
work of it limits the likelihood that an household will face loss of land in a reallocation, 
heterogeneity in the use of administrative land reallocation across counties might influence 
the extend to which households are willing to shift away from agricultural work when hit by 
bad shocks. In the 2009 survey households are asked to report whether in the village there 
has been a land reallocation in the last 5 years. I use the answer to this question as a proxy for 
the inclination of administrative authorities to reallocate land in a specific village, and 
therefore for the likelihood that land reallocation will occur in the future. This assumption is 
based on the fact that reallocations depends on may factors, but Giles and Mu (2014) identify 
some village characteristics, such as lineage group composition or demographic change, that 
in the cross section make some villages more incline to reallocate land. In other words, 
reallocation seems to be just much more common in some villages than in others, thus it is 
reasonable to consider a past reallocation event as a proxy for the likelihood that reallocation 
will take place again in the future.  
Formally I interact the rainfall shock variable with my proxy for the risk that a reallocation 
will occur in the future in the specific village:    
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑘𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁)𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼2(𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾)𝑘 + 𝛼3(𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁 ∗
𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾)𝑣𝑘𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑣𝑘
′ 𝛽1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑘𝑡       Eq. (3) 
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Where LOWRISK is an indicator variable for the low risk that a reallocation will take place 
in the future in the village. The parameter 𝛼1 tells the response to weather shocks in villages 
characterised by high risk of reallocation and 𝛼3 + 𝛼1 provides the response for individuals 
in villages characterised by low risk of land reallocation
63
. Table 4.7 reports estimates from 
individual level specifications employing individual fixed effects. I find that for individuals 
living in villages where the risk of land reallocation is high the elasticity of rural-urban 
migration to rainfall shocks is about half the size than the elasticity in low-reallocation risk 
villages, and it is not statistically different from zero. These results, although the potential 
endogeneity of the risk of reallocation does not allow to attach any causal interpretation to 
them, are consistent with a story where households living in villages where reallocations are 
more frequent are less incline to respond to shocks by shifting labour from the agricultural to 
other sectors and locations because doing so would increase the likelihood of loosing some 
land when a reallocation occurs. These findings also confirm results from a current study 
from Giles and Mu (2014) who find that the probability that a rural resident migrates out of 
the county declines by 2.8 percentage points in response to an expected land reallocation in 
the following year. In this environment land tenure insecurity seems to work as a constraint 
for households to freely reallocate labour across sectors to accommodate variations in sector 
productivities.  
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
The research question this paper wants to answer is if, and in what measure, individuals and 
households in rural China reallocate labour across sectors – away from farming and toward 
local off-farm and the urban sector - as an ex-post response to negative shocks in agricultural 
productivity. The paper focuses on both the participation and the intensive margin of 
adjustment of the labour supply, as well as on the heterogeneous responses to shocks. 
Furthermore, it studies the role that institutional features, such as land tenure insecurity, play 
in influencing and constraining labour reallocation away from agriculture in bad years.    
I find that yearly working days devoted to farming drop by 4% while those spent working in 
the urban sector increase by almost 6% in correspondence to mild negative rainfall shocks, 
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 LOWRISK does not vary with time so 𝛼2 cannot be identified. 
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i.e. rainfall realisations 1 standard deviation below the long term average. The increase in 
number of days individuals spend working in the city derives from both longer spells in the 
city for those already engaging in urban work (intensive margin) and from increase in the 
likelihood to participate at all in the urban sector (extensive margin). Indeed, the probability 
for individuals to engage in rural-urban migration increases by 3.7% on the baseline value. I 
find interesting heterogeneous responses across generations driven by age specific 
productivity in the urban sector and cost of leaving (even temporarily) the home village. 
While younger individuals tend to shift labour supply from farming toward working in the 
city, older individuals generally shift labour from farming toward local off-farm work, 
without leaving the home village. At a higher level, I calculate that in correspondence with 
rainfall 1 standard deviation lower than the average households reduce by 2.6% the total 
labour supply to the farming sector and reallocate it almost completely to the urban one. 
Finally, some preliminary evidence of the relationship between land tenure insecurity and the 
decision of households to reallocate labour toward rural-urban migration is provided. 
Findings would suggest that easing more secure land property rights could increase efficiency 
of rural labour markets and allow households to better cope with negative income shocks. 
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Figure 4.1 - Productivity shocks and labour reallocation  
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
  
Figures 
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Figure 4.2 - Map of RUMiC Survey 
 
Note. The figure shows the provinces in which the RUMiC survey is conducted. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 - Rainfall shocks distribution  
 
Note. The figure shows the distribution of the main measure of rainfall shock (Zscore_Rain) for all 
county-year observations from 2000 to 2010. Zscore_Rain is a county-specific measure, given by the 
deviation of rainfall in year t from the long term average, normalised by its standard deviation: 
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑘 =
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Figure 4.4 - Yearly days of work by sector and age  
 
Note. The figure shows distributions of yearly days of work for each of the three sectors along the 
distribution of age. Pooled estimating sample: 48,214 individual*year observations from year 2008, 
2009 and 2010.  
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Figure 4.5 - Share of individuals by sectoral participation 
 
Panel (A): by gender 
 
Panel (B): by age 
 
Note. The figure shows the shares of individuals participating to different sectors and combination of 
them. Pooled estimating sample: 48,214 individual*year observations from year 2008, 2009 and 2010.
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Figure 4.6 - Yearly changes in days of work supplied: by sector 
 
Note. The figure shows distributions of within-individuals changes in the number of days of work 
supplied to each sector (and the sum of them) between two consecutive years. The sample includes, for 
each sector, individuals who supplied a positive number of days in that specific sector in at least one of 
the three years between 2008 and 2010. More precisely the number of individuals for each panel is as 
follow - Urban: N=5930; Farm: N=13733; Local Off-farm: N=7269; Total days: N=1781
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Figure 4.7 - Heterogeneous response to shock by age group 
                       
      Panel (A): Days of work        Panel (B): Likelihood to participate 
 
Note. The figure reports predicted coefficients on Zscore_Rain (and 90% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered at the county level) in correspondence 
of a negative rainfall shock equal to a 2 standard deviations, from regressions of outcomes on Zscore_Rain and controls in an individual fixed effect specification, by age 
group. Individual and household time-varying controls include marital status, number of family members respectively aged less than 16, in the work force and older than 65, 
sex ratio of family members in working age. In Panel (A) predicted coefficients derive from OLS regressions with days of work as outcome; y-axis: days of work. In Panel (B) 
predicted coefficients derive from LPM regressions with an indicator for days of work >0 (participation); y-axis: probability of participation to the sector. 
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Table 4.1 - Descriptive statistics: individuals   
 
Note. The sample includes all individuals aged between 16 and 65 and not currently in school or 
disabled who reported complete labour supply information in at least two of three years. Individual 
descriptives are based on an unbalanced panel of 18,910 individuals resulting in 48,214 observations.  
Source: 2009, 2010 and 2011 RUMiC-RHS Survey. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Male 0.51 0.50 0 1
Age 43 13 16 65
Married 0.84 0.37 0 1
Years of education 7.2 2.8 0 14
Participation by sector:
Farm 0.67 0.47 0 1
Local Off-farm  0.28 0.45 0 1
Urban 0.24 0.43 0 1
Any 0.95 0.22 0 1
Days of work by sector:
Farm 93 106 0 365
Local Off-farm 60 112 0 365
Urban 65 120 0 365
Any 218 110 0 365
Mean Number of days by sector:
Participation by sector: Farm Off-farm Urban
No work 0.05
Farm only 0.44 174
Local Off-farm only 0.11 287
Urban only 0.17 291
Farm + Local Off-farm  0.16 81 181
Farm + Urban 0.06 50 225
Local Off-farm + Urban 0.00 95 176
All 3 0.01 66 78 116
Panel (B)
Panel (A)
Tables 
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Table 4.2 - Descriptive statistics: households   
 
Note. The sample includes all households with more than one individual in working age who reported 
full labour supply information in each of the three survey years, resulting in a balanced panel of 3,713 
households (i.e. 11,139 observations).  
Source: 2009, 2010 and 2011 RUMiC-RHS Survey. 
 
 
 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Household size 4.0 1.2 2 10
HH members in the work force 2.9 1.0 1 7
Participation by sector:
Farm 0.86 0.35 0 1
Local Off-farm  0.48 0.50 0 1
Urban 0.39 0.49 0 1
Any 0.99 0.10 0 1
Days of work by sector (as 
share of household's total):
Farm 0.47 0.38 0 1
Local Off-farm 0.29 0.38 0 1
Urban 0.24 0.33 0 1
Mean Fraction of total days of work:
Participation by sector: Farm Off-farm Urban
No work 0.01
Farm only 0.25 1.00
Local Off-farm only 0.09 1.00
Urban only 0.04 1.00
Farm + Local Off-farm  0.26 0.38 0.62
Farm + Urban 0.22 0.37 0.63
Local Off-farm + Urban 0.01 0.52 0.48
All 3 0.12 0.27 0.29 0.45
Panel (A)
Panel (B)
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Table 4.3 - Labour supply responses: days of work  
 
Note. The table reports OLS estimates from individual level regressions of the number of days devoted 
to working in different sectors on Zscore_Rain and controls, as well as individual fixed effects. 
Zscore_Rain is the annual rainfall deviation from the county long-term average normalised by its 
standard deviation. Individual and household time-varying controls include marital status, number of 
family members respectively aged less than 16, in the work force and older than 65, sex ratio of family 
members in working age. In Panel B the same analysis is replicated separately for males and females.  
Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level (82 counties) and reported in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
  
Outcome -                          
Yearly days of work:
Zscore Rain
In % of mean outcome 
Observations
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zscore Rain 3.053** 4.497*** 1.898 1.504 -5.564*** -1.678** -0.613 4.324***
(1.213) (1.240) (1.292) (1.087) (1.081) (0.766) (1.267) (1.420)
Mean of outcome 89 98 73 47 81 47 243 192
Observations 24,748 23,466 24,748 23,466 24,748 23,466 24,748 23,466
Individual and HH contr. X X X X X X X X
Individual fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Farm  Local Off-Farm  Urban Any 
(1.163) (1.095) (0.805) (1.234)
4.0% 2.8% 5.7% 0.8%
Panel (A)
Panel (B): by gender
48,214 48,214 48,214 48,214
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3.767*** 1.697 -3.649*** 1.815
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Table 4.4 - Labour supply responses: participation 
 
The table reports estimates from a linear probability model of an indicator for the individual working 
positive number of days in different sectors (participation) on Zscore_Rain and controls, as well as 
individual fixed effects. Zscore_Rain is the annual rainfall deviation from the county long-term 
average normalised by its standard deviation. Individual and household time-varying controls include 
marital status, number of family members respectively aged less than 16, in the work force and older 
than 65, sex ratio of family members in working age. In Panel B the same analysis is replicated 
separately for males and females. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level (82 counties) 
and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
Outcome - Participation:
Zscore Rain
In % of mean outcome 
Observations
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zscore Rain 0.002 0.010** 0.011* 0.010* -0.015*** -0.004 0.000 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of outcome 0.65 0.69 0.34 0.21 0.31 0.18 0.97 0.93
Observations 24,748 23,466 24,748 23,466 24,748 23,466 24,748 23,466
Individual and HH contr. X X X X X X X X
Individual fixed effects X X X X X X X X
Farm Local Off-Farm Urban Any 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.0020.006
Panel (A)
0.010** -0.009***
48,214 48,214 48,214
0.9% 3.6% 3.7%
(0.003)
Panel (B): by gender
48,214
(0.004) (0.003)
0.2%
(0.005)
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 Table 4.5 - Labour supply responses: days of work conditional on participation 
 
Note. The table reports OLS estimates from regressions of the number of days devoted to working in 
different sectors on Zscore_Rain and controls, as well as individual fixed effects. Zscore_Rain is the 
annual rainfall deviation from the county long-term average normalised by its standard deviation. 
Individual and household time-varying controls include marital status, number of family members 
respectively aged less than 16, in the work force and older than 65, sex ratio of family members in 
working age. In Panel B, for each column, the sample is restricted to those observations with positive 
days of work in the specific sector. In order to allow the estimation of individual fixed effect, only 
individuals who have contributed to the sector a positive number of days for at least 2 years are 
included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level (82 counties) and reported in 
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
 
Farm Off-Farm Urban Any 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zscore Rain 3.767*** 1.697 -3.649*** 1.815
(1.163) (1.095) (0.805) (1.234)
Observations 48,214 48,214 48,214 48,214
Zscore Rain 3.068** -3.427** -2.938** 1.249
(1.438) (1.460) (1.402) (1.013)
Observations 32,380 13,523 11,742 45,735
Individual and HH controls X X X X
Individual fixed effects X X X X
Panel (A): Unconditional (baseline)
Panel (B): Conditional on days>0 
Outcome -                   
Yearly days of work:
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Table 4.6 - Household level labour supply responses 
 
Note. The table explores the effect of weather shocks on household labour supply. In columns 1-4 the outcome are days of work divided by the number of household members 
in the estimating sample; in columns 5-6 the outcome are the shares of total household days of work in different sectors; in columns 8-9 estimate derive from a LPM where the 
outcome are indicators of the household participating in different sectors. Zscore_Rain is the annual rainfall deviation from the county long-term average normalised by its 
standard deviation. Household time-varying controls include number of family members respectively aged less than 16, in the work force and older than 65, sex ratio of family 
members in working age. Household fixed effects are included in all regressions. The sample includes all households with more than one individual in working age who 
reported full labour supply information in each of the three survey years, resulting in a balanced panel of 3,713 households (i.e. 11,139 observations). Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the county level (82 counties) and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
 
 
 
Farm Off-Farm Urban Any Farm Off-Farm Urban Farm Off-Farm Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Zscore Rain 3.737** 1.373 -3.408*** 1.702 0.012** 0.001 -0.013*** -0.002 0.006 -0.012**
(1.462) (1.382) (0.820) (1.501) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
In % of mean outcome 4.0% 2.0% 6.2% 0.8% 2.6% 0.3% 5.4% 0.2% 1.3% 3.1%
Observations 11,139 11,139 11,139 11,139 11,034 11,034 11,034 11,139 11,139 11,139
 HH controls X X X X X X X X X X
HH fixed effects X X X X X X X X X X
ParticipationDays of work by HH member Share of total HH days of work
Table 4.7 - Land tenure insecurity  
 
Note. The table reports estimates from individual level regressions of the number of days devoted to 
farming (column 1) and rural-urban migration (column 2) on ZSCORE, LOWRISK, an interaction 
between the two (ZSCORE*LOWRISK) and controls, as well as individual fixed effects. LOWRISK is 
an indicator variable for the low risk that a reallocation will take place in a particular village. Individual 
and household time-varying controls include marital status, number of family members respectively 
aged less than 16, in the work force and older than 65, sex ratio of family members in working age. The 
table reports coefficients for individuals living, respectively, in high and low risk of reallocation 
villages. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level (82 counties) and reported in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
  
Outcome: days of work Farming Migration
(1) (2)
Rain shock * high reallocation risk 8.859*** -1.788
(1.350) (1.599)
Rain shock * low reallocation risk 3.316*** -3.602***
(0.437) (0.517)
Individual controls X X
Household controls X X
Individual fixed effects X X
Observations 43,655 43,655
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Appendix Tables  
 
Table A 4.1 - Robustness of individual level estimates  
 
Note. The table tests the robustness of baseline estimates to the sample of individuals used to construct 
the household level outcomes data, i.e individuals who have reported labour supply data for all 3 years 
and who are not the only ones in their households. Panel (A) should be compared to the same panel in 
Table 4.3; Panel (B) should be compared to the same panel in Table 4.4. Individual and household time-
varying controls include marital status, number of family members respectively aged less than 16, in the 
work force and older than 65, sex ratio of family members in working age. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the county level (82 counties) and reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
 
  
Farm Off-Farm Urban Any 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zscore Rain 3.600** 1.572 -3.633*** 1.540
(1.488) (1.351) (0.876) (1.505)
Zscore Rain 0.005 0.011* -0.009*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 28,692 28,692 28,692 28,692
Individual and HH controls X X X X
Individual fixed effects X X X X
Panel (A) - Outcome: days per year 
Panel (B) - Outcome: participation 
Appendix 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
     
5.    Concluding Remarks 
This thesis addresses questions in applied microeconomics within two topic areas: the first is 
the role of news media in shaping perceptions and political outcomes (chapter 2); the second is 
household and individual decision making about internal migration and labour allocation in 
developing country settings (chapters 3 and 4).   
The second chapter (based on joint work with Nicola Mastrorocco) investigates the influence 
of news media, and in particular partisan ones, on crime perceptions and voting behaviour. To 
do so, we exploit a natural experiment in the Italian television market where the staggered 
introduction of the digital TV signal across regions led to a drastic and sudden drop in the 
viewing shares of partisan channels and, as a consequence, to a lower exposure to potentially 
biased news about crime. We find that the lower exposure to partisan news channels led 
individuals to revise their perceptions about crime as one of the priority problem in Italy 
downward. The effect is mainly driven by individuals from older cohorts who are likely to be 
more exposed to the potential bias before the digital introduction and to place a higher weight 
on information coming from television. Findings suggest that the digital reform induced a 
reduction in exposure to crime news of about 12 percent of the average value and that a 1 
standard deviation decrease in exposure to crime news is associated with a 9.2 percent 
decrease in crime concern, among those aged above 65. Finally, using data from an electoral 
survey collected just before the introduction of digital TV, we predict that the reduction in 
crime concern caused by the digital reform might induce about 3% of those aged above 65 
who voted for the centre-right coalition to change their vote. Our findings contribute to shed 
light on one of the possible mechanisms through which media manage to influence voting 
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decision and policies: the manipulation of individuals’ perceptions with respect to politically 
salient topics. On the one hand we observe that manipulating people’s perceptions is more 
difficult when individuals acquire information from a variety of sources. On the other hand 
individuals for whom we find a significant effect, those aged above age 52, make up about 30 
percent of Italian voting population. Hence, for an office-seeking politician, being able to 
influence their beliefs about politically salient issues might have relevant implications in terms 
of voting outcomes. Media are nowadays a pervasive presence in people’s lives and the 
increasing availability of data about them provides unique opportunity to further explore the 
mechanisms through which they impact on economic decisions and outcomes. Interesting 
future areas of research include: studying the effect of the digital TV introduction on voting, 
political participation and other outcomes; exploring the supply of persuasive communication, 
i.e. the incentives driving the selective provision of information by partisan media. 
The third chapter (based on joint work with Christian Dustmann, Francesco Fasani and Xin 
Meng) studies the relation between household migration decisions and the distribution of risk 
attitudes within a household. To do so we build and test a theoretical framework of household 
migration decisions where household members differ in their preference toward risk. Our 
findings suggest: (i) that conditional on migration gains, less risk averse individuals are more 
likely to migrate; (ii) that within households, the least risk averse individual is more likely to 
emigrate; and (iii) that across households, the most risk averse households are more likely to 
send migrants as long as they have at least one family member with sufficiently low risk 
aversion. The paper provides strong evidence not only that, in the context of internal migration 
in China, migration decisions are taken at the household level, but that heterogeneity in risk 
aversion within the household plays an important part in determining whether a migration 
takes place, who emigrates, and which households send migrants. The insight that migration 
decisions, in the context that we analyse, but also likely in other settings, are taken at 
household level, and are influenced by risk attitudes of other household members has 
important policy implications. For instance, the implementation of a policy that creates 
possibilities to insure against risk – such as the introduction of social safety net schemes - will 
possibly increase migrations if decisions are taken on an individual level. When the migration 
decision is taken at the household level, however, this may work in the opposite direction 
because it allows risk averse household members to diversify risk in other ways. Finally, it 
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would be possible and interesting to apply our model with heterogeneous preferences to other 
household decisions that embody uncertainty, such as investment in risky assets, or even 
human capital investments. 
The fourth chapter analyses if and in what measure individuals and households in rural China 
reallocate labour across sectors as an ex-post response to agricultural productivity shocks. I 
employ various waves of a longitudinal survey of rural households to construct a panel of 
individual and household labour supply histories, and match them to detailed weather 
information, which I use to proxy agricultural productivity. Results suggest that farming is 
reduced by 4% while urban sector employment is increased by almost 6% in correspondence 
to mild negative rainfall shocks, i.e. rainfall realisation 1 standard deviation below the long 
term average. Individuals increase the number of days spent working in the city along both the 
participation and the intensive margin. While younger individuals tend to shift labour supply 
from farming toward working in the city, older ones generally shift labour from farming 
toward local off-farm work, without leaving the home village. Finally, I find that the elasticity 
of rural-urban migration to agricultural productivity in villages with high risk of land 
reallocation is about half the size of that in other villages. Findings confirm previous studies in 
suggesting that providing more secure land property rights could increase efficiency of rural 
labour markets and allow households to better cope with negative income shocks. China is a 
fascinating country for the study of migration processes. The many institutional changes that 
are taking place could allow to answer many other questions such as: how the relaxation of 
different constraint to internal migration – such as more secure land property right or less 
stringent houku residence system – affect internal movement. Finally, the multiple impacts that 
parental migration has on the wellbeing of left-behind children in another topic of great policy 
relevance and that certainly needs to be more deeply researched.  
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